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ABSTRACT
Th i s  d i s s e r t a t i o n  exami nes t he e f f e c t s  o f  l oan and 
d e p o s i t  q u a n t i t y  u n c e r t a i n t y  and r i s k  a v e r s i o n  on:  1) t he 
spread between the r i s k  ave r se  l oan and d e p o s i t  r a t e s ,  and 
2) t he b e h a v i o r  o f  t he i n t e r m e d i a r y  i n t he Feder a l  f unds  
mar ke t .  The i n t e r m e d i a r y ' s  ma j o r  f u n c t i o n  i s  t o  p r o v i d e  
t r a n s a c t i o n  and l i q u i d i t y  s e r v i c e s  t o  i t s  c u s t o m e r s .  
Theor e t i ca l  r e s u l t s  i nd i c a t e  t h a t  qua n t i t y  u nc e r t a i n t y  f rom 
e i t h e r  l oans or  depos i t s  reduces the spread to a l e v e l  below 
t ha t  of  a p r o f i t  maximizi ng i n t er medi ar y .  The pure e f f e c t s  
o f  q u a n t i t y  u n c e r t a i n t y  on t he i n t e r m e d i a r y ' s  spread are 
c ons i s t e n t  and mu t u a l l y  r e i n f o r c i n g  r egar d l ess  o f  whether  
u n c e r t a i n t y  comes f rom l oans  or  d e p o s i t s .  Compar a t i ve  
s t a t i c s  r e s u l t s  r evea l  t ha t ,  under decreasing abso l u t e  r i s k  
aver s i on ,  the management of  the spread may be s i g n i f i c a n t l y  
d i f f e r e n t  t han i t  i s  under  r i s k  n e u t r a l i t y .  The model ' s  
r e s u l t s  i m p l y  t h a t  d e p o s i t  v a r i a b i l i t y  i s  an i n c r e a s i n g  
f u n c t i o n  o f  s i z e  and o f  t he degree o f  l i q u i d i t y  i n  the 
i n t e r med i a r y ' s  asset  p o r t f o l i o .  On the ot her  hand, depos i t  
v a r i a b i l i t y  appears to have no e f f e c t  on the i n t e r med i a r y ' s  
l oan rate.  The r e s u l t s  presented in t h i s  d i s s e r t a t i o n  have 
a number of  i m p o r t a n t  i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  s e v e r a l  aspec t s  of  
the t heory of  depos i t o r y  f i n a n c i a l  in termedi  a r i es .
V l l
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Chapter  1 
INTRODUCTION
Corporate f i n a n c i a l  t heory  has l ong been recogni zed as 
i n a p p l i c a b l e  to the model i ng of  depos i t o r y  i n t e r med i a r i es . ^  
Th i s  n o t i o n  stems f r om t he assumpt i on  o f  p e r f e c t  c a p i t a l  
mar ke t s  wh i ch u n d e r l i e s  most  o f  t he c o r p o r a t e  f i n a n c i a l  
t h e o r y .  Yet ,  f o r  t he most  p a r t ,  d e p o s i t o r y  f i n a n c i a l  
i n t e r m e d i a r i e s  are known t o o p e r a t e  i n  i m p e r f e c t  c a p i t a l  
markets.  In such markets,  the appr opr i a t e  mode of  behav i or  
i s  t h a t  o f  r a t e  s e t t i n g  i n  most  asse t s  and l i a b i l i t i e s  of  
t hese i n s t i t u t i o n s .  E s s e n t i a l l y ,  r a t e  s e t t i n g  c r e a t e s  a 
l i q u i d i t y  problem f o r  depos i t o r y  i n t e r med i a r i es .  They must 
f a c e  u n c e r t a i n t y  as t o  t he  q u a n t i t i e s  o f  a s s e t s  and 
l i a b i l i t i e s  t hey w i l l  have on t h e i r  bal ance sheets expost .  
In l i g h t  o f  t h i s  f a c t ,  q u a n t i t y  v a r i a b i l i t y  i s  c e r t a i n l y  
more i m p o r t a n t  t o  d e p o s i t o r y  i n s t i t u t i o n s  t h a n  r a t e  
v a r i a b i l i t y .
U n t i l  now, t he t h e o r y  of  d e p o s i t o r y  f i n a n c i a l  i n t e r ­
medi ar i es  has not  been successf ul  in r e s o l v i n g  the problem 
of  q u a n t i t y  u n c e r t a i n t y  i n depos i t o r y  i n s t i t u t i o n s .  Models 
of  the i n t e r med i a r y  behav i o r  have g e n e r a l l y  f o l l o w e d  e i t h e r  
a p o r t f o l i o  t h e o r y  or  a f i r m - t h e o r e t i c  approach.  Whereas 
p o r t f o l i o  models of  the i n t e r med i a r y  cannot  deal  w i t h  the
^C. W. Sealey,  Jr . ,  " Va l ua t i on ,  Cap i t a l  St r uc t u r e ,  
and Sharehol der  Unani mi t y f o r  Depos i t or y  F i nanc i a l  I n t erme­
d i a r i e s , "  Journal  of  Fi nance,  38:857-71.  June, 1983.
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l i q u i d i t y  p r ob l em o f  t hese i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  f i r m - t h e o r e t i c  
mode l s  have m a i n l y  been r e s t r i c t e d  t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n  of  
l i n e a r  r i s k  pref erences .
Sea l e y  2 ^ a s t h e  f i r s t  t o  c o n s i d e r  r a t e  s e t t i n g ,  
u n c e r t a i n t y ,  and r i s k  aver s i on  s i mu l t an eous l y  i n a model of  
a d e p o s i t o r y  i n t e r m e d i a r y .  His model  i n c o r p o r a t e d  r a t e -  
s e t t i n g  on depos i t s  w h i l e  assuming q u a n t i t y  s e t t i n g  i n the 
l o a n  mar ke t .  A l t h o u g h  t he assumpt i on  o f  a p e r f e c t l y  
c o mp e t i t i v e  l oan market  i s d e f e n s i b l e ,  some r ecent  emp i r i ca l  
e v i d e n c e ^  s ugg es t s  t h a t  l o an  mar k e t s  are c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by 
i m p e r f e c t  c o m p e t i t i o n ,  and r a t e  s e t t i n g  b e h a v i o r  i s  
p r ev a l en t .
Th i s  d i s s e r t a t i o n  w i l l  s y s t e m a t i c a l l y  e x p l o r e  the
s i m u l t a n e o u s  l o an  and d e p o s i t  r a t e - s e t t i n g  b e h a v i o r  of
depos i t o r y  f i n a n c i a l  i n t e r me d i a r i e s  under  a l t e r n a t i v e  r i s k  
p r e f e r e n c e s .  In essence,  t he model  d e p i c t e d  here assumes 
t h a t  the i n s t i t u t i o n ' s  management acts as a "spread manager" 
o p e r a t i n g  to max i mi ze  t he ex pec t ed  u t i l i t y  o f  p r o f i t s  on 
be h a l f  of  the owners.
The s t r u c t u r e  o f  t he model  i s  r e l a t i v e l y  s i m p l e  and 
a b s t r a c t .  I t  assumes a b a l a n c e  shee t  c o n s t r a i n t  of  l o a n s ,
depos i t s ,  and Federal  funds purchased and sol d.  The
^ C. W. S e a l e y ,  J r .  " D e p o s i t  R a t e - S e t t i n g ,  R i s k  
Aver s i on ,  and the Theory o f  Depos i t or y  F i nanc i a l  I n t e r med i ­
a r i e s , "  Journal  of  F i nance, 35:1139-54.  December, 1980.
3See Myron B. SI ov i n and Mar i e Sushka, "A Model of  the
Commerci al  Loan Ra t e , "  J o u r n a l o f  F i n a n c e , 3 8:1 5 83 - 96.
December, 1983.
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i n t e r m e d i a r y ' s  management  i s  an a c t i v e  p a r t i c i p a n t  i n the 
market  f o r  Federal  funds usi ng t h i s  market  t o make balance 
s hee t  a d j u s t me n t s  r e s u l t i n g  f r om u n c e r t a i n t y  i n l oans  and 
d e p o s i t s .  Thus,  t he mechanism used by the i n s t i t u t i o n  in 
d e a l i n g  w i t h  q u a n t i t y  u n c e r t a i n t y  depends e n t i r e l y  on the 
ex i s t ence  of  a p e r f e c t l y  c ompe t i t i v e  Federal  funds market .  
Th i s  v i ew i s c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  a renewed emphasi s on market s  
f o r  i mmedi at e l y  a v a i l a b l e  l i q u i d  funds.
The r e s u l t s  i n d i c a t e  t ha t  q ua n t i t y  u n c e r t a i n t y  i n the 
i n t e r m e d i a r y ' s  b a l a n c e  shee t  and r i s k  a v e r s i o n  g e n e r a l l y  
t end to r educe t he s i z e  o f  t he i n t e r m e d i a r y ' s  spr ead.  The 
t h e o r e t i c a l  r e s u l t s  suppor t  the con t en t i on  t h a t  depos i t o r y  
i n t e r m e d i a r i e s  are h i g h l y  r i s k  a v e r s e ,  and w i l l i n g  to 
s a c r i f i c e  p r o f i t s  f o r  reduced r i s k s .
C o m p a r a t i v e  s t a t i c s  d e v e l o p e d  i n  t h e  d i s c u s s i o n  
d emons t r a t e  t h a t  t he degree o f  r i s k  a v e r s i o n  ( a b s o l u t e  
sense)  i s  a c r i t i c a l  d e t e r m i n a n t  o f  t he b e h a v i o r  o f  the 
i n t e r m e d i a r y ' s  spr ead i n  r esponse to changes i n  t he cos t  
parameters of  the model .
These r e s u l t s  have i mpor t an t  i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  severa l  
aspects of  the theory of  depos i t o r y  i n t e r med i a r i es .
Chapter  2 rev i ews a l t e r n a t i v e  approaches used to model 
the depos i t o r y  i n t e r med i a r y .  Chapter  3 present s  the s t r u c ­
ture of  the model ,  i t s  s o l u t i o n ,  and the comparat i ve s t a t i c s  
r e s u l t s .  F i n a l l y ,  c h a p t e r  4 d e t a i l s  t he i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  
the t heory of  depos i t o r y  i n t e r med i a r i es .
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
C h a p t e r  2
REVIEW OF ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO THE THEORY OF 
DEPOSITORY FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES
This chapter  synt hes i zes the var i ous  approaches used to 
model  and e x p l a i n  t he b e h a v i o r  o f  d e p o s i t o r y  f i n a n c i a l  
i n t e r me d i a r i e s . !  In r ecent  t imes,  a s ubs t an t i a l  amount of  
l i t e r a t u r e  has emerged aimed a t  d e v e l o p i n g  a t h e o r e t i c a l  
f ramework app r op r i a t e  f o r  model i ng the process of  f i n a n c i a l  
i n t e r m e d i a t i o n .  Thus f a r ,  t h i s  l i t e r a t u r e  remai ns i n  a 
f ragmented and heterogeneous s t a t e .  A gr ea t  deal  of  con t r o ­
v e r s y  e x i s t s  o v e r  t he t ype of  f r amewor k  i n  wh i ch to model  
the macroeconomic process of  f i n a n c i a l  i n t e r med i a t i on .  This 
c o n t r o v e r s y  has l e d  some a u t h o r s  to q u e s t i o n  the mere 
ex i s t ence of  f i n a n c i a l  i n t e r med i a r i es  as v i a b l e  f i r ms  in the 
f i n a n c i a l  m a r k e t s . 2 At  t he mi c r oeconomi c  l e v e l ,  the 
p u b l i s h e d  l i t e r a t u r e  has o f f e r e d  a m u l t i t u d e  o f  model s of  
the i n t e r med i a r y  based on severa l  compet ing approaches.
The l a r g e s t  p o r t i o n  o f  t he e x i s t i n g  l i t e r a t u r e  on 
f i n a n c i a l  i n t e r m e d i a r i e s  has c o n c e n t r a t e d  on s p e c i f i c  
p r o b l e m s  o f  a s s e t  s e l e c t i o n .  For  t h e  mos t  p a r t ,  t he
^ H e r e i n a f t e r ,  the t erms " i n t e r m e d i a r y " ,  " f i n a n c i a l  
i n t e r med i a r y " ,  and " i n s t i t u t i o n "  w i l l  be used to r e f e r  onl y  
to a depos i t o r y  f i n a n c i a l  i n t er medi ar y .
2 S e e  John J. P r i n g l e ,  "The I m p e r f e c t - M a r k e t s  Model  of  
Commercial  Bank F i nanc i a l  Management, " Journal  of  F i nanc i a l  
and Q u a n t i t a t i v e  Ana l ys i s ,  9:69-87,  January,  1974.
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emphasis has been on i ssues p e r t a i n i n g  to the management of  
l i q u i d i t y  and r e s e r v e s  by commerc i a l  banks. ^  Wi t h few 
e x c e p t i o n s ,  most  mi c r oeconomi c  model s  o f  t he i n t e r m e d i a r y  
have been o f  p a r t i a l  e q u i l i b r i u m  in n a t u r e  and have d e a l t  
e x c l u s i v e l y  wi t h  the s e l e c t i o n  of  the i n t e r med i a r y ' s  assets 
wh i l e  assuming the s i ze and s t r u c t u r e  of  i t s  l i a b i l i t i e s  to 
be f i x e d  and exogenousl y gi ven.  However,  a s ma l l e r  segment 
of  the l i t e r a t u r e  on f i n a n c i a l  i n t e r me d i a r i e s  has focused on 
complete models of  the i n t e r med i a r y ;  models i n which a l l  the 
t r a d i t i o n a l  d e c i s i o n s  o f  t he f i r m  are c o n s i d e r e d . ^  In 
c o n t r a s t  to p o r t f o l i o  choi ce models,  complete models of  the 
i n t e r med i a r y ' s  behav i o r  address the j o i n t  de t e r mi na t i on  of  
a s s e t / l i a b i l i t y  s t r u c t u r e ,  t h e i r  i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p  i f  any, 
and the t o t a l  s i ze or scal e of  the i n t e r med i a r y .
Before proceedi ng wi t h  the exami nat i on of  a l t e r n a t i v e  
f r amewor k s ,  t he f i r s t  p a r t  o f  t h i s  c h a p t e r  w i l l  i n t r o d u c e  
some o f  t he n o t a t i o n  necessar y  i n  o r d e r  t o f a c i l i t a t e  
compar i son between models to be di scussed.
Not at i on
C u r r e n t l y ,  no s t a n d a r d  s e t  o f  symbol s  i s  used i n  the 
l i t e r a t u r e  d e a l i n g  w i t h  f i n a n c i a l  i n t e r m e d i a r i e s .
^See f o r  exampl e W i l l i a m  Poo l e ,  "Commerc i a l  Bank 
Reserve Management in an Uncer t a i n Wor l d;  I mp l i c a t i o n s  f o r  
Monet a r y  P o l i c y , "  J ou r n a l  o f  Fi nance,  23:769-91,  December, 
1968.
^ F 0 r a r e v i e w  o f  t h i s  l i t e r a t u r e  see E r n s t  
Ba1 t ensperger ,  " A l t e r n a t i v e  Approaches to the Theory of  the
Bank i ng F i r m, "  J o u r n a l o_f Mo n e t a r y  Economi cs , 6 : 1 - 37 ,
January,  1 980.
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N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  i t  i s  i m p o r t a n t  t o e s t a b l i s h  a t  t h i s  p o i n t  
some b a s i s  n o t a t i o n  system to be empl oyed t h r o u g h o u t  t h i s  
r ev i ew and in f or t hcomi ng chapters as w e l l .
The f o l l o w i n g  l i s t  d e f i n e s  t he  v a r i a b l e s  most  
f r e q u e n t l y  used i n  t he t e x t  ( a d d i t i o n a l  v a r i a b l e s  and 
symbols w i l l  be def i ned as needed):
D = depos i t s
L = loans
S = s e c u r i t i e s
R = reserves or  money market  bo r r owi ng / l end i ng
r = l oan r a t e  
rQ = depos i t  r a t e
r ^  = r i s k - f r e e  r at e
X = market  p r i c e  of  r i s k
n = p r o f i t s
U ( n )  = u t i l i t y  of  p r o f i t  f u n c t i o n
Var (n)  = var i ance of  p r o f i t
Cov = covar i ance
This r ev i ew w i l l  concent r a t e  on a l t e r n a t i v e  f rameworks 
used to f o r mu l a t e  complete models o f  t he i n t e r med i a r y .  The 
unde r l y i ng  assumpt ion here i s t h a t  most i mpor t an t  aspects of  
t he t h e o r y  o f  f i n a n c i a l  i n t e r m e d i a r i e s  are b es t  examined 
us i ng  c o mp l e t e  mode l s  o f  t hese f i r m s .  A c c o r d i n g l y ,  t h i s  
c h a p t e r  w i l l  p r oceed w i t h  a t h r e e - p a r t  r e v i e w  o f  t he 
d i f f e r e n t  f r amewor ks  used i n  t he l i t e r a t u r e  to model  t he 
behav i o r  of  depos i t o r y  i n t e r med i a r i es :  1) p o r t f o l i o  t heory
approach,  2) f i r m - t h e o r e t i c  approach,  3) ex t ens i ons  and
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r ecent  models of  the i n t e r med i a r y .
P o r t f o l i o  Theory Approach 
The p r i n c i p l e s  o f  p o r t f o l i o  s e l e c t i o n  d e v e l o p e d  by 
Ma r k o w i t z ^  and l a t e r  ex t ended by Tobin® have s e r v ed  as a 
f r amewor k  f o r  a number  o f  model s  o f  t he i n t e r m e d i a r y .  
Models using t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  f ramework view the i n t e r med i a r y  
as a r i s k  averse i n v e s t o r  a t t empt i ng  to s e l e c t  a p o r t f o l i o  
of  s e c u r i t i e s  i n  a way t h a t  max i mi zes  t he ex pec t ed  u t i l i t y  
of  the i n t e r med i a r y ' s  t e r mi na l  wea l t h . ^
The most  no t ab l e  p o r t f o l i o - b a s e d  model in the l i t e r a ­
t u r e ,  P y l e ' s ® ,  c o n c e n t r a t e d  on d e v e l o p i n g  a s e t  o f  
c o n d i t i o n s  under  wh i ch  t he p r ocess  o f  f i n a n c i a l  i n t e r m e ­
d i a t i o n  i s  more l i k e l y  t o t ake p l a c e .  Py l e  f ound t h a t  the 
i n c e n t i v e  f o r  f i n a n c i a l  i n t e r me d i a t i o n  to occur  i s  g r eat er  
(1) the s ma l l e r  the r i s k  premium on depos i t s  and the l a r ge r  
t he  r i s k  premium on l o a n s ,  (2)  t he g r e a t e r  t he p o s i t i v e  
dependence between l oan  and d e p o s i t  y i e l d s ,  and (3) t he 
l a r g e r  the standard d e v i a t i o n  of  depos i t  y i e l d s  and s ma l l e r
®Harry M. Markowi t z ,  " P o r t f o l i o  Se l e c t i o n , "  Journal  of  
F i nance, 7:77-91,  March,  1952.
®James Tobin,  " L i q u i d i t y  Preference as Behavi or  towards 
Ri sk , "  The Review of  Economic Studi es,  26:65-86,  February,  
1958.
^Since p o r t f o l i o  t heory does not  address the problem of  
l i a b i l i t i e s ,  they are s i mpl y  viewed as nega t i ve  p o s i t i o n s  on 
a s s e t s .
®David H. Py l e,  "On the Theory of  F i nanc i a l  I n t e r med i a ­
t i o n , "  Journal  of  Fi nance,  26:737-48,  June,  1971.
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t he s t a n d a r d  d e v i a t i o n  o f  l oan  } u e l d s .  Fu r t he r mo r e ,  he 
showed t h a t  t he a s s e t  and l i a b i l i t y  c h o i c es  o f  t he i n t e r ­
mediary are g e n e r a l l y  i n t er dependent .  In the con t ex t  of  hi s 
model ,  Pyl e concl uded t ha t  the degree of  c o r r e l a t i o n  between 
asset  and l i a b i l i t y  y i e l d s  i s the most  i mpor t ant  determi nant  
of  the process of  f i n a n c i a l  i n t e r med i a t i on .
Har t  and Ja f f ee9 pr ov i ded another  i mpor t an t  p o r t f o l i o -  
based model  o f  t he i n t e r m e d i a r y .  Usi ng a gene r a l  model  of  
t he i n t e r m e d i a r y  s u b j e c t  t o r e s e r v e  r e q u i r e m e n t s ,  t hey 
e s t a b l i s h e d  s e v e r a l  i m p o r t a n t  r e s u l t s .  They d e r i v e d  the 
ma t h e ma t i c a l  p r o p e r t i e s  o f  t he o p p o r t u n i t y  s e t  f o r  the 
i n t e r med i a r y  and demonst rated the ex i s t ence of  a separat i on 
theorem^O which di d not  r equ i r e  equal  bor rowi ng and l endi ng 
by t he i n s t i t u t i o n .  Wi t h r e s p e c t  t o t he o p p o r t u n i t y  se t ,  
they found the e f f i c i e n t  f r o n t i e r  to be a l i n e a r  f unc t i on  in 
t he ex pec t ed  va l u e - s t anda r d  d e v i a t i o n  space.  Both the 
compar at i ve  s t a t i c s  p r o p e r t i e s  as we l l  as the pr oof  of  the 
separ a t i on  theorem were found to be qu i t e  general  and onl y 
dependent  on the assumpt ion of  a zero net  wor th component of  
t o t a l  l i a b i l i t i e s  of  the i n t e r med i a r y .
^ O l i v e r  D. Har t  and Dwight  M. Ja f f ee ,  "On the Ap p l i c a ­
t i o n  o f  P o r t f o l i o  T h e o r y  to D e p o s i t o r y  F i n a n c i a l  
I n t e r me d i a r i e s , "  Review of  Economic S t u d i e s , 41:129-47,  
January,  1974.
l ^See John L i n t n e r ,  "The V a l u a t i o n  o f  Ri sk  Asset s  and 
the Se l ec t i o n  of  Ri sky I nvestments i n Stock P o r t f o l i o s  and 
Cap i t a l  Budgets, "  Review of  Economics and S t a t i s t i c s , 47:13- 
37, February,  1965, f o r  a f ormal  s t atement  of  the separat i on 
t heorem.
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With r espec t  to emp i r i ca l  s t ud i es ,  few have at tempted 
to t e s t  p o r t f o l i o - b a s e d  models of  the i n t e r med i a r y .  Parki n 
was t he f i r s t  to use a p o r t f o l i o  f r amework  t o examine
e m p i r i c a l l y  t he b e h a v i o r  o f  t he i n t e r m e d i a r y . i l  He f ound 
t h a t  a l a r g e  p o r t i o n  o f  t he changes i n  p o r t f o l i o  and debt  
account s  o f  d i s c o u n t  houses i n t he Un i t e d  Kingdom c o u l d  be 
e x p l a i n e d  i n  terms of  a s i mp l e  p o r t f o l i o  model  o f  t hese 
i n s t i t u t i  ons .
Ot her  e x i s t i n g  p o r t f o l i o  model s  o f  t he i n t e r m e d i a r y  
have been of  p a r t i a l  e q u i l i b r i u m  in nature.  As such,  t h e i r  
u s e f u l n e s s  has been l i m i t e d  t o the s t udy  o f  more s p e c i f i c  
asset  management problems.
Next  t o be r ev i ewed  i s  t he f o r m u l a t i o n  o f  p o r t f o l i o  
models of  the i n t e r med i ar y .  Major  assumpt ions r equ i r ed  w i l l  
be d e t a i l e d  f i r s t .  Th i s  d i s c u s s i o n  w i l l  be f o l l o w e d  by a 
s i mp l e  model  o f  t he i n t e r m e d i a r y  w i t h i n  t he c o n t e x t  of  
p o r t f o l i o  t heory f ramework.
A P o r t f o l i o  Model of  the I n t e rmedi ar y
In g e n e r a l ,  p o r t f o l i o  model s  o f  t he i n t e r m e d i a r y  
r e q u i r e  a number of  r e s t r i c t i v e  as s umpt i ons ;  (1)  a s i n g l e  
d e c i s i o n  p e r i o d ,  (2) r i s k  a v e r s i o n ,  (3) p e r f e c t l y  c o m p e t i ­
t i v e  c a p i t a l  mar ke t s ,  (4)  e x i s t e n c e  o f  r i s k l e s s  s e c u r i t y ,  
(5)  b o r r ow i ng  and l e n d i n g  at  t he r i s k l e s s  r a t e  by a l l  
economi c u n i t s ,  and (6)  management  o f  t he i n t e r m e d i a r y
 ^  ^M. P a r k i n ,  " D i s c o u n t  House P o r t f o l i o  and Debt  
Se l ec t i o n , "  Review of  Economic St ud i es , 37:469-97,  October ,  
1970.
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ac t i ng  In the best  i n t e r e s t s  o f  shar ehol ders .  A d d i t i o n a l l y ,  
p o r t f o l i o - b a s e d  models d i s r egar d  the ex i s t ence of  resource 
cost s or  so l vency  c ons i de r a t i ons  at tached to the management 
of  the i n t e r med i a r y ' s  assets and l i a b i l i t i e s .
These assumpt ions have sever a l  i mp l i c a t i o n s .  Of p a r t i ­
c u l a r  i n t e r e s t  i s  the way in whi ch these r e s t r i c t i o n s  have 
u s u a l l y  been i n c o r p o r a t e d  i n t o  model s  o f  t he f i n a n c i a l  
i n t e r m e d i a r y .  Assumpt i on (2) ,  f o r  exampl e ,  r e s t r i c t s  t he 
form and p r o p e r t i e s  of  the u t i l i t y  f unc t i on  being maximized 
by t he i n t e r m e d i a r y  to t hose t h a t  are s t r i c t l y  concave in 
p r o f i t s .  Mor eov e r ,  t he assumpt i on  i m p l i e s  t h a t  s h a r e ­
h o l d e r s '  p r e f e r e n c e s  can be c o m p l e t e l y  s p e c i f i e d  by 
i n d i f f e r e n c e  curves def i ned s o l e l y  i n terms of  the f i r s t  two 
moments of  the d i s t r i b u t i o n  of  r e t u r ns  f rom a l l  p o r t f o l i o s  
of  s e c u r i t i e s  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  i nvestment .
A s s u m p t i o n  (3)  i s  p e r h a p s  t he  mos t  r e s t r i c t i v e  
assumpt ion r equ i r ed  by p o r t f o l i o  models of  the i n t er medi ar y .  
Wi th p e r f e c t l y  c ompe t i t i ve  c a p i t a l  markets,  the i n t e r med i ar y  
faces p e r f e c t l y  e l a s t i c  demand and suppl y f unc t i ons  f o r  i t s  
as s e t s  and l i a b i l i t i e s .  The i n t e r m e d i a r y  t hus behaves 
e s s e n t i a l l y  as a q u a n t i t y  s e t t e r  s e l e c t i n g  t he d e s i r e d  
q u a n t i t i e s  of  the assets and l i a b i l i t i e s  i t  wishes to hol d 
on t he bases o f  ex pec t ed  mar ke t  p r i c e s  and y i e l d s  on t hese 
s e c u r i t i e s .  Wi t h q u a n t i t y  s e t t i n g  as t he a p p r o p r i a t e  
behav i o r a l  mode, u n c e r t a i n t y  i s  assumed to ent er  i n t o  these 
model s  v i a  random r a t e s  o f  r e t u r n  or  random y i e l d s  on the 
s e c u r i t i e s  he l d  by the i n s t i t u t i o n  at  the s t a r t  of  i t s
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dec i s i on  per i od.  Two f a c t o r s  presumabl y c o n t r i b u t e  to r a t e  
u n c e r t a i n t y .  F i r s t ,  the i n a b i l i t y  of  t hese i n s t i t u t i o n s  to 
match p e r f e c t l y  the m a t u r i t i e s  of  t h e i r  asset  and l i a b i l i t y  
p o r t f o l i o s  w i t h  t he l e n g t h  o f  t h e i r  d e c i s i o n  o r  h o l d i n g  
per i od.  The second f a c t o r  i s r e l a t e d  to the p o s s i b i l i t y  of  
d e f a u l t  on t he i n t e r m e d i a r y ' s  a s s e t  p o r t f o l i o  and t o  t he 
renewal  cos t  of  matur i ng l i a b i l i t i e s .  Gene r a l l y ,  f o r  most 
i n t e r me d i a r i e s ,  t he m a t u r i t y  s t r u c t u r e  of  t h e i r  l i a b i l i t i e s  
i s l e s s  than t h a t  of  t h e i r  asset  p o r t f o l i o  and a l l  p o r t f o l i o  
mode l s  o f  t he i n t e r m e d i a r y  have been d e v e l o p e d  w i t h i n  a 
s i n g l e  per i od  f ramework.
Gi ven t he as s ump t i o ns  p r e v i o u s l y  l i s t e d ,  a s i mp l e  
p o r t f o l i o  model  of  the i n t e r med i a r y  w i l l  now be descr i bed.
Co ns i d e r  a d e p o s i t o r y  i n t e r m e d i a r y  w i t h  two as se t s  to 
choose f rom at  the s t a r t  of  i t s  dec i s i on  per i od:  l oans (L)
and U.S. Government  s e c u r i t i e s  (S). On the l i a b i l i t y  si de,  
the i n t e r med i a r y  can i ssue one type of  c l a i m:  depos i t s  (D).
The bal ance sheet  i d e n t i t y  i s g i ven by
L + S = D (2-1)
wi t h  L, S, and D t raded i n p e r f e c t l y  c omp e t i t i v e  markets.
The i n t e r med i a r y ' s  p r o f i t  f u n c t i o n ,  n i s g i ven by
n = r ^  L + r f S - r^D (2-2)
where r[_, r ^  and r g are the r a t es  of  r e t u r n  on l oans,  
s e c u r i t i e s ,  and depos i t s  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  I t  i s  assumed t ha t  
r a n d  r ^  are exogenous and s t oc h a s t i c .  The r a t e  of  r e t u r n
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on s e c u r i t i e s ,  r ^ ,  i s  known wi t h  c e r t a i n t y  and equal  to the 
r i s k - f r e e  rate of  r e t u r n .
The i n t e r med i a r y ' s  probl em amounts to the s e l e c t i o n  of  
a p o r t f o l i o  of  l oans ,  s e c u r i t i e s ,  and depos i t s  i n a way t ha t  
maximizes the u t i l i t y  of  the i n s t i t u t i o n .  Thi s o p t i m i z a t i o n  
probl em can be s t a t ed  as f o l l o w s :
maximize U(i f ,  Va r ( n ) )  (2-3)
L,S,D
sub j ec t  to L + S = D
L > 0, S > 0, D> 0 ,
where U(n , Var (n) )  i s a s i n g l e  per i od u t i l i t y  f unc t i on  
d e f i n e d  i n t erms o f  t he mean (H) and v a r i a n c e  ( Va r ( n ) )  of  
p r o f i t .  I t  w i l l  be assumed t ha t  U(n, Var (n) )  has p r ope r t i es  
c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  i n c r e a s i n g  ma r g i n a l  u t i l i t y ,  U' > 0, and 
r i s k  a v e r s i o n  U" < 0.
The mean and v a r i a n c e  of  p r o f i t  are g i v e n  by
n = r - rgD + r^S (2-4)
Var (n)  = Var ( r g )  + Var ( rg )  + 2DL Cov( r | _, rg) ,  (2-5)  
where r i  and rg are t he ex pec t ed  r a t e s  o f  r e t u r n  on l oans  
and d e p o s i t s ;  V a r ( r g ) ,  V a r ( r g ) ,  and Cov ( r g ,  r g )  are the 
var i ances  of  rg,  rg,  and the covar i ance between r g and rg.
Ne x t ,  c o n s i d e r  one p a r t i c u l a r  s o l u t i o n  t o  t he 
o p t i m i z a t i o n  p r o b l e m  g i v e n  by ( 2 - 3 ) .  In p a r t i c u l a r ,  
cons i der  Park i n ' s^^  assumpt ion wi t h  r espec t  to the u t i l i t y
I Z p a r k i n ,  op. c i t . ,  pp. 471-73.
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f un c t i o n  being maximized by the i n t e r med i ar y .  Parki n assumed 
n to be n o r m a l l y  d i s t r i b u t e d  and U(II) t o be g i v e n  by
U ( n )  = a - b [ exp ( - o i l ) ] ,  ( 2 - 6 )
where a, b and o are parameters and b > 0, o > 0.
L i n t n e r 13 has shown t h a t  i f  p r o f i t s  are n o r m a l l y  
d i s t r i b u t e d ,  max i mi z i ng  t he expec t ed  v a l u e  o f  ( 2-6)  i s  
e q u i v a l e n t  to maximi z i ng the c e r t a i n t y  e q u i v a l e n t  of  random 
p r o f i t , n  , g i ven by
n = 1  - | V a r ( n ) .  (2-7)
Thus, the problem gi ven by (2-3)  can be r e w r i t t e n  as
maxi mi ze Ï Î  - 0-Var(n)  (2-8)
L,D,S 2
sub j ec t  to L + S = D
L > 0, S > 0, D > 0.
Using the d e f i n i t i o n s  o f  n and Var( l i )  g i ven by (2-4)  and (2- 
5),  and i n c o r p o r a t i n g  the bal ance sheet  c o n s t r a i n t  i n t o  (2- 
8),  the f o l l o w i n g  unconst ra i ned problem i s obt ai ned:
V a r ( r o )  + 2DL C o v ( r L , r Q ) ]  . ( 2 - 9 )
ma x i mi z e  r|_L - r^ D  + r f ( D  -  L)  -  “ [L'^ V a r ( r L )  + 
L , D
. 2
13John L i n t n e r ,  "The I mpact  o f  U n c e r t a i n t y  on the 
T r a d i t i o n a l  Theory o f  the F i rm:  P r i c e - S e t t i n g  and Tax
S h i f t i n g , "  i n I n d u s t r i a l  Organi za t i on and Economic Devel op­
ment ,  e d i t e d  by J. W. Markham and G. F. Papanek,  Houghton 
M i f f l i n  Co., Boston,  1970, pp. 238-65.
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A f t e r  ( 2 - 9 )  i s  s o l v e d  f o r  L, t he o p t i ma l  amount  o f  l oan  
ex t ens i ons ,  L*,  i s  g i ven by
(?L -  r - f )  V a r ( r o )  -  ( T q -  r ^ )  C o v ( r L ,  rp)
L = ----------------------------------------------------------  ■ (2-10)
a[ Var ( r | _ ) Var ( r p )  - [ Cov( r|_, r p ) ] ^ ]
S i m i l a r l y ,  s o l v i n g  f o r  D, t he o p t i ma l  amount  o f  d e p o s i t s  
t ha t  the i n t e r med i a r y  shoul d accept  i s equal  to:
(?L - r f ) Cov(rL, rp)  - ( rp - r^)  Var( rL)
D =   _____ 1__________ ____ - ________ _______: 5_______— • ( 2 - 1 1 )
a[Var ( r | _)  Var ( r p )  - [ C o v ( r L , r p ) ] Z ]
The p a r a m e t e r  a i n  ( 2 - 1 0 )  and ( 2 - 1 1 )  i s  e q u a l  t o  t he  
abso l u t e  va l ue  of  the r a t i o  of  margi nal  u t i l i t y  of  p r o f i t  to 
the var i ance of  p r o f i t .  As l ong as r i s k  aver s i on  i s assumed 
on the pa r t  of  the i n t e r med i a r y ,  the va l ue  of  a w i l l  always 
be p o s i t i v e .
The model  p r e s e n t e d  above i s  n e a r l y  i d e n t i c a l  to t he 
models devel oped by Park i n^^  and Pyl e. ^^  Park i n ' s  model  was 
aimed a t  e m p i r i c a l l y  s t u d y i n g  the b e h a v i o r  o f  d i s c o u n t  
houses in the Uni t ed Kingdom. Pyl e ' s  a n a l y s i s ,  on the o t her  
hand,  a t t e mp t e d  t o  d e r i v e  a s e t  o f  c o n d i t i o n s  under  wh i ch  
i n t e r med i a t i on  would be more l i k e l y  to occur .
In terms of  i mpor tance,  Py l e ' s  r e s u l t s  are perhaps the 
most s i g n i f i c a n t  among the l i t e r a t u r e  d ea l i ng  wi t h  p o r t f o l i o  
models of  the i n t e r med i a r y .
l ^Park in , 1oc. ci t.
15 Pyle,  loc.  c i t .
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Pyl e demonst rated t ha t  asset  and l i a b i l i t y  dec i s i ons  of  
the i n t e r med i a r y  were g e n e r a l l y  not  i ndependent .  Re f e r r i ng  
to e x p r e s s i o n s  ( 2 - 10)  and ( 2 - 1 1 ) ,  i t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  t he 
opt i mal  l end i ng  and depos i t  dec i s i ons  are each a f u n c t i o n  of  
a c o m b i n a t i o n  o f  f a c t o r s  i n c l u d i n g  t he expec t ed  r a t e s  on 
l o a n s  and d e p o s i t s ,  t he v a r i a n c e s  o f  r|_ and r g ,  and t he 
c o v a r i a n c e  between r|_ and rp.  F u r t h e r mo r e ,  Py l e  f ound  t he 
c o r r e l a t i o n  between l oan  and d e p o s i t  r a t e s  t o  be a key 
det er mi nan t  of  the process of  i n t e r med i a t i on .  In p a r t i c u ­
l a r ,  i f  t he r a t e s  on l o ans  and d e p o s i t s  are u n c o r r e l a t e d ,  
the necessary and s u f f i c i e n t  c o nd i t i on s  f o r  f i n a n c i a l  i n t e r ­
m e d i a t i o n  to t ake  p l a c e  are 1) a p o s i t i v e  r i s k  premium on 
l o a n s ,  and 2) a n e g a t i v e  r i s k  premium on d e p o s i t s .  Wi t h 
p o s i t i v e  c o r r e l a t i o n  be t ween  t h e  r a t e s  on l o a n s  and 
depos i t s ,  Py l e concl uded t ha t  i n t e r med i a t i on  would be more 
l i k e l y  to take pl ace under the f o l l o w i n g  c ond i t i on s ;  1) the 
l a r g e r  t he d i f f e r e n c e  between expec t ed  r a t e s  o f  r e t u r n  on 
l oans and depos i t s ,  2) the g r ea t e r  the p o s i t i v e  c o r r e l a t i o n  
between l oan  and d e p o s i t  r a t e s ,  and 3) t he l a r g e r  t he 
s t a n d a r d  d e v i a t i o n  o f  d e p o s i t  r a t e s  and t he s m a l l e r  t he 
standard d e v i a t i o n  of  l oan rat es .
The nex t  s e c t i o n  exami nes a second approach t o t he 
model i ng of  depos i t o r y  f i n a n c i a l  i n t e r med i a r i es .  Rooted in 
t he mi c r oec on omi c  t h e o r y  o f  t he f i r m ,  t h i s  w i l l  be cermed 
the f i r m - t h e o r e t i c  approach.
F i r m- Theo r e t i c  Approach
An o t h e r  segment  o f  t he l i t e r a t u r e  f oc us es  on the
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o p t i m i z i n g  behav i o r  of  depos i t o r y  f i n a n c i a l  i n t e r med i a r i es  
i n a f r amewor k  t h a t  c l o s e l y  r es emb l es  t he n e o c l a s s i c a l  
m i c r oec onomi c  t h e o r y  o f  t he f i r m .  Model s  f o l l o w i n g  t h i s  
approach have taken one of  two d i r e c t i o n s .  On the one hand, 
one p a r t i c u l a r  s ubs e t  o f  t hese model s  i s  an a t t e mp t  to 
a n a l y z e  t he b e h a v i o r  o f  t he i n t e r m e d i a r y  under  i m p e r f e c t  
c a p i t a l  markets.  Kl ei n^® was among the f i r s t  to recogni ze 
t h e  need t o d e v e l o p  mo d e l s  o f  t he  i n t e r m e d i a r y  t h a t  
i n c o r p o r a t e  ma r k e t  i m p e r f e c t i o n s .  Hi s model  c o n s i d e r e d  a 
bank f a c i n g  a downward-s l opi ng demand f un c t i o n  f o r  l oans and 
an u p w a r d - s l o p i n g  s u p p l y  f u n c t i o n  f o r  d e p o s i t s  under  
c ond i t i on s  of  r i s k  n e u t r a l i t y .
A second segment o f  t h i s  l i t e r a t u r e  has emphasized the 
real  resource cost s and pr oduc t i on  aspects assoc i at ed wi t h  
t he f i n a n c i a l  s e r v i c e s  p r o v i d e d  by i n t e r m e d i a r i e s  o f  t he 
d e p o s i t o r y  t ype.  Model s  of  t h i s  k i n d ,  such as t he ones 
p r o v i d e d  by Pesek , ^^  Sav i ng , ^ ® and Sea l ey  and L i n d l e y ^ ^  
r ep r esen t  pure pr oduc t i on  cost s models of  the i n t e r med i ar y
l ^ M i c h a e l  K l e i n ,  "A Theory  o f  t he Bank i ng F i r m, "  
Journal  of  Money, Cr ed i t ,  and Banki ng, 3:205-18,  May, 1971.
l ^ B o r i s  P. Pesek,  "Bank ' s  Supp l y  F u n c t i o n  and the 
E q u i l i b r i u m  Quant i t y  of  Money," Canadian Journal  of  Econom­
i c s , 3:357-85,  August ,  1970.
l ^Thomas  S a v i n g ,  "A Th e o r y  o f  Money S u p p l y  w i t h  
Compet i t i ve  Banking, "  Journal  of  Monetary Economics,  3:289-  
303, J u l y ,  1977.
l ^ C .  W. S e a l e y ,  J r .  and J. T. L i n d  l e y ,  " O u t p u t s ,  
I n p u t s ,  and a Theory o f  P r o d u c t i o n  Cost  a t  De p o s i t o r y
F i n a n c i a l  I n s t i t u t i o n s , "  J o u r n a l o f  F i n a n c e , 32 : 1251- 66 ,
September,  1977.
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at t empt i ng  to e x p l a i n  asset  and l i a b i l i t y  s t r u c t u r e s  of  the 
i n t e r med i a r y  on the bas i s  of  the resource cost s  i ncur r ed  by 
t he  i n s t i t u t i o n  i n  m a i n t a i n i n g  a c e r t a i n  l e v e l  o f  
f i n a n c i a l l y  r e l a t e d  se r v i c es  such as check c l e a r i n g ,  book­
keeping,  and depos i t  wi t hd r awa l s .  In c o n t r a s t  to the former  
type of  models which have emphasized the i mper f ec t  nature of  
the i n t e r med i a r y ' s  markets,  the l a t t e r  type of  models have 
been f o r mu l a t ed  under  p e r f e c t l y  c ompe t i t i v e  markets.
A F i r m- Theo r e t i c  Model of  the I n t e rmedi ar y
For  t h e  mos t  p a r t ,  f i r m - t h e o r e t i c  mo d e l s  o f  t he  
i n t e r med i a r y  have depar ted f rom the f o l l o w i n g  assumpt ions:^*^
1) a s i n g l e  d e c i s i o n  p e r i o d ,  2) r i s k  n e u t r a l i t y ,  3) 
i mper f ec t  asset  and l i a b i l i t y  markets,  and 4) a p e r f e c t l y -  
e l a s  t i c  s u p p l y  o f  U.S. G o v e r n me n t  s e c u r i t i e s  a t  an 
exogenousl y g i ven r a t e  of  r e t u r n .  Given these assumpt ions,  
t he i n t e r m e d i a r y  i s  v i ewed as a p r i v a t e  economi c  u n i t  
a t t e m p t i n g  t o  max i mi ze  t he ex pe c t ed  v a l u e  o f  e n d - o f - t h e  
per i od p r o f i t .
F i r m - t h e o r e t i c  models d i f f e r  f rom p o r t f o l i o - t y p e  models 
i n two s i g n i f i c a n t  aspec t s .  F i r s t ,  most  f i r m - t h e o r e t i c  
model s  have been d e v e l o p e d  under  c o n d i t i o n s  of  r i s k  neu­
t r a l i t y  w i t h  t he e x c e p t i o n  o f  R a t t i ' s ^ l  model .  Second,  in
I n a d d i t i o n ,  i t  i s  assumed t h a t  a s s e t s  and 
l i a b i l i t i e s  have equal  m a t u r i t i e s  of  the same l eng t h  as the 
dec i s i on  per i od.
Zl Ronal d A. R a t t i ,  "Bank A t t i t u d e  Toward Risk,  I m p l i c i t  
Rates o f  I n t e r e s t ,  and t he B e h a v i o r  o f  an I ndex o f  Ri sk
A v e r s i o n  f o r  Commerci al  Banks, "  Tj ie Q u a r t e r l y J o u r n a l of
Economi cs,  95:309-31 , September,  1980.
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c on t r as t  to the p e r f e c t  markets assumpt ion used in p o r t f o l i o  
mode l s ,  f i r m - t h e o r e t i c  mode l s  r e l y  on the e x i s t e n c e  o f  
i mper f ec t  c a p i t a l  markets.
The wo r k i ngs  o f  t he f i r m - t h e o r e t i c  approach can be 
i l l u s t r a t e d  wi t h  a s i mpl e model .  In essence,  the f o r mu l a ­
t i o n  o f  t he model  t h a t  f o l l o w s  i s  s i m i l a r  i n s t r u c t u r e  to
K l e i n ' s  model
Cons i de r  an i n t e r m e d i a r y  w i t h  t h r e e  k i nds  o f  as s e t s :  
l oans ( l ), cash r eser ves  (R), and Government  s e c u r i t i e s  (S). 
The i n s t i t u t i o n  i s  a l l o w e d  t o  i s s ue  one t ype o f  c l a i m ,  
namely depos i t s  (D). The bal ance sheet  c o n s t r a i n t  i s g i ven 
by
L + R + S = D. (2-12)
The i n t e r med i a r y  w i l l  be assumed to be a monopo l i s t  in
i t s  l oan  market .  The l oan  demand i s  a d o w n w a r d - s l o p i n g  
f u n c t i o n  o f  t he r a t e  o f  i n t e r e s t  on l oans  chosen by t he 
i n t e r med i a r y  :
rL = r ^ f L ) ;  r ' ^ f L )  < 0. ( 2-13)
The demand f u n c t i o n  g i v e n  by ( 2 - 13)  s i mp l y  s t a t e s  t h a t  t he 
average r e t u r n  f rom loans i s a downward-sl opi ng f u n c t i o n  of  
t he amount  L.
The Government  s e c u r i t i e s  mar ke t  i s  assumed t o be 
p e r f e c t l y  c ompe t i t i v e  and the i n t e r med i a r y  faces an upward- 
s l o p i n g  s u p p l y  o f  d e p o s i t s  g i v e n  as a f u n c t i o n  o f  t he r a t e
Z^Kl e i n ,  l oc .  c i t .
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paid on depos i t s ,
D = D( r o ) ;  D ' ( r p )  > 0. (2-14)
Uncer t a i n t y  a f f e c t s  the i n t e r med i a r y ' s  dec i s i ons  i n the 
f o l l o w i n g  manner .  The model  assumes t h a t  d u r i n g  the 
d e c i s i o n  p e r i o d  t he i n s t i t u t i o n  e x p e r i e n c e s  a ne t  random 
d e p o s i t  o u t f l o w .  The i n t e r m e d i a r y  e n t e r s  i t s  d e c i s i o n  
p e r i o d  w i t h  a g i v e n  s t o c k  o f  cash r e s e r v e s  and w i t h  f u l l  
knowl edge o f  t he p r o b a b i l i t y  d e n s i t y  f u n c t i o n  o f  t he net  
depos i t  o u t f l o w  t ha t  mi ght  occur  dur i ng the per i od.  In the 
e v e n t  o f  a cash r e s e r v e  d e f i c i e n c y  ( d e f i n e d  as a s i t u a t i o n  
i n wh i ch  the d e p o s i t  o u t f l o w  i s  l a r g e r  t han the i n i t i a l l y  
hel d amount of  cash r ese r ves ) ,  the i n t e r med i a r y  has to pay a 
pena l t y  cost  of  r per cent  per d o l l a r  of  the s h o r t f a l l .
The pena l t y  cost  f u n c t i o n  i s g i ven by P(X):
r (X-R)  i f  X > R 
P(X) = \  (2-15)
0 i f  X < R,
where X stands f o r  the random net  depos i t  ou t f l ow.
P r o f i t s  a t  the end of  the per i od can be w r i t t e n  as
n= Tl L + r^S - r^D - P(X) .  (2-16)
The expected p r o f i t s  are gi ven by
'  CO
n = r ^L + r f S - r^D - J  P(X) f (X)dX,  (2-17)
where f (X)  i s the p r o b a b i l i t y  dens i t y  f unc t i on  o f  X.
The i n t e r med i a r y ' s  o b j e c t i v e  i s to maximize (2-17)
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s u b j e c t  t o t he b a l a n c e  s hee t  c o n s t r a i n t  g i v e n  by ( 2 - 12) .
Th i s  p r ob l em can be s t a t e d  as ^
maximize r|_L + r^S - r^D - P(X) f (X)dX (2-18)
ro
s ub j ec t  to
L + R + S = D.
The s o l u t i o n  t o t he o p t i m i z a t i o n  p r o b l e m g i v e n  by (2-  
18) can be e a s i l y  o b t a i n e d  t h r o u g h  t he use o f  t he Lagrange 
m u l t i p l i e r  method. I t  t urns  out  t ha t  the opt i mal  va l ues  f o r  
r|_ and rp are g i ven i m p l i c i t l y  i n the f o l l o w i n g  expr ess i ons :
MRL = r  (2-19)
and
MCD = r  (2-20)
where MRL and MCD are the margi nal  revenue and margi nal  cost  
on l oans and depos i t s  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  The i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of  
( 2 - 19 )  and ( 2 - 20)  i s  as f o l l o w s .  The i n t e r m e d i a r y  i n t h i s  
s i m p l e  model  w i l l  s e t  i t s  r a t e  on l o a n s  by e q u a t i n g  the 
ma r g i n a l  r evenue  f rom l oans  t o t he ma r g i n a l  c o s t  o f  cash 
r e s e r v e s .  S i m i l a r l y ,  t he i n t e r m e d i a r y  d e t e r m i n e s  the 
i n t e r e s t  r a t e  t o  be p a i d  on d e p o s i t s  by e q u a t i n g  t he  
margi nal  cost  of  depos i t s  to the exogenous r a t e  r.  In terms 
of  the s i ze o f  the l oan p o r t f o l i o ,  the i n t e r med i a r y  extends 
l oans up to the po i n t  where the margi nal  revenue f rom loans
equal s  the expected r a t e  of  r e t u r n  on Government  s e c u r i t i e s .
The same a l s o  h o l d s  t r u e  f o r  d e p o s i t s :  t he i n t e r m e d i a r y  
accepts depos i t s  u n t i l  t h e i r  margi nal  cost  equal s  the r i s k ­
f r ee  rate.
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Based on a model  v e r y  s i m i l a r  to t he one p r es en t ed  in 
t h i s  sec t i on ,  K l e i n  concl uded t ha t  the i n t e r med i a r y ' s  asset  
s e l e c t i o n  cou l d  be consi dered i ndependent  of  i t s  l i a b i l i t y  
d e c i s i o n s . 23 P r i n g l e  quest i oned the g e n e r a l i t y  of  K l e i n ' s  
r e s u l t s  a t t r i b u t i n g  t hese  c o n c l u s i o n s  t o  t he r e s t r i c t i v e  
n a t u r e  o f  t he as s umpt i ons  K l e i n  used i n f o r m u l a t i n g  h i s  
model .2^
The nex t  s e c t i o n  o f  t h i s  c h a p t e r  w i l l  exami ne r e c e n t  
c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  t h e  t h e o r y  o f  d e p o s i t o r y  f i n a n c i a l  
i ntermedi  a r i es .
Extensi ons and Recent  Models of  the I n t e r med i a r y
In r ecent  years ,  a number of  models of  the i n t e r med i a r y  
have at tempted to combine or extend the two major  approaches 
p r e v i o u s l y  d i s c u s s e d .  S e a l e y 2 5  d e v e l o p e d  a model  o f  t he 
i n t e r med i a r y  which bl ends t oget her  the major  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  
o f  t he M a r k o w i t z - T o b i n  f r amework  and t he f i r m - t h e o r e t i c  
approach.  Sea l e y ' s  model  a l l ows  f o r  s i mul t aneous c ons i de r a ­
t i o n  o f  n o n l i n e a r  r i s k  p r e f e r e n c e s ,  d e p o s i t  r a t e - s e t t i n g  
b e h a v i o r ,  and l i q u i d i t y  c o s t  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  a l l  under  
u n c e r t a i n t y .  Another  no t ab l e  c o n t r i b u t i o n  to the theory of
2 3 K l e i n ,  op. c i t . ,  pp. 213-15.
24John J . P r i n g l e ,  "A Theory o f  t he Bank i ng F i rm:  A 
Comment," Journal  o f  Money, Cr ed i t ,  and Bank i ng, 5:990-96,  
November,  1973.
2 5c.  W. S e a l e y ,  J r . ,  " D e p o s i t  R a t e - S e t t i n g ,  R i s k  
Aver s i on ,  and the Theory o f  Depos i t or y  F i na n c i a l  I n t e r me d i ­
a r i e s , "  Journal  of  Fi nance,  35:1139-54.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
22
d e p o s i t o r y  f i n a n c i a l  i n t e r m e d i a r i e s ,  Mason' s^G^ can be 
v i ewed as an e x t e n s i o n  o f  t he M a r k o w i t z - T o b i n  p o r t f o l i o  
a p p r o a c h  t o  a c o n t e x t  o f  c a p i t a l  a s s e t  p r i c i n g  unde r  
u n c e r t a i n t y .
Seal ey ' s  Model
Sea l ey ' s  model  r equ i r es  the f o l l o w i n g  assumpt ions about  
t h e  i n t e r m e d i a r y :  1) a s i n g l e  d e c i s i o n  p e r i o d ,  2) a
p e r f e c t l y  c omp e t i t i v e  l oan market ,  3) a s t o c h a s t i c  suppl y of  
depos i t s  t o the i n t e r med i a r y ,  4) an o b j e c t i v e  of  the i n t e r ­
mediary to maximize the expected va l ue of  a u t i l i t y  f unc t i on  
t h a t  d e f i n e s  s h a r e h o l d e r s '  a t t i t u d e s  t owar ds  r i s k ,  5) 
resource costs assoc i at ed wi t h  the pr oduc t i on  and s e r v i c i n g  
of  l oan and depos i t  con t r ac t s .
The i n t e r med i a r y ' s  bal ance sheet  i d e n t i t y  i s  gi ven by
L = D + Z, (2-21)
where L and D s t and ,  as b e f o r e ,  f o r  l oans  and d e p o s i t s ;  and 
Z i s a bor rowi ng/ 1 ending v a r i a b l e  measur ing the d i f f e r enc e  
between money market  bor rowi ng and l endi ng.
This model  assumes t ha t  the i n t e r med i a r y  operates i n a 
p e r f e c t l y  c o mp e t i t i v e  l oan market  wi t h  the r a t e  of  r e t u rn  on 
l oans rL assumed s t o c h a s t i c  wi t h  a known s u b j e c t i v e  proba­
b i l i t y  d e n s i t y  f u n c t i o n .  Fu r t he r mo r e ,  r|_ has a range over  
the i n t e r v a l  between zero and i n f i n i t y .
ZGjohn M. Mason,  F i n a n c i a l Management  o f  Commerc i a 1
Banks,  ( Bos t on :  War ren,  Gorham, and Lam o n t ,  197 97, PP- 6 7-
717“
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F o l l o w i n g  Lel and^? the depos i t  suppl y  f u n c t i o n  to the 
i n t e r med i a r y  w i l l  be assumed an i m p l i c i t  f u n c t i o n  D*:
D * ( D , r o , u )  = 0 ,  ( 2 - 2 2 )
where D* i s assumed to have cont i nuous p a r t i a l  d e r i v a t i v e s ;  
D i s  t he q u a n t i t y  o f  d e p o s i t s  s u p p l i e d ;  u i s  a random 
pa r ame t e r  unknown e x - a n t e  bu t  w i t h  a known p r o b a b i l i t y  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  de f i ned over  the h a l f - c l o s e d  i n t e r v a l  [ g , ») ;  rg 
is the c o n t r a c t  r a t e  of  i n t e r e s t  on depos i t s .
For a depos i t  r a t e s e t t e r ,  (2-22)  can be r e w r i t t e n  as
D = D( r g , u ) .  (2-23)
The s u p p l y  o f  d e p o s i t s  f u n c t i o n  g i v e n  by ( 2 - 23)  has two 
r e s t r i c t i o n s :  1) f o r  any u, the r e l a t i o n s h i p  between D and
rg i s  u p w a r d - s l o p i n g ,  or  3D/3rg > 0, and 2) D( r g , u )  i s  an 
i nc r eas i ng  f unc t i on  of  u.
The t i m i n g  o f  d e c i s i o n s  i s  as f o l  l ows :  a t  t he s t a r t  of
i t s  d e c i s i o n  p e r i o d ,  t he i n s t i t u t i o n  s e l e c t s  t he r a t e  of  
i n t e r e s t  to be pa i d  on d e p o s i t s  and the q u a n t i t y  o f  l oans  to 
be extended.  Hence, rg and L are termed ex-ant e c o n t r o l s .  
A f t e r  a smal l  i n t e r v a l  of  t ime has e l apsed,  the v a l ue  of  the 
random pa r amet e r  u becomes known and t hus  t he amount  of  
d e p o s i t s .  At  a l m o s t  t he  same t i me ,  t he r e t u r n  on l oans  
becomes known, and the i n t e r med i a r y  must e i t h e r  bor row (Z>0) 
or  l end (Z<0),  i n order  to bal ance i t s  assets and c l a i ms.
2 ^Haynes E. Le i  and ,  " T h e o r y  o f  t h e  F i r m  F a c i n g  
U n c e r t a i n  Demand," Amer i can Economic Rev i e w, 62 : 278- 91 ,  
June,  1972.
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The i n t e r m e d i a r y ' s  o b j e c t i v e  i s  assumed t o be 
m a x i m i z a t i o n  o f  ex pe c t e d  u t i l i t y  o f  p r o f i t s .  Denote t he 
p r e f e r e n c e  f u n c t i o n  by U(II) w i t h  U' (I I )  > 0,  and U" ( n ) ^ 0 
d e p e n d i n g  on t h e  assumed r i s k  p r e f e r e n c e s  o f  t he  
i n t e r m e d i a r y ' s  sharehol ders .
The mathemat i cal  o p t i m i z a t i o n  probl em i s g i ven by
maximize [ maxi mi ze E[U(n) ] }  
rO' L Z
sub j ec t  to
L = D + Z.
The i n t e r med i a r y ' s  random p r o f i t ,  II , i s  g i ven by
II = r ^L - r oD( r o , u )  - C^fL)  - C^id)  - C(Z) ,  (2-25)
where C|_(L) and Cq are resource costs i n s e r v i c i n g  loans and 
d e p o s i t s ;  C(Z) i s  t he l i q u i d i t y  c o s t  f r om hav i n g  to bor row 
(Z>0) or  the revenue f rom l end i ng  excess funds (Z<0) at  the 
end o f  t he d e c i s i o n  p e r i o d .  I t  i s  assumed t h a t  and Cq 
are i n c r e a s i n g  f u n c t i o n s  o f  L and D r e s p e c t i v e l y ;  or  C'|_>0 
and C ' q > 0 .  Moreover ,  economies of  sca l e  are i gnored.  This 
i s e q u i v a l e n t  to assumi ng t h a t  bot h  Cq and Cq i n c r e a s e  at  an 
i nc r eas i ng  rate.
The l i q u i d i t y  cost  f unc t i on  C(Z) i s g i ven by
C(Z) = rZ;  f o r  a l l  Z = 0,  (2-26)
where r i s both the bor rowi ng and l end i ng  rate.
I n c o r p o r a t i n g  t hese c o s t  f u n c t i o n s  and t he ba l anc e  
sheet  c o n s t r a i n t  i n t o  (2-25)  y i e l d s  the f o l l o w i n g  express i on 
f o r  p r o f i t s :
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n = r LL - r [ 3D( r D, u ) - CL ( L ) - CD( D) - r [ L - D( r D, u ) ] .  ( 2-27)
Using (2-27) ,  the uncons t r a i ned problem in terms of  ex-ant e 
c o n t r o l s  and parameters of  the model  becomes
max U[ r | _L - r QD( r Q, u ) - C| _ ( L ) - CQ( D) - r [ L - D( r o , u ) ] ]  . ( 2 - 28)
Us i ng ( 2 - 2 8 ) ,  Sea l ey  d e r i v e d  two se t s  o f  o p t i m a l  
s o l u t i o n s  f o r  rg and L. F i r s t ,  he l ooked at  a r i s k - n e u t r a l  
i n t e r m e d i a r y  ( i . e . ,  U"(n)  = 0) .  L e t t i n g  r a n d  l "  s t and 
f o r  t he o p t i m a l  d e p o s i t  r a t e  and l oan p o s i t i o n  under  r i s k  
n e u t r a l i t y ,  he de f i ned these as f o l l o w s :
f g  = r  + C g ' ( L " )  ( 2 - 2 9 )
r g "  = F g  -  D / D ' -  C ' g D  -  C g ' ( L " ) .  ( 2 - 3 0 )
Expressi on (2-29)  i m p l i c i t l y  def i nes the opt i mal  l oan p o s i ­
t i o n  under  r i s k  n e u t r a l i t y .  The r i s k - n e u t r a l  i n t e r med i a r y  
extends l oans up to the po i n t  t ha t  expected marginal  revenue 
f rom l o a n s  e q u a l s  t he sum of  t he ma r g i n a l  r e s o u r c e  and 
l i q u i d i t y  cost .  The i n t e r med i a r y  sets the opt i mal  depos i t  
r a t e  under  r i s k  n e u t r a l i t y  as the d i f f e r e n c e  between the 
m a r g i n a l  r e t u r n  on l oa ns  and the sum of  t he ma r g i n a l  
i n t e r e s t  and r e s o u r c e  c o s t  o f  d e p o s i t s  and the ma r g i na l  
r e s o u r c e  c o s t  on l oans  ( 2 - 3 0 ) .  Note t h a t  in the absence of  
r e s o u r c e  c o s t s  on l oans  and d e p o s i t s ,  t hese r e s u l t s  are 
i d e n t i c a l  to the ones obt ai ned by Kl e i n .
Under r i s k  aver s i on  (U"( i l )<0),  Sealey found the opt i mal
Z^ K l e i n ,  l oc .  c i t .
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r i s k  av e r s e  l oan p o s i t i o n  (L®) to be g i v e n  by
Cov(U'  ( n ) , r L )
E [ U ' ( n ) ]
The l a s t  t erm i n  ( 2 - 31 )  i s  t he c o v a r i a n c e  between t he 
m a r g i n a l  u t i l i t y  o f  p r o f i t  and t he  random l o a n  r e t u r n .  
Sea l ey 29  de mo n s t r a t e d  t h a t  t he  r i s k  premium demanded by a 
r i s k  averse i n t e r med i a r y  i s an i nc r eas i ng  f u n c t i o n  of  loan 
e x t e n s i o n s .
Seal ey ' s  r e s u l t s  i n d i c a t e d  t ha t  the r i s k - a v e r s e  i n t e r ­
med i a r y  t ends  t o o p e r a t e  a t  a l o we r  l oan  p o s i t i o n  t han i t  
woul d under r i s k  n e u t r a l i t y .
The e f f e c t s  o f  r i s k  a v e r s i o n  on d e p o s i t  r a t e - s e t t i n g  
dec i s i ons  obt a i ned by Sealey were f a r  l ess c o n c l us i v e .  In 
most  cases,  the e f f e c t s  of  n o n - l i n e a r  r i s k  pref erences  tend 
to depend on the f u n c t i o n a l  f orm o f  t he d e p o s i t  s u p p l y  
f u n c t i o n .  For  a g e n e r a l  d e p o s i t  s u p p l y  f u n c t i o n ,  t he 
e f f e c t s  t urned out  to be i n c o n c l u s i v e .
Us i ng a model  s i m i l a r  t o  t he one d i s c u s s e d  i n t h i s  
s ec t i on ,  S e a l e y ^ O  examined the c a p i t a l  s t r u c t u r e  dec i s i ons  
and s h a r e h o l d e r s '  u n a n i m i t y  f o r  a d e p o s i t o r y  f i n a n c i a l  
i n t e r med i a r y .  He demonst rated t ha t  unani mi t y  w i t h  r espect  
t o c a p i t a l  s t r u c t u r e  d e c i s i o n s  among t he i n t e r m e d i a r y ' s  
shar eho l der s  i s p o s s i b l e  i f  the i n t e r med i a r y ' s  r e t u r ns  are
Z^ Se a l e y ,  op. c i t . ,  pp. 1144-45.
30c. W. Sealey,  J r . ,  " V a l u a t i o n ,  Capi t a l  S t r uc t u r e ,  and 
S h a r e h o l d e r  Un an i mi t y  f o r  D e p o s i t o r y  F i n a n c i a l  I n t e r ­
medi ar i es . "  Journal  of  Fi nance,  38:857-71,  June 1983.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
27
i ndependen t  o f  i n v e s t o r s '  payment  f l o w s ,  and the mar ke t  i s 
f u l l y  spanned in a l l  s t a t es .
K o p p e n h a v c r ^ l  ext ended Sea l ey ' s  model  t o i n c l u d e  CD 
f u t u r e s  t r a d i n g .  He compared t he hedgi ng per f o r mance  of  
t h i s  model  a g a i n s t  a p o r t f o l i o - b a s e d  model  f o r  f o u r
d i f f e r e n t  hedging s t r a t eg i es .  Koppenhaver concl udes t ha t  i f  
banks maxi mi ze expec t ed  u t i l i t y  o f  p r o f i t  and e x h i b i t  
cons t ant  r e l a t i v e  r i s k  aver s i on,  then hedges using CD's or 
Treasury b i l l  f u t u r es  are e q u a l l y  e f f e c t i v e .
Mason's Model
Mason^Z has p r o v i d e d  a model  of  a commerc i a l  bank i ng 
f i r m t ha t  assumes maxi mi zat i on of  va l ue  r a t h e r  than expected 
u t i l i t y .  Using the f a m i l i a r  c a p i t a l  asset  p r i c i n g  model ,  he 
l e t s  t he v a l u e  o f  t he bank be g i v e n  by
w . 1 [I - Co v ( n , r ^ ) ] ,  (2-32)
V - 1 + r f
where n and n now st and f o r  r a t e s  o f  r e t u r n  r a t h e r  than
d o l l a r s ,  and X i s  the mar ke t  p r i c e  o f  r i s k  or  [ r ^  - r ^ ] /
Var ( r ^ ) .  Fur thermore,  and r„, are the expected rate
and r a t e  o f  r e t u r n  on a mar ke t  i ndex  p o r t f o l i o ,  such as 
S & P 500 s t ock  i n d e x ;  V a r ( r ^ )  i s  t he v a r i a n c e  o f  t h i s  
market  i ndex p o r t f o l i o .
Mason assumed the bank faces a downward-sl opi ng demand
G. 0. K o p p e n h a v e r ,  "Bank F u n d i n g  R i s k s ,  Ri sk  
A v e r s i o n ,  and the Choice o f  Fu t u r es  Hedgi ng I n s t r u me n t . "  
Journal  of  Fi nance, 40: 241-55,  March 1985.
3^Mason, 1oc. ci  t .
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c u r v e  f o r  l oans  and an u p w a r d - s l o p i n g  s u p p l y  c u r v e  f o r  
depos i t s .  These can be w r i t t e n  as
L = L ( r L , u )  ; 3L/3r i_<0 (2-33)
D = D( r o , v )  ; 3D/3rQ>0.  (2-34)
The random terras u and v are assumed t o  have f i n i t e  means 
and v a r i a n c e s .  The demand and s u p p l y  f u n c t i o n s  i n ( 2-33)  
and ( 2 - 3 4 )  a r e  a l s o  assumed t o hav e  f i n i t e  means and 
var i ances .
The bank's bal ance sheet  i d e n t i t y  i s gi ven by
L = & +  K, (2-35)
where L,D and K are d e f i n e d  as p r o p o r t i o n s  ( expec t ed )  of  
l oans,  depos i t s  and equ i t y  to the t o t a l  amount of  funds.
The r e s u l t s  f rom maxi mi z i ng V (gi ven by (2-32))  sub j ec t  
to ( 2 - 35)  are g i v e n  by t he f o l l o w i n g  e q u i l i b r i u m  p r i c i n g  
r e l a t i o n s h i  p
r \ ( l  + 1 / 6 l )  _ \  . B C o v t n ' T m )  =
( 3L / 3 r L )  3Tl
r o ( l  + l / e g )  + X . (2-36)
(3 D/3 rp ) 5T q
wher e  e|_ and e g a r e  t he  mean e l a s t i c i t y  o f  l o a n s  and
deposi  t s .
Us i ng  e q u i l i b r i u m  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  such as t h e  one 
descr i bed in (2-36) ,  Mason^^ po i n t ed out  the s i g n i f i c a n c e  of  
qu a n t i t y  v a r i a t i o n s  as opposed to i n t e r e s t  r a t e  v a r i a t i o n s
33john M. Mason, "Model i ng Mutual  Funds and Commercial  
Banks," Journal  of  Banking and Fi nance, 3:347-53,  1979.
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f o r  t he commer c i a l  bank i ng  f i r m .  He t hen c o n t r a s t e d  t h i s  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  (2-36)  t o the one devel oped f o r  a mutual  fund 
i n t r y i n g  to e s t a b l i s h  mo d e l i n g  d i f f e r e n c e s  f o r  t hese two 
types o f  i n t e r me d i a r i e s .
Chateau^4 employed the same f ramework as Mason f o r  the 
ana l y s i s  of  r a t e  d i f f e r e n t i a l s  i n  c o r r e  1 a t e d - u n c o r r e  1 a ted 
m u l t i d e p o s i t  markets.  He showed t h a t  under some cond i t i ons  
excess l i a b i l i t y  capac i t y  may be opt i mal  f o r  an i n t e r med i a r y  
wh i ch must  meet  c a p i t a l  adequacy t e s t s  w i t h  a t t a c h e d  
p e n a l t i e s ,  or  en f o r c eab l e  ba l ance- shee t  growth l i m i t a t i o n s .
O ' H a r a ^ B  devel oped a dynamic model  of  a commercial  bank 
wh i ch i n c o r p o r a t e s  the f u n c t i o n s  o f  b r ok e r age  and r i s k  
t r a n s f o r m a t i o n .  The model  i s  nov e l  in t he sense t h a t  i t  
e x p l i c i t l y  c o n s i d e r s  t he agency c o s t s  i n c u r r e d  due to 
s e p a r a t i o n  o f  management  f r om t h e  o w n e r s h i p  o f  t he  
i n s t i t u t i o n .
A s u b s t a n t i a l  amount  o f  l i t e r a t u r e  has f ocused  on the 
development  of  a t heory  of  bank l oan commi tments.  Thakor^G 
examined the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of  f i x e d  versus v a r i a b l e  rate 
l oan commi tments usi ng a c o n t i n g e n t - c l a i ms  f ramework.  Based 
on a m u l t i p e r i o d  model  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  asymmet r y ,  Thakor
p. Chateau,  "On DFI ' s  L i a b i l i t y  Management . "  
Journal  of  Banking and F i nance, 6:533-47.  December, 1982.
^^Maureen O' Hara,  "A Dynamic Theory o f  t he Banki ng 
Fi rm."  Journal  of  Fi nance, 38:127-40.  March,  1983.
36 An j a n  V. T h a k o r ,  " Towa r d  a The o r y  o f  Bank Loan 
Commi t ments. "  J o u r n a l  o f  Bank i ng and F i nanc e ,  6 : 55 - 83 .  
1982.
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at tempted to p r ov i de  an ex p l ana t i on  of  the t rend toward the 
s u b s t i t u t i o n  o f  f i x e d  r a t e  f o r  v a r i a b l e  r a t e  l o a n  
c o m mi t m e n t s .  More r e c e n t l y ,  Deshmukh,  Greenbaum and 
Kanatas^^ have focused on the i n t e r med i a r y ' s  choi ce between 
oper a t i ng  as a br oker  or as an ass e t - t r ans f o r mer .  They have 
shown t h a t  an i n c r e a s e  i n i n t e r e s t  r a t e  u n c e r t a i n t y  l eads  
the i n t e r med i a r y  toward a r educ t i on  in the asset  t r ans f o r ma­
t i o n  f u n c t i o n  and t o an i n c r e a s e  i n b r ok e r age  s e r v i c e s .  
The i r  model i s based on ba l ance- shee t  du r a t i on  mismatching.
Conclusi ons form the Review
This chapter  has revi ewed the major  approaches employed 
to model  the depos i t o r y  f i n a n c i a l  i n t e r med i a r y .  I t s  scope 
has been l i m i t e d  t o model s  t h a t  c o n s i d e r  bot h  as s e t  and 
l i a b i l i t y  dec i s i ons  as we l l  as the de t e r mi na t i on  of  the si ze 
or sca l e  of  the i n t e r med i a r y .  Thi s chapter  w i l l  now address 
some of  t he i s s ues  r a i s e d  by mo de l i ng  d i f f e r e n c e s .  Thi s  
d i scuss i on  w i l l  be f o l l o w e d  by an exami nat i on of  the i ssues 
and r e s u l t s  a r i s i n g  f rom these models and approaches.
Mo d e l i n g  d i f f e r e n c e s  can be e x p l a i n e d  i n  t erms of  at  
l e a s t  t h r e e  key a s s u m p t i o n s .  The f i r s t  c o n c e r n s  t he  
c omp e t i t i v e  nat ur e of  the l oan and depos i t  markets in which 
the i n t e r med i a r y  operates.  In the l oan and depos i t  markets 
t h a t  are assumed p e r f e c t l y  c o m p e t i t i v e ,  t he i n t e r m e d i a r y
^^Sudhakar D. Deshmukh, S t ua r t  I. Greenbaum, and George 
Kanatas,  " I n t e r e s t  Rate Unc er t a i n t y  and the F i nanc i a l  I n t e r ­
mediary ' s  Choice of  Exposure. "  Journal  o f  F i nance, 38:141-  
47. March,  1983.
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behaves as a q u a n t i t y  s e t t e r  or  r a t e  t a k e r .  That  i s ,  i t  has 
no c o n t r o l  o v e r  t he r a t e s  t o  be pa i d  on l oans  or  on the 
y i e l d s  pr ov i ded to depos i t o r s .  These rates  are e s s e n t i a l l y  
exogenous to the i n s t i t u t i o n  and cannot  be determined w i t h i n  
the model .  Two i mmedi a t e  consequences o f  t h i s  assumpt i on 
are 1) u n c e r t a i n t y  e n t e r s  v i a  random r a t e s  o f  r e t u r n  on 
assets and l i a b i l i t i e s ,  and 2) on l y  a p o r t f o l i o  dec i s i on has 
to be made to s p e c i f y  c o m p l e t e l y  t he b a l a n c e  shee t  o f  the 
i n s t i t u t i o n .
Such i s  the case of  p o r t f o l i o  models.  I f  on the other  
hand, the l oan and depos i t  markets are assumed i mper f ec t  in 
n a t u r e ,  t he i n t e r m e d i a r y  becomes a r a t e - s e t t e r  i n t hese 
mar ke t s  and e x e r t s  c o mp l e t e  c o n t r o l  ov e r  r a t e  d e c i s i o n s .  
Wi t h t h i s  t ype o f  b e h a v i o r a l  mode, t he i n t e r m e d i a r y  f aces 
qua n t i t y  u n c e r t a i n t y  and must bal ance assets and l i a b i l i t i e s  
be f o r e  and a f t e r  r a t e s  are announced.  The p r ob l em becomes 
more cumbersome in t h a t  the p o s s i b i l i t y  e x i s t s  t ha t  assets 
mi gh t  f a l l  s h o r t  o f  l i a b i l i t i e s .  I t  i s  t h i s  p o s s i b i l i t y  
t h a t  g i v e s  r i s e  to a l i q u i d i t y  d e c i s i o n  t h a t  must  be made at  
the s t a r t  o f  t he p e r i o d :  enough l i q u i d  asse t s  must  be on 
hand or  the i n t e r med i a r y  must have access to funds t ha t  can 
be bor rowed i n o r d e r  t o meet  l i q u i d i t y  d e f i c i e n c i e s .  Such 
i s the case of  f i r m - t h e o r e t i c  models.
A second assumpt ion t ha t  d i s t i n g u i s h e s  f i r m - t h e o r e t i c  
f rom p o r t f o l i o  models concerns the r i s k  pref erences of  the 
i n t e r m e d i a r y ' s  s h a r e h o l d e r s .  In c o n t r a s t  t o  p o r t f o l i o  
models,  f i r m - t h e o r e t i c  models assume l i n e a r  r i s k  preferences
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or  r i s k  n e u t r a l i t y  on the p a r t  o f  t he i n s t i t u t i o n .  Thi s  
i mp l i es  t h a t  the i n t e r med i a r y  does not  cons i der  the v a r i a ­
b i l i t y  o f  i t s  i ncome s t r eam as a f a c t o r  i n i t s  o b j e c t i v e  
f unc t i on .  Presumably,  a r i s k - n e u t r a l  i n t e r med i a r y  would be 
w i l l i n g  t o ac c ep t  a r a t e  o f  r e t u r n  on l oans  equal  t o the 
r i s k - f r e e  r a t e  r egar d l ess  of  the per ce i ved r i s k  of  the loan.
The t h i r d  and f i n a l  d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  assumpt ion r e l a t e s  
t o t he e x i s t e n c e  o f  r e s o u r c e  c o s t s .  C l a s s i f i e d  as f i r m -  
t h e o r e t i c ,  p r o d u c t i o n  c o s t  model s  have emphasi zed the 
presence of  real  resource cost s i ncu r r ed  by the i n t e r med i ar y  
in p r o v i d i n g  depos i t o r s  wi t h  such s e r v i ces  as safekeeping,  
check c l e a r i n g ,  and bookkeep i ng .  However ,  p r opounder s  of  
t hese t ype  o f  mode l s  have,  f o r  t he most  p a r t ,  n e g l e c t e d  to 
c o n s i d e r  such i m p o r t a n t  aspec t s  o f  t he t h e o r y  of  i n t e r m e ­
d i a r i e s  as n o n l i n e a r  r i s k  p r e f e r e n c e s ,  i m p e r f e c t  mar ke t s ,  
and l i q u i d i t y  adj ust ment  costs.
In t erms of  s i g n i f i c a n t  r e s u l t s ,  t he m a j o r i t y  of  the 
e a r l i e r  work done on the theory of  depos i t o r y  i n t e r med i a r i es  
tended to concent r a t e  on i ssues concerni ng the s e p a r a b i l i t y  
of  the i n t e r med i a r y ' s  asset  and l i a b i l i t y  dec i s i ons .  Most 
n o t a b l y  Py l e , ^ ® us i ng  a p o r t f o l i o  mode l ,  c on c l u d e d  t h a t  
asset  and l i a b i l i t y  p o r t f o l i o s  of  the i n t e r med i a r y  g e n e r a l l y  
cou l d  not  be chosen i ndependent l y .  A d d i t i o n a l l y ,  h i s  s t a t e ­
ment concerni ng the necessary c ond i t i ons  f o r  i n t e r med i a t i on  
to occur  s t i l l  remains as one of  the most i mpor t ant  r e s u l t s
3Bpyle,  l oc .  c i t .
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
33
i n  t h i s  area.
K l e i n ^ S  p r o v i d e d  a no t he r  s i g n i f i c a n t  c o n t r i b u t i o n  to 
t h i s  a r e a  o f  f i n a n c e .  B a s i n g  h i s  r e s u l t s  on a f i r m -  
t h e o r e t i c  model  of  the i n t e r med i a r y ,  K l e i n  concl uded t ha t  
as s e t  and l i a b i l i t y  d e c i s i o n s  o f  t he i n t e r m e d i a r y  were 
i ndependent .
More r e c e n t l y ,  Seal ey^O a t t e mp t e d  t o show t h a t  t he 
c o n c l u s i o n s  reached by Py l e  l a c k e d  g e n e r a l i t y  and were 
r e s t r i c t e d  to cases where the i n t e r m e d i a r y  was assumed to 
f o l l o w  a q u a n t i t y - s e t t i n g  b e h a v i o r a l  mode. Seal ey  a l s o  
i n v e s t i g a t e d  t he e f f e c t s  o f  r i s k  a v e r s i o n  on the i n t e r ­
me d i a r y ' s  l oan  p o s i t i o n  and d e p o s i t  r a t e  d e c i s i o n .  His 
conc l us i ons  were most l y  r e s t r i c t e d  by the f u n c t i o n a l  form of  
the depos i t  suppl y  f u n c t i o n  used in hi s model .
Chapt er  3 w i l l  i n t r o d u c e  a r a t e - s e t t i n g  model  o f  t he 
i n t e r m e d i a r y  under  u n c e r t a i n t y .  The model  i s  used to 
ex ami n e  t he  e f f e c t s  o f  q u a n t i t y  u n c e r t a i n t y  and r i s k  
a v e r s i o n  on t he i n t e r m e d i a r y ' s  management  o f  i t s  spread 
between l oan and depos i t  rates.
^^ K l e i n ,  l o c .  c i t .
40sealey,  op. c i t . ,  pp. 1150-51.
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C h a p t e r  3
A MODEL OF A DEPOSITORY FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARY
The appr oaches  empl oyed i n  mo d e l i n g  the b e h a v i o r  of  
f i n a n c i a l  i n t e r m e d i a r i e s  have been t he  s u b j e c t  o f  
c ons i de r ab l e  c on t r ove r sy . ^  The i ssues have ranged f rom the 
e f f e c t s  o f  r e g u l a t i o n  (such as c a p i t a l  adequacy) to problems 
d e a l i n g  w i t h  t h e  management  o f  s p e c i f i c  a s s e t s  and 
l i a b i l i t i e s .  One a s p e c t  o f  t h e  t h e o r y  o f  f i n a n c i a l  
i n t e r m e d i a r i e s  has r e c e i v e d  f a r  l e s s  a t t e n t i o n  i n  t he 
l i t e r a t u r e :  the r a t e - s e t t i n g  behav i o r  of  depos i t o r y  i n t e r ­
m e d i a r i e s  i n  an u n c e r t a i n  e n v i r o n me n t .  Se a l e y ^  was among 
t he f i r s t  t o  c o n s i d e r  t he  e f f e c t s  o f  u n c e r t a i n  d e p o s i t  
s u p p l i e s  on the e x - a n t e  d e p o s i t  r a t e  pa i d  by a r i s k  ave r s e  
i n t e r m e d i a r y .  More r e c e n t l y ,  Chateau^ c o n s i d e r e d  r a t e -  
s e t t i n g  s t r a t e g i e s  under  c o r r e l a  t e d - u n c o r r e l a t e d  m u l t i ­
depos i t  markets usi ng a model  of  an i n t e r med i a r y  w i t h i n  the 
CAPM f ramework.
For  a s u r v e y  o f  a l t e r n a t i v e  approaches see E r n s t  
Bal  t ensperger ,  " A l t e r n a t i v e  Approaches to the Theory of  the 
Banking Fi rm, "  Journal  of  Monetary Economics, 5: 1-37,  
January,  1980.
 ^C. W. S e a l e y ,  J r . ,  " D e p o s i t  Rat e S e t t i n g ,  R i s k  
A v e r s i o n ,  and the Theory  o f  D e p o s i t o r y  F i n a n c i a l  I n t e r m e ­
d i a r i e s , "  Journal  o f  F i nance, 35:1139-54,  December 1980.
 ^J . P. C h a t e a u ,  "On DF I ' s  L i a b i l i t y  Ma n a g e me n t , "  
Journal  o f  Banking and Fi nance, 6:533-47,  1982.
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Up to da t e ,  most  have f ocused  on e x t e n d i n g  the t heor y  
o f  d e p o s i t o r y  i n t e r m e d i a r i e s  t o c o n s i d e r  d e p o s i t  r a t e  
s e t t i n g  under u n c e r t a i n t y  and r i s k  aver s i on.  As Mason^ has 
p o i n t e d  o u t ,  d e p o s i t o r y  i n t e r m e d i a r i e s  ar e ,  f o r  t he most  
pa r t ,  ex - ant e  r a t e  s e t t e r s  in the l oan and depos i t  markets.  
Ex-ante r a t e  s e t t i n g  coupl ed wi t h  a downward-s l opi ng demand 
f o r  l oans  and an u p w a r d - s l o p i n g  s u p p l y  o f  d e p o s i t s  causes 
t he i n t e r m e d i a r y ' s  b a l a n c e  shee t  t o be u n c e r t a i n .  One 
i m p o r t a n t  e f f e c t  o f  t h i s  u n c e r t a i n t y  i s  on t he l i q u i d i t y  
t ha t  these i n s t i t u t i o n s  must  mai n t a i n  in order  to deal  wi t h  
unexpected changes i n assets and l i a b i l i t i e s .
For  more t han a decade d e p o s i t o r y  i n s t i t u t i o n s  have 
at tempted to manage t h e i r  bal ance sheets by f ocus i ng on the 
l i a b i l i t y  si de.  One l i a b i l i t y  management p r a c t i c e  which has 
f ound wi des p r ea d  use among d e p o s i t o r y  i n s t i t u t i o n s  i s  the 
s o - c a l  l e d  " sp r ead  m a n a g e m e n t ".5 Spread management  emerged 
dur i ng the e a r l y  1970's when depos i t o r y  i n s t i t u t i o n s  e x p e r i ­
enced i n c r eas i ng  l oan demand coupl ed wi t h  d e c l i n i n g  growth 
i n  d e p o s i t s .  I n s t i t u t i o n s  such as banks t u r n e d  t o  non­
d e p o s i t  sour ces  of  f unds  t o meet  t h e i r  needs w h i l e  ma i n ­
t a i n i n g  an adequat e spr ead between l e n d i n g  and b o r r ow i ng  
r a t e s .  The mechani sm by wh i ch  i n s t i t u t i o n s  d e t e r mi ne  and
4john M. Mason, " Mo d e l l i n g  Mutual  Funds and Commercial  
Banks, "  Journal  of  Banking and Fi nance, 3: 347-53,  1979.
^For  examp l e ,  A r n o l d  D i l l ,  " L i a b i l i t y  Management  
Banking, "  Mont h l y  Review,  Federal  Reserve Bank of  A t l a n t a , 
56:223,  December,  1974.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
36
con t r o l  the spread i s ye t  to be understood.®
The purpose of  t h i s  d i s s e r t a t i o n  i s to exp l o r e  systema­
t i c a l l y  t he s i mu l t a n e o u s  l oan  and d e p o s i t  r a t e - s e t t i n g  
b e h a v i o r  o f  d e p o s i t o r y  f i n a n c i a l  i n t e r m e d i a r i e s  under  
a l t e r n a t i v e  r i s k  p r e f e r e n c e s .  Th i s  c h a p t e r  d e s c r i b e s  
the proposed model and i t s  s o l u t i o n .
The proposed model i s t ha t  of  a r a t e - s e t t i n g  depos i t or y  
f i n a n c i a l  i n t e r med i ar y  under c ond i t i ons  of  unc e r t a i n t y .  In 
essence,  the view of  the i n t er medi ar y  proposed in t h i s  study 
i s  ana l ogous  to t h a t  o f  a spread manager  a t t e m p t i n g  to 
max i mi ze the ex pec t ed  u t i l i t y  o f  p r o f i t s  s u b j e c t  t o a 
balance sheet  c o n s t r a i n t .  Acco r d i ng l y ,  the spread i s taken 
to be the d i f f e r e n c e  between t he r a t e  charged on l oans  and 
the y i e l d  o f f e r ed  on deposi t  l i a b i l i t i e s .
The f r amework  empl oyed i s  a s i n g l e  p e r i o d  or  s t a t i c  
model .  U n c e r t a i n t y  en t e r s  t he model  i n two ways:  random 
loan demand and random depos i t  supp l i es  at  the s t a r t  of  the 
dec i s i on  per i od.
The i n t e r med i a r y  i s  assumed to hol d assets c ons i s t i ng  
o f  l oans  and r e s e r v e s  i n  t he f orm o f  i n v e s t m e n t s  i n  the 
Feder a l  f unds  mar ke t .  Onl y  a s i n g l e  t ype  o f  d e p o s i t  
l i a b i l i t y  i s  c on s i d e r e d .  In a d d i t i o n ,  t he model  assumes 
t ha t  the i n t e r med i ar y  has access to the Federal  funds market  
as a source of  nondeposi t  f i nanc i ng  and t ha t  equ i t y  c ap i t a l
®Two reasons t ha t  perhaps account  f o r  t h i s  are 1) l ack 
o f  s u p p o r t  f o r  t h i s  p r a c t i c e  f rom the f i n a n c e  d i s c i p l i n e ,
2) absence of  model s  of  the i n t e r m e d i a r y  wh i ch emphasi ze 
t h i s  behav i or .
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equal s  zero.^ The i n t e r med i a r y  i ncur s  r eal  resource cost s 
i n t he p r o d u c t i o n  and ma i n t enance  o f  s e r v i c e s  a s s o c i a t e d  
wi t h  l oan and depos i t  con t r ac t s .  Product i on (and thus cost  
f u n c t i o n s  o f  t he i n t e r m e d i a r y )  are assumed s epa r a b l e . ® 
F i n a l l y ,  the model  r ecogni zes the p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  l i q u i d i t y  
adj ustment  cost s assoc i a t ed wi t h  random depos i t  supp l i es  and 
uncer t a i n  l oan demand.
Th i s  c h a p t e r  i s  o r g a n i z e d  as f o l l o w s .  I t  f i r s t  
d e s c r i b e s  the model  and i t s  as sumpt i ons .  The model ' s  
s o l u t i o n ,  s t r u c t u r e d  i n t o  f o u r  p a r t s ,  t hen f o l l o w s :  1)
C e r t a i n t y  E q u i v a l e n t  Case,  2) Loan U n c e r t a i n t y  Case,  3) 
De p o s i t  U n c e r t a i n t y  Case,  4) Loan and De p o s i t  U n c e r t a i n t y  
Case.
S t r uc t u r e  o f  the Balance Sheet
The depos i t o r y  i n t e r med i a r y  descr i bed i n t h i s  model can 
acqui re two k i nds o f  asset s :  l oans ( p r i v a t e  o b l i g a t i o n s  of
i n d i v i d u a l s  and f i r ms )  and loans in the Federal  funds market  
( l e n d i n g  excess f unds ) .  The i n t e r m e d i a r y  i s s ues  two t ypes
^One of  the d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of  f i n a n c i a l  
i n t e r m e d i a r i e s  i s  t he s ma l l  amount  o f  c a p i t a l  h e l d  i n 
r e l a t i o n  t o  t o t a l  l i a b i l i t i e s .  In most  cases,  c a p i t a l  
r e g u l a t i o n  sets a minimum r a t i o  of  net  wor th to depos i t s  f o r  
t hese f i r m s .  See f o r  exampl e ,  O l i v e r  D. Ha r t  and Dwi ght  M. 
J a f f e e ,  "On t he  A p p l i c a t i o n  o f  P o r t f o l i o  Th e o r y  t o 
D e p o s i t o r y  F i n a n c i a l  I n t e r m e d i a r i e s , "  Rev iew o f  Economic 
S t ud i es , 41:129-47,  January 1974.
®C. W. Se a l e y ,  Jr .  and J. T. L i n d l e y ,  " Ou t p u t s ,  I n p u t s ,  
and a Theory  o f  P r o d u c t i o n  Cost  a t  D e p o s i t o r y  F i n a n c i a l  
I n s t i t u t i o n s , "  J ou r n a l  o f  F i nance .  32 : 1251- 66 ,  September  
1977 .
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of  l i a b i l i t i e s :  d e p o s i t s ^  and b o r r o w i n g s  i n t he Feder a l
funds market .
The bal ance sheet  c o n s t r a i n t  takes the f o l l o w i n g  form:
L* + R = D* (3-1)
where :
L* = ex-ant e l oans.
R = Federal  funds l end i ng / bo r r ow i n g .
D* = ex-ant e depos i t s .
Note t h a t  R i s  a c ompos i t e  v a r i a b l e  r e p r e s e n t i n g  t he ne t  
l end i ng  and bor rowi ng in the Federal  funds market .  An R > 0 
i m p l i e s  t h a t  t he i n t e r m e d i a r y  i s  a n e t  l e n d e r  o f  Feder a l  
f unds .  I f  R = 0, t he  i n t e r m e d i a r y  does not  l end  or bor r ow 
Feder a l  f unds .  F i n a l l y ,  an R < 0 i m p l i e s  t he i n t e r m e d i a r y  
i s  a net  bor rower  in the Federal  funds market .
The model  assumes t h a t  t he i n t e r m e d i a r y  h o l d s  no 
c a p i t a l ,  an assumpt i on  adopt ed i n s e v e r a l  p l a c e s  i n  the 
l i t e r a t u r e .  For example.  Har t  and Ja f f ee^^  j u s t i f i e d  t h i s  
assumpt ion by p o i n t i n g  out  t h a t  c a p i t a l  c o n s t i t u t e s  a smal l  
po r t i on  of  the i n t e r med i a r y ' s  t o t a l  c l a i ms.  Fur t hermore,  in 
most  i n s t a n c e s ,  c a p i t a l  r ema i ns  f i x e d  r e l a t i v e  to d e p o s i t  
l i a b i l i t i e s .  The model  a l so  abs t r ac t s  f rom l ega l  r eser ve 
r e q u i r e m e n t s  and o t h e r  r e g u l a t o r y  c o n s t r a i n t s  u s u a l l y  
imposed on f i n a n c i a l  i n t e r med i a r i es .
^Note t h a t  a s i n g l e  t ype o f  homogeneous,  i n t e r e s t  
bear i ng l i a b i l i t y  i s assumed.
10 Har t  and J a f f e e ,  op. c i t . ,  pp. 130-32.
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The I n t e r med i a r y ' s  Loan Market  
Loans are p r i v a t e  con t r ac t s  i ssued by the i n t er medi ar y  
and hel d by i n d i v i d u a l  economic u n i t s .  The average ma t u r i t y  
o f  a l oan  c o n t r a c t  i s  assumed to c o i n c i d e  w i t h  t he l e n g t h  of  
t he i n t e r m e d i a r y ' s  d e c i s i o n  p e r i o d .  A l l  bo r r owe r s  are 
v i ewed as homogeneous by the i n t e r m e d i a r y  and w i t h  equal  
r i s k  o f  d e f a u l t  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .  A l l  n o n p r i c e  t erms on 
l oans ,  such as c o l l a t e r a l  p r ov i s i ons  and o t her  p r o t e c t i v e  
covenants are assumed i d e n t i c a l  f o r  every bor rower .
The i n t e r med i a r y  faces a l oan market  c ha r ac t e r i zed  by 
mar ke t  i m p e r f e c t i o n s  and demand u n c e r t a i n t y . ! !  Under  an 
i m p e r f e c t  l oan mar ke t ,  t he i n t e r m e d i a r y  s e t s  i t s  r a t e  on 
l o a n s  and c o n f r o n t s  a random demand c u r v e  f o r  l o a n s .  The 
model  assumes t ha t  the i n t e r med i a r y ' s  l oan demand f un c t i o n  
c o n t a i n s  a random e r r o r  t erm whi ch i s  unknown a t  t he t i me 
r a t e  d e c i s i o n s  are made. In i t s  most  gen e r a l  f o r m,  t he 
i n t e r med i a r y ' s  l oan demand can be w r i t t e n  as
L* = L*( r i _,  y ) , (3-2 )
where L* i s  the amount of  l oans demanded, r|_ i s  the r at e of  
i n t e r e s t  on l oans ,  and y i s  a random term hav i n g  a known 
p r o b a b i l i t y  d e n s i t y  f u n c t i o n  g(y) .  The random f u n c t i o n  in 
( 3 - 2 )  s i m p l y  s t a t e s  t h a t  f o r  each s e t  o f  v a l u e s  f o r  r a n d  
y , t he  i n t e r m e d i a r y  knows the amount  o f  l o ans  t h a t  w i l l  be 
demanded.  But ,  s i n c e  y i s  unknown a t  t he s t a r t  o f  t he
l ^An ex t ens i ve  amount of  l i t e r a t u r e  dea l s  w i t h  demand 
u n c e r t a i n t y  i n the c o n t e x t  of  t he m a n u f a c t u r i n g  f i r m .  For  
e x a m p l e ,  Hay ne E. Le l a n d ,  " T h e o r y  o f  t h e  F i r m  F a c i n g  
Uncer t a i n  Demand," American Economic Review, 62:278-91,
June, 1972.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
40
dec i s i on  per i od,  the i n t e r med i ar y  i s unable to f o r ec as t  the 
e x a c t  v a l u e  o f  L* i n  a d v a nc e  and mus t  w a i t  u n t i l  a 
p a r t i c u l a r  va l ue of  y obt a i ns .  I t  i s assumed t ha t  the si ze 
o f y  canno t  be a l t e r e d  by chang i ng  r O n e  a d d i t i o n a l  
assumpt ion concerns the f u n c t i o n a l  form of  the random loan 
demand g i v e n  by ( 3 - 2 ) :  y a f f e c t s  t he q u a n t i t y  o f  l oans  
demanded i n an a d d i t i v e  f a s h i o n . T h u s ,  t he l o a n  demand 
f unc t i on  i s  w r i t t e n  as
L* = L(ri_} + y , (3-3)
where L( r^)  i s the c e r t a i n  l oan demand and y has an expected 
v a l u e  equal  to zer o ov e r  i t s  domain ( - L,  ») .  In a d d i t i o n ,  
L(r|_) i s assumed to be a downward-s l opi ng f un c t i o n  of  r|_; or 
L ' ( r L ) < 0 .
The i n t e r m e d i a r y  i n c u r s  r es ou r c e  cos t s  i n  c o n n e c t i o n  
wi t h  the maintenance and s e r v i c e  of  l oan c on t r ac t s .  Costs 
i nc l ude  those r e s u l t i n g  f rom the e v a l u a t i o n  and c on t r o l  of  
co l  l a t e r a l ,  a p p r a i s a l  o f  c r e d i t  r i s k s ,  bookkeep i ng  c os t s ,  
and so on. The t o t a l  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  costs on loans is gi ven 
by the product  of  a cons t ant  margi nal  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  cost  on 
l oans,  C|_, t imes the t o t a l  amount of  l oans,  L*.
The I n t e r med i a r y ' s  Deposi t  Market  
The model  w i l l  c o n s i d e r  a s i n g l e  homogeneous t ype of  
depos i t  l i a b i l i t y .  The i n t e r med i a r y  acts as a monopsonist
l ^ F o r  p r o p e r t i e s  o f  random demand f u n c t i o n s  hav i ng  
a d d i t i v e  f o r m,  see Edwin S. M i l l s ,  " U n c e r t a i n t y  and Pr i c e  
Theory, "  Qua r t e r l y  Journal  of  Economics,  73:116-29,  February,  
1 959 .
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
41
i n t he d e p o s i t  ma r k e t ,  s e t t i n g  t he r a t e  o f  i n t e r e s t  on 
depos i t s  and c o n f r on t i ng  an upwar d- s l op i ng suppl y f unc t i on  
of  d e p o s i t s .  U n c e r t a i n t y  i n t he d e p o s i t  mar ke t  i s  model ed 
t h r o ugh  t he use o f  an a d d i t i v e  random term e w i t h  known 
p r o b a b i l i t y  d e n s i t y  f u n c t i o n  h ( c ) .  The d e p o s i t  s upp l y  
f un c t i o n  i s  g i ven by
D* = D( ro)  + E , ( 3-4)
where Df rg)  i s  t he c e r t a i n  d e p o s i t  s u p p l y ;  E i s a  random 
d i s t u r bance term w i t h  expected v a l ue  of  zero over  i t s  domain 
( - D , “  ). D f r g )  i s  an u p w a r d - s l o p i n g  f u n c t i o n  o f  r  g ; 
DX r o ) > 0 .
The margi nal  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  cost  i ncur r ed  in the mai n­
tenance of  depos i t  con t r ac t s  i s assumed constant .  The t o t a l  
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  cost  of  depos i t s  i s  gi ven as the produc t  of  
t he ma r g i na l  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  c o s t  of  d e p o s i t s ,  Cg, and t he 
amount of  depos i t s ,  D*.
Federal  Funds Bor rowi ng/ Lendi ng and the Timing of  Deci s i ons
The depos i t o r y  i n t e r med i a r y  i s  assumed to have access 
to t he b o r r o w i n g  and l e n d i n g  o f  f unds  in t he Feder a l  f unds  
mar ke t .  Through i t s  c ho i c e  o f  r|_ and r ^ ,  t he i n t e r m e d i a r y  
w i l l  a l s o  be s e l e c t i n g  whe t he r  i t  wants t o be an expec t ed  
net  l e n d e r  (R>0) ,  expec t ed  net  bo r r owe r  (R<0),  or  n e i t h e r  a 
l ender  nor  a bor rower  (R=0). The u l t i ma t e  r e a l i z e d  va l ue  of  
R depends on r a t e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  and c ond i t i ons  in the l oan 
and depos i t  markets.
The i n t e r med i a r y  w i l l  not  be assumed to be a s t o r e r  of  
l i q u i d i t y ,  t h a t  i s ,  one keep i ng  a c e r t a i n  amount  o f  l i q u i d
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assets on stock to meet l i q u i d i t y  needs. I ns t ead,  the f i r m 
uses t he Fede r a l  f unds  mar ke t  as a sour ce  or  as a use of  
f unds  i n  o r d e r  t o make needed b a l a n c e - s h e e t  a d j u s t me n t s  
a f t e r  r e s o l u t i o n  of  l oan and depos i t  u n c e r t a i n t i e s .
The t i mi ng  of  dec i s i ons  i s as f o l l o w s .  At  the s t a r t  of  
i t s  d e c i s i o n  p e r i o d ,  t he i n t e r m e d i a r y  makes d e c i s i o n s  
c o n c e r n i n g  t he r a t e s  on l o a n s  and d e p o s i t s .  Assumed known 
at  t h i s  p o i n t  are 1) t he p r o b a b i l i t y  d e n s i t y  f u n c t i o n s  of  
U and G, and 2) L(r|_) and D( rg)  a t  t he s e l e c t e d  r a t e s  r ^  and 
rg.  F o l l o w i n g  t he s e l e c t i o n  of  r|_ and r ^ ,  t he u n c e r t a i n t y  
sur roundi ng l oan demand i s r evea l ed .  I mmedi ate l y  f o l l o w i n g  
t h i s ,  t he s u p p l y  o f  d e p o s i t s  a t  t he pos t ed  r a t e ,  r g , i s  
r e a l i z e d .  At  t h i s  p o i n t ,  t he  i n t e r m e d i a r y  makes t he  
nec essar y  b a l a n c e - s h e e t  a d j u s t me n t s  by us i n g  t he Feder a l  
f unds  m a r k e t . 13 Th i s  e v e n t u a l l y  d e t e r mi nes  t he v a l u e  of  
p r o f i t  at  the end of  the per i od.
The I n t e r me d i a r y ' s  Ob j ec t i ve  Funct i on
The i n t e r m e d i a r y ' s  o b j e c t i v e  i s  t o  m a x i m i z e  t he  
expec t ed  u t i l i t y  o f  p r o f i t s  s u b j e c t  t o a b a l a n c e  shee t  
c o n s t r a i n t .  Let  U(II) be a von Neuma nn - Mor ge ns te rn u t i l i t y  
f u n c t i o n  def i ned in terms of  end - o f - pe r i od  p r o f i t s ,  H , wi t h  
p r o p e r t i e s  such t h a t  U' ( l l ) >0 ,  and U" ( I I ) ^0,  depend i ng  on 
whe t he r  t he i n t e r m e d i a r y  i s  r i s k  s eeke r ,  r i s k  n e u t r a l ,  or 
r i s k  averse.
l ^The  Feder a l  f unds  mar ke t  i s  assumed to be p e r f e c t l y  
c omp e t i t i v e  w i t h  a p e r f e c t l y  e l a s t i c  suppl y  of  funds at  an 
exogenous ra t e  of  r%.
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The o p t i m i z a t i o n  problem i s  gi ven by
L -DU(n)h(e)g(y  )dedy (3-5)Maximize U = 
rU' To
s ub j ec t  t o:
L* + R = D*,
where U i s the expected val ue of  U(n) .
P r o f i t s  can be exp r essed  as the d i f f e r e n c e  between 
revenues and cos t s :
H = ri^L - c L - rQD - CqD + rR. (3-5)
The cons t r a i ned o p t i m i z a t i o n  problem g i ven by (3-5)  can 
be t r a n s f o r m e d  i n t o  an u n c o n s t r a i n e d  o b j e c t i v e  f u n c t i o n .  
S o l v i n g  f o r  R ou t  o f  ( 3-1) ,  and us i ng  t he d e f i n i t i o n s  of  L* 
and D* g i v e n  by ( 3 - 3 )  and ( 3 - 4 )  r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  ( 3 - 5 )  can be 
s t at ed as : . „  . „
Maximize
r t . r o
,0 U{rL(L( r | _)  + y ) - C|__(L(rL) + y )
- rQ( D( rg)  + e) - CQ(D(rQ) + e) + r [ D( r Q)  + e
- L(r|_) - y ] } h  (e )g(y )dedy. (3-7)
Risk Premiums and Measures of  Ri sk Avers i on 
Be f o r e  c o n s i d e r i n g  t he s o l u t i o n  o f  t he mode l ,  i t  i s 
use f u l  at  t h i s  p o i n t  t o r ev i ew the not i ons  of  r i s k  premiums
and measures o f  r i s k  a v e r s i o n  as t hey have been a p p l i e d  to
i n d i v i d u a l s .  Risk premium i s  def i ned as the maximum amount 
of  ex pec t ed  i ncome a r i s k  av e r s e  i n d i v i d u a l  i s  w i l l i n g  to 
f orego i n order  to avo i d  a r i s k y  prospect .  Risk premium can 
al so be i n t e r p r e t e d  as the maximum amount of  expected income 
a r i s k  p r e f e r r i n g  i n d i v i d u a l  i s w i l l i n g  to pay in order  to 
ob t a i n  a r i s k y  pr ospec t .
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
44
Fi gure 1(a) i l l u s t r a t e s  the case of  an i n d i v i d u a l  wi th 
a r i s k  averse u t i l i t y  f unc t i on .  Suppose t h i s  i n d i v i d u a l  is
U(C)U(D)
(a) r i s k  averse (b) r i s k  n e u t r a l i t y  (c)  r i s k  p r e f e r r i n g
Fi gure 1 
Risk Premiums and 
A t t i t u d e s  towards Risk
faced w i t h  a random game which coul d i ncrease hi s wea l t h  to 
t he l e v e l  , or  l o we r  i t  down to I I q. The i n d i v i d u a l ' s  
expected weal t h would be gi ven by II. The c e r t a i n t y  
equ i v a l en t  of  the game, II, would then by def i ned by
n =n -  8 *
where 0  ^ i s  t he r i s k  premium f o r  the r i s k  averse u t i l i t y  
f u n c t i o n .  I t  i s  e a s i l y  v e r i f i e d  t ha t  6 ® > 0, s i n c e  H > H, 
as shown i n F i g u r e  1(a) .  F i g u r e s  1(b)  and 1(c)  i l l u s t r a t e  
t he r i s k  n e u t r a l  and r i s k  p r e f e r r i n g  cases.From 1 (b) i t  i s 
c l e a r  t h a t  i f  t he u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  i s  l i n e a r  i n  H ( r i s k  
n e u t r a l  case) ,  the r i s k  n e u t r a l  premium,  , e q u a l s  zero.  
On t he o t h e r  hand,  i f  t he i n d i v i d u a l  p r e f e r s  r i s k  ( convex 
u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n ) ,  the r i s k  premium i s l ess  than zero.  The 
r i s k  p r e f e r r i n g  premium, denoted by 0P, i s def i ned by
n = n -  e P ,
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where H i s  t he c e r t a i n t y  e q u i v a l e n t  o f  H f o r  t he r i s k  
p r e f e r r i n g  case.  F i g u r e  1 (c)  shows l i l i e s  to the r i g h t  of  
ff. Co ns equ en t l y ,  eP < 0, s i nce  the i n d i v i d u a l  i s  w i l l i n g  to 
pay in order  t o engage i n a r i s k y  gamble.  Note t ha t  as r i s k  
aver s i on decreases,  the s i ze of  the r i s k  premium decreases 
as w e l l ,  and > g"  > gP. i t  s h o u l d  a l s o  be not ed t h a t  
g i ven r i s k  aver s i on ,  the r i s k  premium i s  always g r ea t e r  than 
zero.  Fur t hermore,  f o r  a gi ven r i s k y  prospect ,  the gr eat er  
t he r i s k  premium,  t he more r i s k  av e r s e  an i n d i v i d u a l  i s .  
Thus,  t he s i z e  o f  t he r i s k  premium measures the degree or  
s t r e n g t h  o f  r i s k  a v e r s i o n  e x h i b i t e d  by a u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  
f o r  a gi ven r i s k y  gamble.
As a measure of  r i s k  aver s i on ,  the r i s k  premium depends 
on the u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  and on t he d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  the 
random prospect  being consi dered.  For a gi ven r i s k y  gamble,  
t he  s i z e  o f  t he  p r emi um demanded depends  upon t he  
i n d i v i d u a l ' s  i n i t i a l  w e a l t h .  I f  t he s i z e  o f  t he r i s k  
premium demanded f o r  a gi ven r i s k y  prospect  decreases as the 
i n d i v i d u a l ' s  weal t h  i ncreases then hi s behav i or  i s cons i s ­
t e n t  w i t h  d e c r e a s i n g  a b s o l u t e  r i s k  a v e r s i o n  (DARA). Thi s  
case i s i l l u s t r a t e d  below in Fi gure 2.
F i g u r e  2 shows t he r i s k  premi ums,  g^ and 8^, demanded 
by a r i s k  averse i n d i v i d u a l  f o r  the same r i s k y  gamble at  two 
d i f f e r e n t  l e v e l s  of  p r o f i t ,  IIq and The expected val ues
o f  iIq and are g i v e n  by ITq and r e s p e c t i v e l y .  Wi th
decreasing abso l u t e  r i s k  aver s i on,  i f  one o f f e r ed  the same 
r i s k y  p r o s p e c t  to a r i s k  ave r s e  i n d i v i d u a l  a t  Eg and then at
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, the s i ze of  the r i s k  premium demanded by the i n d i v i d u a l
0 n, no
Fi gure 2
Decreasing Absolute Risk Aversi on 
would decrease as h i s / h e r  l e v e l  of  weal t h  (or  p r o f i t  i n t h i s  
case)  i n c r e a s e d .  As shown i n F i g u r e  2, 0^ > s i nc e  >
n, I f  t he  r i s k  p r emi um demanded by t he  i n d i v i d u a l
i ncreased w i t h  h i s / h e r  wea l t h ,  then h i s / he r  behav i or  would 
be c ons i s t e n t  wi t h  i nc r eas i ng  abso l u t e  r i s k  aver s i on (lARA). 
F i n a l l y ,  i f  the r i s k  premium demanded by the i n d i v i d u a l  f o r  
a g i ven r i s k y  prospect  remains unchanged as h i s / h e r  weal t h  
changes,  then the i n d i v i d u a l ' s  behav i or  i s c ons i s t en t  wi t h  
cons t ant  abso l u t e  r i s k  aver s i on  (CARA).
An i m p o r t a n t  measure o f  r i s k  a v e r s i o n  i n t he a b s o l u t e  
sense was f i r s t  d e v e l o p e d  by P r a t t ^ ^  and i n d e p e n d e n t l y  by 




■J. W. P r a t t ,  " Ri sk  A v e r s i o n  i n  t he Smal l  and in t he 
Large "  Economet r i ca 32:122-36,  January,  1974.
K. J. Ar row,  Essays i n  t he Theory o f  Ri sk Bear i n g
(Markham, Chicago,  l9"Tl T-
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def i ned as :
U"(H)
R a ( n )  = -  --------------'a
U’ (n)
where U' (n)  and U"(n)  are t he f i r s t  and second d e r i v a t i v e s  
o f  t he u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o p r o f i t .  Rg(n) 
measures abso l u t e  r i s k  aver s i on  at  a g i ven l e v e l  of  weal t h 
( i n terms of  p r o f i t  or  income),  and f o r  a p a r t i c u l a r  u t i l i t y  
f u n c t i o n .  P r a t t ^ ^  demonst rated t ha t  R^fE) i s  p r opo r t i ona l  
to the r i s k  premium demanded by a r i s k  averse i n d i v i d u a l .
Gi ven  DARA, the s i z e  o f  t he r i s k  premium i s  i n v e r s e l y  
r e l a t e d  to t he l e v e l  o f  w e a l t h ,  and Ra(n)  i s  a dec r eas i ng  
f u n c t i o n  of  n.  Under lARA, the r i s k  premium i ncreases wi t h  
t he l e v e l  o f  w e a l t h  f o r  a g i v e n  r i s k y  p r os pec t ,  and Rg(n) i s 
an i n c r e a s i n g  f u n c t i o n  o f  H. F i n a l l y ,  i f  t he r i s k  premium 
demanded f o r  a g i ven gamble remains cons t ant  as the l e v e l  of  
p r o f i t  changes,  then Rgdl )  i s  a c o n s t a n t .  Th i s  i s  the case 
of  cons t ant  abso l u t e  r i s k  aver s i on  (CARA). In gener a l ,  the 
most  w i d e l y  ac c ep t ed  h y p o t h e s i s  abou t  t he r e l a t i o n s h i p  
be t we en  w e a l t h  and r i s k  t a k i n g  b e h a v i o r  i s  t h a t  o f  
decreas i ng abso l u t e  r i s k  ave r s i on  (DARA).^^
The r e m a i n d e r  o f  t h i s  c h a p t e r  w i l l  f o c u s  on t he 
s o l u t i o n  of  t he model .  The c e r t a i n t y  e q u i v a l e n t  or  r i s k  
neu t r a l  case w i l l  be cons i dered f i r s t .
I Gp r a t t ,  op.  ci  t . , p. 118.
I r w i n  F r i e n d  and M a r s h a l l  E. Bl ume,  "The Demand 
f o r  Ri sky Asset s , "  Amer ican Economic Revi ew, 65:900-22.  
December,  1975.
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The Ce r t a i n t y  Equ i va l en t  Case 
Ob j ec t i ve  Funct i on
Under the c e r t a i n t y  e q u i v a l e n t  case,  the i n t e r med i a r y  
maximizes the expected v a l ue  of  uncons t r a i ned p r o f i t s .  The 
o b j e c t i v e  f u n c t i o n  i s gi ven by
M a x i m i z e !  = r|_L(r|_) - C|_L(rL) - r oOf r ^ )  - CoD(rQ)
^L.  r[)
+ r [ D ( r o )  - L ( r L ) ] ,  ( 3-8)
where f f i s  t he ex pe c t ed  v a l u e  o f  p r o f i t s  w i t h  t he b a l anc e  
sheet  c o n s t r a i n t  i nco r po r a t ed  i n t o  i t .  The random terms y 
and e di sappear  s i nce E[ y ]  = E[ e]  = 0.
F i r s t  and Second Order Condi t i ons
The f i r s t  o r d e r  c o n d i t i o n s  are o b t a i n e d  by t a k i n g  the 
p a r t i a l s  o f  II w i t h  r e s p e c t  to r[_ and r ^  and s e t t i n g  them 
equal  to zero:
ÊL = L( r L )  + L ' ( r L ) [ r i _  - C|_ - r ]  = 0. (3-9)
no = - D( r o)  + D ' ( r o ) [ r  - r ^  - Cq] = 0.  (3-10)
I nspec t i on  o f  (3-9)  r e v e a l s  t ha t  an i n t e r i o r  s o l u t i o n  
f o r  r|_ r e q u i r e s  t h a t  - r  > 0, s i n c e  L(r|_) > 0 and
L' ( r [_)  < 0 by as s umpt i on .  In t he same manner ,  an i n t e r i o r
s o l u t i o n  f o r  rg r e q u i r e s  t h a t  r  - r ^  - Cq > 0 , s i n c e  O' ( rQ)
> 0 by assumpt i on  and - D( r o )  < 0. Thus,  c omb i n i ng  t he two 
c o nd i t i on s ,  an i n t e r i o r  s o l u t i o n  f o r  r|_ and r ^  r equ i r es  t ha t  
Tl  - > Cl  + C0 , (3-11)
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or  t h a t  t he spread between r a n d  rp be s t r i c t l y  g r e a t e r  
t han t he sum of  t he ma r g i na l  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  c os t  of  l oans  
and depos i t s .
The second order  cond i t i ons  f o r  a maximum are gi ven by 
I ’l l  = [ 2 L ' ( r L )  + L " ( r L ) [ r L  - Cl  - r ] ]  < 0 (3-12)
^DD ~ [ " 2 0 ' ( r g )  + D" ( r Q) [ r  - r g -Cq] ]  < 0 (3-13)
0 = nLLÜDD - (Sl d )^ > 0- (3-14)
Since HLO = 0, s u f f i c i e n t  c ond i t i ons  f o r  a maximum are
t ha t  L " ( r L )  < 0 and 0 " ( r  g ) _< 0 .^®
Using the f i r s t  order  cond i t i ons ,  an express i on f o r  the 
c e r t a i n t y  e q u i v a l e n t  spread may be obtai ned.  So l v i ng  f o r  r 
ou t  o f  ( 3 - 1 0 ) ,  s u b s t i t u t i n g  i n t o  ( 3 - 9 ) ,  and r e a r r a n g i n g
y i e l d s
D(ro)  L( rL)
- rn = CL + CQ + -----------  -  ’ (3-15)
D ' ( r o )  L ' ( r L )
D( ro)  rg L( rL)  _ rL
not i ng t ha t  ----------- —  and ------------ " — ; where en and
D ' ( r o )  ' - • ( rL)  6 l
eL are the r a t e  e l a s t i c i t i e s  of  the depos i t  suppl y and loan 
demand r e s p e c t i v e l y .  Hence (3-15) can be r e w r i t t e n  as
l ^ T h e s e  s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n s  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  t he 
assumpt i ons  o f  do wn wa r d - s l o p i n g  l oan  demand and upward-  
s l op i ng  suppl y  of  deposi t s  i mpl y  t ha t :  1 ) l oan demand i s a
d e c r e a s i n g  f u n c t i o n  o f  rL a t  an i n c r e a s i n g  r a t e ,  and 2 ) 
d e p o s i t  s u p p l y  i s  an i n c r e a s i n g  f u n c t i o n  o f  r ^ a t  a 
decreasing ra t e .
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r - Tq - c 1^ + Cq + —  + — . (3-16)
From (3-16) ,  the c e r t a i n t y  e q u i v a l e n t  spread appears to 
be a f u n c t i o n  of  the margi nal  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  cost  of  l oans
and depos i t s ,  the e l a s t i c i t i e s  of  l oan demand and suppl y of  
d e p o s i t s ,  and t he r a t e s  on l oans  and d e p o s i t s .  Note t h a t  
t he assumpt i on  o f  i m p e r f e c t  l oan  and d e p o s i t  mar ke t s  i s  of  
f oremost  impor tance w i t h  r espec t  to the s i ze of  the spread.  
As t he  l o a n  and d e p o s i t  m a r k e t s  become p e r f e c t l y  
c o m p e t i t i v e ,  eg and e a p p r o a c h  i n f i n i t y .  The l a s t  two 
terms in (3-16)  van i sh,  and the spread narrows.  As would be 
ex pe c t ed ,  i m p e r f e c t  l oan  and d e p o s i t  mar ke t s  a l l o w  the 
i n t e r m e d i a r y  t o o p e r a t e  a t  a w i d e r  spread t han i t  wou l d  
ot herwi se under  p e r f e c t l y  c ompe t i t i v e  markets.
The c e r t a i n t y  e q u i v a l e n t  spread in (3-16)  can be shown
to be i d e n t i c a l  t o the spread set  by the i n t e r med i ar y  under
c ond i t i ons  of  r i s k  n e u t r a l i t y . ^ ^
Comparat i ve S t a t i c s
A number  o f  c o m p a r a t i v e  s t a t i c  r e s u l t s  can be 
es t a b l i s h e d  wi t h  r espec t  to the c e r t a i n t y  e q u i v a l e n t  or  r i s k  
n e u t r a l  s o l u t i o n .  For  exampl e ,  how wou l d  a change i n t he 
ma r g i n a l  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  c o s t  o f  l o ans  a f f e c t  the r a t e s  
chosen by the i n t e r m e d i a r y ?  What  wou l d  be t he o v e r a l l
1 Thi s  can be e a s i l y  shown by f i n d i n g  t he f i r s t  o r d e r  
c o n d i t i o n  o f  the p r ob l em g i v e n  by ( 3 - 7 )  and us i ng  the 
assumpt i on  of  r i s k  n e u t r a l i t y ;  t h a t  i s ,  U( n)  i s  l i n e a r  and 
U ' ( n )  = c o n s t a n t .  Once t h i s  a_ssumpt i on_i s  i n c o r p o r a t e d ,  
t hen i t  w i l l  f o l l o w  t h a t  U a n d  Uq = t td-
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impact  of  t h i s  change on the r i s k  neu t r a l  spread?
I m p l i c i t  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  of  the f i r s t  or der  cond i t i ons  
wi t h  r espec t  to c^ i ' i e l d s
—  = - - I dd] (3-17)
9Cl
9C|
= - D’ n n L L  • nDci_]- (3-18)
From ( 3 - 1 7 ) ,  Î Ï lc|_ = " L ' ( r ^ )  > 0. Si nce Hqq < 0 and D < 0 
the second order  c o n d i t i o n s ,  9 r L / 9 C|_ > 0. The c e r t a i n t y  
e q u i v a l e n t  r a t e  on l oans  i s  an i n c r e a s i n g  f u n c t i o n  o f  t he 
marginal  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  cost  o f  l oans.  = 0 in (3-18)
i m p l i e s  t h a t  9rQ/9CL = 0. Thus,  t he c e r t a i n t y  e q u i v a l e n t  
r a t e  on d e p o s i t s  i s  i n v a r i a n t  t o  changes i n  c^.  A f t e r  
c omb i n i ng  t he two e f f e c t s  ( i . e . ,  3r|_/9c|_ > 0 and g r ^ / a c ^  = 
0 ), t he c e r t a i n t y  e q u i v a l e n t  spread w i l l  be an i n c r e a s i n g  
f unc t i on  of  the margi nal  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  cos t  of  l oans.
In s i m i l a r  f ash i on ,  i m p l i c i t  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  of  the 
f i r s t  o r der  c ond i t i on s  wi t h  r espec t  to cg y i e l d s
' ' L  o - l r .
9Cq D- ' [ nLCD ' %DD] ( 3 - 1 9 )
9rn , _
  = - D [ ^LL ' ^Dcn-1' (3-20)
9Cq U
Si nce H L c o  - 0 1 n ( 3 - 1 9 ) ,  9 r L / 9 Cp = 0 , and t he c e r t a i n t y  
e q u i v a l e n t  r a t e  on l o ans  i s  i n v a r i a n t  t o changes i n the 
ma r g i n a l  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  c o s t  o f  d e p o s i t s .  From ( 3 - 2 0 ) ,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
52
^Dc[) " - D ' f r g )  < 0,  i iLL 0,  and D > 0 by t he  second
order  c o nd i t i on s ,  thus SCq/ Scq < 0. The c e r t a i n t y  e q u i v a l e n t  
r a t e  on d e p o s i t s  i s  a d e c r e a s i n g  f u n c t i o n  o f  t he ma r g i na l  
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  cost s  of  deposi t s .  An i ncrease (decrease)  in 
the margi nal  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  costs of  depos i t s  w i l l  tend to 
l o w e r  ( r a i s e )  t he r a t e  pa i d  on d e p o s i t s  w h i l e  hav i ng  no 
e f f e c t  on the l oan ra t e .  Thus,  the c e r t a i n t y  e q u i v a l e n t  or  
r i s k  n e u t r a l  spr ead w i l l  be an i n c r e a s i n g  f u n c t i o n  of  t he 
margi nal  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  cost  of  depos i t s  as w e l l .
F i n a l l y ,  how wou l d  t he r a t e s  on l oans  and d e p o s i t s  
change i n  r esponse t o  changes i n  t he c o s t  o f  l i q u i d i t y  
ad j us t ments ,  r? I m p l i c i t  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  of  the f i r s t  order  
c ond i t i on s  w i t h  r espec t  to r  y i e l d s




= - D- 1[ : LL • %Dr] > 0. (3-22)9r
Both,  9r |_/9r  and Br ^ / Br  are s t r i c t l y  p o s i t i v e .  Thi s f o l l o w s  
f rom f a c t  t h a t  IIi_^  = - L' ( r |_)  > 0 and Eg^ = D ' ( r g )  > 0. 
The c e r t a i n t y  e q u i v a l e n t  l o a n  and d e p o s i t  r a t e s  are both 
i nc r eas i ng  f unc t i ons  of  r .
The o v e r a l l  e f f e c t  on the c e r t a i n t y  e q u i v a l e n t  spread 
f rom a change i n  r i s  no t  c l e a r .  Wi t h bo t h ,  s i nce  the 
e f f e c t s  on l oan  and d e p o s i t  r a t e s  f rom a change i n r are in 
the same d i r e c t i o n ,  the r e s u l t i n g  change in the si ze of  the
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spread cannot  be determined.  Subt r ac t i ng  (3-22)  f rom (3-21) 
y i e l d s  the f o l l o w i n g  express i on f o r  the change in the spread 
f r om a change i n  r :
L ' ( r L )  D ' ( r o )
- & ( r L  - rp)  = = ---------  + (3-23)
3r  Hll  npD
The f i r s t  term i n ( 3 - 23 )  can be e x p l a i n e d  as t he mar g i na l  
l o a n  demand c r e a t e d  by a change i n  r f r o m  t he c e r t a i n t y  
e q u i v a l e n t  r a t e .  The second one i s the margi nal  suppl y of  
d e p o s i t s  r e s u l t i n g  f r om a change i n  r g f rom the o p t i ma l  
c e r t a i n t y  e q u i v a l e n t  r ate.  The magni tude of  each of  these 
t erms depends on the r a t e  e l a s t i c i t i e s  o f  l oan demand and 
depos i t  suppl y .
Consider  now the e f f e c t s  of  changes in the admi n i s t r a ­
t i v e  c o s t  o f  l oans  and d e p o s i t s  on the i n t e r m e d i a r y ' s  
p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  t he Feder a l  f unds  mar ke t .  How woul d  
changes i n c [_ and cq a f f e c t  t he vo l ume o f  Feder a l  f unds 
purchased or  so l d  by the i n s t i t u t i o n ?  The c e r t a i n t y  equ i v a ­
l e n t  bo r r owi ng / l end i ng  of  Federal  funds i s gi ven by:
R = D( ro)  - L ( r L ) .  (3-24)
D i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  of  (3-24)  wi t h  r espect  t o Cl and Cq y i e l ds
3R 3rn 3rI




  = D' — l  - L ' — I -  (3-26)
3cq 3cq 3cq
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I nspec t i on of  (3-25)  r ev e a l s  t ha t  3R/ 3cl > 0, since 9D/8ci_ = 
D'3rQ/8C|_ = 0 and 3L/3C|_ < 0. Thus,  as t he a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  
c o s t  per  l o a n  i n c r e a s e s ,  t he i n t e r m e d i a r y  s h i f t s  d e p o s i t  
funds f rom the l oan market  i n t o  the Federal  funds market .
From ( 3 - 2 6 ) ,  3R/3cq < 0,  s i nc e  3D/3Cq < 0 and 3L/3C[) = 
0. As t he  m a r g i n a l  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  c o s t  o f  d e p o s i t s  
i n c r e a s e s ,  t he i n t e r m e d i a r y  t ends  to reduce t he vo l ume of  
l end i ng  in the Federal  funds market  and/or  begins to borrow 
Federal  funds.
F i n a l l y ,  what  wou l d  be the e f f e c t  of  a change i n t he 
Feder a l  f unds  r a t e  on t he b o r r o w i n g / l e n d i n g  vol ume o f  t he 
i n t e r m e d i a r y ?  D i f f e r e n t i a t i n g  ( 3 - 24)  w i t h  r e s p e c t  to r 
y i e l d s
3R 3rn 9r,
—  = O'   - L '  • (3-27)
3r 3r  3r
I t  i s  e a s i l y  v e r i f i e d  t h a t  3R/ a r  > 0 s i nc e  3 ^ 0 / 3  r  > 0, and 
3 r L / 3 r  > 0. Theref ore,  as the Federal  funds r at e i ncreases,  
the i n t e r med i a r y  i ncreases the amount of  l end i ng  in Federal  
funds (or ,  borrows l ess Federal  funds) .
T h i s  s e c t i o n  has p r e s e n t e d  t h e  s o l u t i o n  t o  t h e  
c e r t a i n t y  e q u i v a l e n t  model  and t he c o m p a r a t i v e  s t a t i c s  
r e s u l t s .  Al so examined were the e f f e c t s  of  changes in cost  
pa r amet e r s  o f  t he model  on t he i n t e r m e d i a r y ' s  b o r r o w i n g /  
l end i ng  in Federal  funds.  The r e s u l t s  can be summarized as 
f o l l o w s :  1) r ^  i s  an i n c r e a s i n g  f u n c t i o n  o f  ci_> i n v a r i a n t
w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  Cq , and i n c r e a s i n g  i n  r ; 2) r g i s  a
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d e c r e a s i n g  f u n c t i o n  o f  Cp, i n v a r i a n t  to c , and i n c r e a s i n g  
in r .  The spread between r|_ and rp i ncreases (decreases)  as 
t he ma r g i n a l  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  c o s t  o f  l o ans  and d e p o s i t s  
i n c r e a s e s  ( dec r eas es ) .  The e f f e c t  on t he spr ead f r om a 
change in t he Feder a l  f unds  r a t e  depends on t he r a t e  e l a s ­
t i c i t i e s  of  depos i t  suppl y  and l oan demand. Wi th r espect  to 
t he i n t e r m e d i a r y ' s  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  t he Feder a l  f unds  
mar k e t ,  any change in t he c o s t  o f  e i t h e r  l oans  or  d e p o s i t s  
(such as change i n  c |_ or  cp) causes t he i n t e r m e d i a r y  to 
s h i f t  towards the cons t ant  cost  ( r e t u r n )  source (use) of  the 
p e r f e c t l y  c ompe t i t i v e  Federal  funds market .  For i nstance,  
an i n c r e a s e  i n a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  expenses o f  d e p o s i t s  r a i s e s  
the c o s t  o f  t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  sour ce o f  f unds  to t he i n t e r ­
mediary.  As a r e s u l t ,  the i n t e r med i a r y  w i l l  use the Federal  
f unds  mar ke t  as an a l t e r n a t i v e  sour ce o f  f u n d i n g  and i t s  
b o r r o w i n g s  f r om t he Feder a l  f unds  ma r k e t  w i l l  i n c r ea s e .  
F i n a l l y ,  an i ncrease in the Federal  funds r a t e  i ncreases the 
o p p o r t u n i t y  c o s t  t o t he i n t e r m e d i a r y .  Co n s e q u e n t l y ,  the 
i n t e r med i a r y  w i l l  i ncrease the amount of  l end i ng  of  Federal  
funds .
The r e s u l t s  i n d i c a t e  t ha t  the l oan and depos i t  p r i c i n g  
dec i s i ons  are made i ndependent l y  by the i n t e r med i ar y .
One f i n a l  note wi t h  r espec t  to the c e r t a i n t y  e q u i v a l e n t  
s o l u t i o n  of  the model .  Equat i ons (3-9)  and (3-10)  y i e l d
r | _ + L / L '  =Ci_ + r  (3-28)
r  = Cp + rp + D/O' ,
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r e s p e c t i v e l y .  Reca l l  t ha t  L'=3L/3r|_.  Hence, r _^ + L/L'  = r|_ 
+ L • 3r ^ / 3L,  whi ch i s margi nal  revenue f rom l oans ,  say 
MR[_. In a d d i t i o n ,  t he f i r m  can l e nd  f unds  i n  t he Feder a l  
funds market .  The margi nal  revenue per  d o l l a r  l e n t  i n the 
Fed e r a l  f unds  mar k e t  i s  r ,  s i n c e  t he f i r m  i s  a p e r f e c t  
c o m p e t i t o r  i n  t he  F e d e r a l  f u n d s  m a r k e t .  S i m i l a r l y ,  
D' =3D/3rQ and Cq + r ^  + D/D'  = Cq + r ^  + D • 3rQ/3D,  whi ch 
i s  t he ma r g i n a l  c os t  o f  d e p o s i t s ,  say MCq. T h e r e f o r e ,  the 
i n t e r med i a r y  chooses r a n d  r ^  such t ha t
MR  ^ = C|  ^ + MCq .
The f i r m  equa t es  the ma r g i n a l  r evenue f r om l o a n s  w i t h  the 
margi nal  cost  of  l oans ,  which i nc l udes  the marg i na l  admi n i s ­
t r a t i v e  c o s t  o f  l o a n s  p l u s  t he ma r g i n a l  c o s t  o f  d e p o s i t s .  
I f  t he f i r m  l e n d s  f unds  i n  t he Feder a l  f unds  mar k e t  (R > 0) 
as w e l l  as makes cus t omer  l o a n s ,  i t  has two sour ces  of  
r evenue.  One d o l l a r  l e n t  t o  a cus t omer  c anno t  be l e n t  i n 
the Federal  funds market .  Thus, the o p p o r t u n i t y  cost  of  the 
l a s t  d o l l a r  l e n t  to a customer  i s the margi nal  revenue gi ven 
up i n the Federal  funds market ;  t ha t  i s ,  MR^ = C|_ + r.
The Loan Uncer t a i n t y  Case 
Thi s sec t i on  w i l l  cons i der  the e f f e c t s  of  uncer t a i n  
l oan  demand on t he r a t e s  s e t  by the i n t e r m e d i a r y  under  
d i f f e r e n t  a t t i t u d e s  toward r i s k .  For t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  case,  
depos i t s  are assumed to be known wi t h  c e r t a i n t y .  A l l  of  the 
o t h e r  assumpt i ons  i n t r o d u c e d  a t  t he b e g i n n i n g  o f  t h i s  
c h a p t e r  r emai n i n  e f f e c t  f o r  t he a n a l y s i s  o f  t h i s  s e c t i o n .
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Comparat i ve s t a t i c s  exer c i ses  l i n k  the A r r o w - P r a t t ^ O  i ndex 
of  abso l u t e  r i s k  aver s i on  to the e f f e c t s  on loan and depos i t  
r a t e s  a r i s i n g  f rom changes i n  t he ma r g i n a l  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  
and l i q u i d i t y  cost s  of  the i n t e r med i ar y .
Ob j ec t i ve  Funct i on
The o b j e c t i v e  f u n c t i o n  of  the i n t e r med i a r y  i s  gi ven
by
Maximize j  U( n ) g ( y ) dp ,  (3-29)
ro -I.
where U(n) i s  a von Neumann-Morgenstern u t i l i t y  of  p r o f i t s  
f u n c t i o n  w i t h  U' (I I) > 0 and U"(II) ^ 0, depend i ng  on whet her  
t he i n t e r m e d i a r y  i s  r i s k  a v e r s e ,  r i s k  n e u t r a l ,  or  r i s k  
seeki  ng.
The i n t e r me d i a r y ' s  p r o f i t a i  (n) i s gi ven by
n = r i_[L(r|_) + y ]  - CL[L(r |_)  + y ]  - r 0 D(rQ) - CoD(r 0 )
+ r [ 0 ( r Q )  - L(r[_) - y ] .  (3-30)
F i r s t  and Second Order  Condi t i ons
The f i r s t  or der  c ond i t i on s  can be obt a i ned by d i f f e r e n ­
t i a t i n g  ( 3 - 29)  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  r ^  and r g .  A f t e r  r e p l a c i n g  
t he i n t e g r a l  s i gn  w i t h  t he ex pec t ed  v a l u e  o p e r a t o r ,  E, t he
J. Ar row,  £ ^ s a ys i n  t he Theory o f  Ri sk Bear i ng  
(Markham, Chicago,  1971)7”  and J. W. P r a t t ,  ' 'Ri sk Avers i on in 
t he Smal l  and i n  t he La r ge , "  Economet r i  c a 32:  122- 36 , 1974 .
Z l f h i s  p r o f i t  f u n c t i o n  assumes depos i t s  are c e r t a i n  
( i . e . , e = 0 ) .
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f i r s t  order  cond i t i ons  are
Ül = E{U ' (n)  [L(r i _)  + V + L ‘ ( rL) [ r i _  - Cl - r ] ] }  = 0
(3-31)
ÛQ ={E U ' ( n ) [ - D ( r o )  + D ' ( r o ) [ r  - r ^  - Cq] ] }  = 0, (3-32)
8 E[ U( n) ]  _  3E[U(n) ]
where L)| = and Un = . Rewr i t i ng U| as
a r i  arc
ÛL = E { U ' ( n ) [ L ( r L ) + y ] } + E [ U ' ( n ) ] L ' ( r L ) [ r L - C L - r ]  = 0.
( 3 - 3 3 )
E{U ' ( n ) [  L( rL)  + y ]  > > 0 s i nc e  U' ( i i )  > 0 f o r  a l l  n ,  and L(r|_) 
+ y 0 f o r  a l l  y. Thus,  i t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  a necessar y  
c o n d i t i o n  f o r  an o p t i m a l  v a l u e  of  r |_ i s t h a t  r[_ - c |_ - r  > 
0. S i m i l a r l y  Uq can be r e w r i t t e n  as
ÙD = E[U‘ ( n ) ] - [ - D ( r o )  + D ' ( r g ) [ r  - r ^  - c ^ ] ]  = 0. (3-34)  
E l i m i n a t i n g  E[ U' ( I I ) ]  f r om ( 3 - 34 ) ,  and r e c o g n i z i n g  D ' t r ^ )  > 
0 , a necessar y  c o n d i t i o n  f o r  an opt imum v a l u e  of  r g i s t h a t  
r  - rg - Cg > 0. Thus,  j u s t  as i n t he c e r t a i n t y  e q u i v a l e n t  
case,  a necessar y  c o n d i t i o n  f o r  an opt imum v a l u e  r e q u i r e s  
t h a t  t he spread be s t r i c t l y  g r e a t e r  t han t he sum o f  the 
marginal  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  cos t  of  l oans and depos i t s .
The second or der  cond i t i ons  f o r  a maximum are
ÏÏLL = E { U ' ( : ) [ 2 L ' ( r L )  + L " ( r L ) [ r g  - Cg - r ]
+ U" ( n ) ( n L ) Z ] }  < 0, (3-35)
Ug g  = E { U ' ( n ) [ - 2 D ' ( r g )  + D " ( r g ) [ r  - rg - C g ]  
+ U" ( n ) ( n g ) Z ] }  < 0
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and
D = Ü|_|_U[)Q - (U[_q)^ > 0,
where II|_ and Hg are t he p a r t i a l  - d e r i v a t i v e s  o f  n w i t h
respect  to r ^  and rp.  S i m i l a r l y ,  IJli_ and LFqq are the second
p a r t i a l s  o f  t he f i r s t  o r d e r  c o n d i t i o n s  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  r|_ 
and rp.  [T|_q i s  g i ven by
8 ^Ü
U l o = ^ = E { n D } - E { U " ( n ) n L > .  ( 3 - 3 6 )
■5r]TF^
However ,  U|_q = 0 s i nc e  [ [ H p ]  = 0 by ( 3 - 32 ) .  I n s p e c t i o n  of  
(3-35)  r e v e a l s  t h a t  s u f f i c i e n t  cond i t i ons  f o r  a maximum in 
t he case o f  t he r i s k  a v e r s e  i n t e r m e d i a r y  ( U" ( I I )  < 0) are 
D" ( rp)  < 0 and L"( r |_)  < 0. For  U"(H) > 0, t he second o r d e r
c ond i t i ons  may not  be s a t i s f i e d .
Before proceeding wi t h  the comparat i ve s t a t i c s  of  the 
mode l ,  i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t o compare t he r a t e s  on l oans  and 
d e p o s i t s  u n d e r  l o a n  demand u n c e r t a i n t y  and d i f f e r e n t  
a t t i t u d e s  toward r i s k  to the rates t ha t  would p r e v a i l  under 
c e r t a i  n t y .
Ce r t a i n t y  versus Unc e r t a i n t y  Comparisons
I t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t o  show t h a t  U ' (II ) and [ L( r | _)  + y + 
L X r p ) [ r L  - cp - r ] ]  i n  ( 3 - 31)  are o p p o s i t e l y ,  i n d e p e n ­
d e n t l y ,  or s i m i l a r l y  ordered in y depending on whether  the 
i n t e r m e d i a r y  i s  r i s k  a v e r s e ,  r i s k  n e u t r a l  or  r i s k  seek i ng .
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Since
3 U ' ( n ) < _   . <U " ( n ) [ r L  - Cl  - r ]  - 0 as U " ( n )  - 0 ( 3 - 3 7 )3# ' '  I- " > >
and,  3 [ - ] / 3 y  = 1, where [ • ]  = [ L ( r L )  + y + L ' ( r l  ) [ r l~ c l “ r ] ] . 
As a r e s u l t ,  Cov(U' ( I I ) ,  [ • ] )  < 0, f o r  a l l  U‘' (I I) < 0, and w i t h  
E [ U ' ( n ) ]  > 0, t hen E [ L ( r L )  + P + L ' ( r L ) [ r L  - c L - r  ] ] > 0. 
Theref ore,  by theorem 236 in Hardy,  L i t t l e wo o d  and Pol ya,  
i t  f o i l o w s  t ha t
[ L ( r L )  + L ' ( r L ) [ r L  - Cl - r ] ]   ^ 0 as U"(n)   ^ 0. (3-38)
Let  rL"^ and rp'^ denot e the r i s k  n e u t r a l  r a t e s  on 
l oans  and d e p o s i t s  whi ch d e f i n e  the l o c u s  of  p o i n t s  in t he 
(Cl , r g)  space such t h a t  Hl Cc l . Cq ] = 0. D e f i n i n g  rL as an 
i m p l i c i t  f un c t i o n  of  r ^ ,  and d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g  Î Ï l C'^L^'^D^’ r ^ ]  
wi t h  r espec t  to rp y i e l d s
acL
:LL 3^  + :LD = O’ (3-39)
w h i c h  i m p l i e s  t h a t   ^c L / ^ r  p = 0 by t he  s ec ond  o r d e r
c o n d i t i o n ,  %LD “ 0 . Thus,  l ip = 0 i f  and o n l y  i f  r  p = r p " .  
For  np > 0, r  p < r p" (see F i g u r e  3).
33g. s . Hardy,  J. E. L i t t l e w o o d ,  and G. Po l y a ,
" I n e q u a 1 i t i e s " (London,  Eng l and :  Cambr i dge U n i v e r s i t y
PressT,  1967.
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FIGURE 3
Ce r t a i n t y  versus Uncer t a i n t y  
Comparisons f o r  r a n d  r^ 
(Loan Uncer t a i n t y )
De f i n e  r|_® and r |_P as the r a t e s  char ged on l oans  by a 
r i s k  a v e r s e  and a r i s k  p r e f e r r i n g  i n t e r m e d i a r y .  As demon­
s t r a t e d  p r e v i o u s l y  II|_(r[_^) = [L(r|_®) + L' ( rL®) [ r i _®-C|_- r ] ]  > 
0, wh i ch i m p l i e s  t h a t  r ^  < r ^ " .  For  t he r i s k  p r e f e r r i n g  
i n t e r m e d i a r y ,  n(r[_P) < 0,  and r|_P > r ^ " .
L e t t i n g  rp^  and rpP denote the r a t e s  pa i d  on d e p o s i t s  
by a r i s k  averse and a r i s k  p r e f e r r i n g  i n t e r med i ar y .  Then, 
d i v i d i n g  (3-34)  by E [ U ' ( n ) ]  y i e l d s :
[ - D ( r p )  + D ' ( r p ) [ r  - rp - C p ] ]  = 0,
which i mp l i es  t h a t  Up = l ip = 0. Theref ore,  rp^ = rp = i p ' .
Hence, the r i s k  averse i n t e r med i a r y  s e l e c t s  a l oan rate 
t h a t  i s  l owe r  t han the r i s k  n e u t r a l  l o an  r a t e .  I f  t he 
i n s t i t u t i o n  p r e f e r s  r i s k ,  i t  w i l l  charge a h i gher  l oan rate 
t han t h a t  o f  t he r i s k  n e u t r a l  i n t e r m e d i a r y .  On the o t h e r
rpP.
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hand,  d e p o s i t  r a t e s  o f  t he r i s k  ave r s e  and r i s k  p r e f e r r i n g  
i n t e r med i a r y  are the same as the r i s k  neu t r a l  depos i t  r at e.  
Consequent l y ,  l oan demand unc e r t a i n t y  l eads the r i s k  averse 
i n t e r m e d i a r y  t o  o p e r a t e  at  a s m a l l e r  spread t han the r i s k  
n e u t r a l  spread.  In c o n t r a s t ,  t he r i s k  p r e f e r r i n g  i n s t i ­
t u t i o n  sets a spread t ha t  i s l a r g e r  than the r i s k  n eu t r a l ' s .
One p os s i b l e  ex p l a n a t i o n  of  the e f f e c t s  of  l oan demand 
u n c e r t a i n t y  and r i s k  a v e r s i o n  on t he s i z e  o f  t he spread i s 
i n terras o f  t he mean and v a r i a n c e  o f  t he i n t e r m e d i a r y ' s  
p r o f i t s .  I t  can be demon s t r a t e d  t h a t  t he v a r i a n c e  of  p r o ­
f i t s  i s  an i n c r e a s i n g  f u n c t i o n  o f  r ^ . ^ ^  Under  r i s k  
a v e r s i o n ,  t he i n t e r m e d i a r y  d i s l i k e s  d i s p e r s i o n  or  v a r i a ­
b i l i t y  o f  p r o f i t s  and i s  w i l l i n g  to s a c r i f i c e  mean income 
( f r o m  l o w e r  r  |_ ) i n  e x c h a n g e  f o r  t he  r e d u c t i o n  i n  t he
var i ance  of  p r o f i t s .  Since the depos i t  r a t e  remains at  the
r i s k  n e u t r a l  l e v e l ,  t he r e d u c t i o n  i n r|_ causes the spread 
under  r i s k  a v e r s i o n  t o be s m a l l e r  t han the r i s k  n e u t r a l  
sp r ead .
Other  quest i ons ar i se .  W i l l  the r i s k  averse f i r m  tend 
t o be a l e n d e r  or  a b o r r o we r  i n  t he Feder a l  f unds  market? 
How does r i s k  p r e f e r e n c e  i n f l u e n c e  t he i n t e r m e d i a r y ' s  
l e n d i n g  or  b o r r o w i n g  b e h a v i o r ?  Suppose the l oan  demand,  
d e p o s i t  s u p p l y ,  l i q u i d i t y  c o s t  and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  expense 
c ond i t i on s  are such t ha t  the r i s k  neu t r a l  f i r m  expects to be
^^The var i ance of  II i s  Var(I I ) = (r|_ - C|_ - r ) ^Var ( p) ,  
and  ^ = 2(r|_ - C|_ - r ) Va r ( y )  > 0.
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n e i t h e r  a l e n d e r  nor  a bo r r o we r ;  t h a t  i s ,  expec t ed  = 
D( rQ" )  - L(r|_'^) = 0. Our r e s u l t s ,  r^® < r < r a n d  r = 
r = TqP, i mp l y  t h a t  expec t ed R® < 0 and expec t ed  RP > 0. 
The r i s k  averse i n t e r med i ar y  chooses r ^  and rp such t h a t  i t  
e x pe c t s  t o be a bo r r owe r  i n t he Feder a l  f unds  mar ke t .  The 
r i s k  p r e f e r r i n g  f i r m chooses r ^  and rp such t h a t  i t  expects 
to be a l ender  in the Federal  funds market .  At  f i r s t ,  these 
conc l us i ons  may appear h i gh l y  counter  i n t u i t i v e .  However,  
the l ower  r[_ chosen by the r i s k  averse i n t e r med i a r y  r a i ses 
expected loans as i t  reduces the var i ance of  random p r o f i t .  
Hence,  t he r e d u c t i o n  i n  p r o f i t  " r i s k "  i s  o b t a i n e d  a t  t he 
cost  of  bor rowi ng in the Federal  funds market .
Comparat i ve St a t i c s
The d i s c u s s i o n  now moves to t he e f f e c t s  o f  changes in 
t he ma r g i n a l  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  and l i q u i d i t y  c os t s  on the 
i n t e r m e d i a r y ' s  spread.  I nasmuch as r e a l  r e s ou r c e  and 
l i q u i d i t y  c os t s  are s i g n i f i c a n t  f a c t o r s  i n the p r i c i n g  of  
l oans and depos i t s ,  i t  i s i mpor t ant  to cons i der  the e f f e c t s  
of  changes in t hese c os t s  on t he o p t i ma l  spread s e t  by the 
i n t e r m e d i a r y .  For  exampl e ,  are i n c r e a s e s  i n  t he ma r g i na l  
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  cost  of  l oans r e f l e c t e d  in a l a r g e r  spread? 
Is the behav i or  of  the r i s k - a v e r s e  spread i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e  
f rom the c e r t a i n t y  e q u i v a l e n t  case? Is the l oan r a t e  i nde­
pendent  of  the r a t e  and cost s of  deposi t s?
Tu r n i ng  now t o t he c o mp a r a t i v e  s t a t i c s  o f  t he model ,  
c o n s i d e r  f i r s t  t he i mpac t  o f  a change i n  t he mar g i na l  
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  c o s t  o f  l oans  on the o p t i ma l  l oan  r a t e  as
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chosen t he i n t e r m e d i a r y  a t  t he s t a r t  o f  t he p e r i o d .  
I m p l i c i t  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  of  the f i r s t  order  c ond i t i on s  wi t h  
r espec t  to C|_ y i e l d s ^ ^
SrL - L ' E [ U ' ( n ) 3  -  E{ U" ( n ) ( L+y ) [ L+v +L - ( r L - C L - r ) ] }
Ü
LL (3-40)
The f i r s t  term i n the numerator  of  (3-40)  i s p o s i t i v e  si nce
- L ' > 0 and E [ U ' ( I I ) ]  > 0. A f t e r  one adds and s u b t r a c t s  
L ' ( r i  - Cl  - r ) i n s i d e  t he p a r e n t h e s i s  a t  (L + V ) , t he 
second term in the numerator  of  (3-40)  can be r e w r i t t e n  as
- E { U" ( n ) ( L  + y ) [ L  + V + L ' ( r L  - Cl - r ) ] }  = 
- E { U" ( n ) [ L  + y + L ' ( r L  - Cl - r ) ] ? }
+ E{U" ( I I ) [ L + y + L ' ( r L  - Cl - r ) ] } L ' ( r L  ~ ^ l - r ).
(3-41)
The f i r s t  term i n (3-41)  i s  c l e a r l y  p o s i t i v e  f o r  U"(I I )  < 0.
Proposi  t i  on 1): Given decreasing abso l u t e  r i s k
a v e r s i o n  (DARA) i n  t he A r r o w - P r a t t  sense,  t he s i gn  of
3Cl / 8Cl i s ambiguous.
P r oo f :  In o r d e r  t o  v e r i f y  t h a t  SrL/ScL i s  ambiguous
under  DARA, t he s i gn  o f  t he second term i n ( 3 - 41 )  must  be
shown to be negat i ve.
Let  y °  be t he v a l u e  o f  y such t h a t  L + y°  + L ' ( r L  - c L
- r )  = 0, and l e t  11° be t he v a l u e  o f  II when y = W°. The
Ar r ow- Pr a t t  i ndex of  abso l u t e  r i s k  avers i on i s de f i ned as
Z^Note t h a t  t he argument s  of  L and D w i l l  be o m i t t e d  in 
o r d e r  t o  s i m p l i f y  t h e  v a r i o u s  e x p r e s s i o n s .  The same 
omissi on app l i es  to t h e i r  d e r i v a t i v e s .
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Rg(n) i s  decreas i ng under DARA, thus
u" ( n )  < u " ( n ° )
- ---------  - -   f o r  a l l  u > u , ( 3-43)
U' ( n )  U ' ( n ° )
s i nce M  = ( r i  - Ct - r )  > 0. In a d d i t i o n ,
Bp L
U' ( I I ) [L  + y + L ' ( r|_-Ci_-r ) ] 2 0 f o r  a l l  y >. y° (3-44)
by c o n s t r u c t i o n .  T h e r e f o r e ,  f r om ( 3 - 43 )  and ( 3 - 44 )  i t  
f o l l o w s  t ha t  f o r  a l l  y >^y°,
- U"( I I ) [L + y + L ' ( r L  - Cl - r ) ]
U"(J I ° )
< - • U- ( H) [ L  + y + L ' ( r L  - Cl  - r ) ] .  (3-45)
U ' ( n° )
Now, cons i der  the case when y < y ° . Then,
U" (n)  U" ( n° )
- ---------  > -   (3-46)
u ' ( n )  U' ( i i ° )
by DARA, s i nce M  > 0. S i m i l a r l y ,
3y
U ' ( I I ) [ L  + y + L ' ( r L - C L - r ) ]  < 0 f o r  a l l  y < y°  (3-47)  
by c o n s t r u c t i o n .  Hence, f rom (3-46)  and ( 3 - 47 ) ,
- U " ( n ) [ L  + y + L ' ( r L  - Cl  - r ) ]
IJ" (11°)
U'  ( n ° )
—  • U' (T. ) [L + y + L ' ( r L  - Cl - r ) ] .  (3-48)
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B)' (3-48)  one concl udes t ha t  (3-45)  hol ds f o r  a l l  va l ues  of  
y. T h e r e f o r e ,  t a k i n g  expec t ed  v a l u e s  o f  bot h s i des  o f  (3-  
45) g i ves
- E{ U" ( n ) [ L  + y + L - ( r L  - Cl - r ) ] }
u " ( n °  )
• E { U ' ( n ) [ L + y  + L ' ( r L - C L - r ) ] }  = 0. (3-49)
U ' ( n ° )
the f i r s t  order  c o nd i t i on  f o r  rL- From (3-49)  i t  f o l l o w s  
t h a t ,
E{ U" ( n ) [ L  +y + L ' ( r L  - Cl - r ) ] }  > 0. (3-50)
M u l t i p l y i n g  both s i des  o f  ( 3 - 50 )  by L ' ( r L  - Cl - r )  y i e l d s  
the des i r ed r e s u l t  t ha t
E{ U" ( n ) [ L  + y + L ' ( r L  - Cl - r ) ]  L ' ( r L  - Cl r ) } <  0.
(3-51)
Hence,  t he s i gn of  ( 3-41)  canno t  be d e t e r m i n e d ,  and SrL/SCL
is ambiguous under DARA.
Pr opos i t i on  2 ): Given cons t ant  abso l u t e  r i s k  avers i on
(CARA), t he o p t i m a l  l oan  r a t e  i s  an i n c r e a s i n g  f u n c t i o n  of  
the marginal  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  cos t  of  l oans.
Proof :  The proof  t ha t  3rL/ 3CL > 0 under  CARA r equ i r es
t ha t  (3-37)  be signed as p o s i t i v e .
Si nce the f i r s t  t erm in ( 3 - 41)  i s  a l way s  p o s i t i v e  f o r
U"(I I ) < 0, i t  remains to show t ha t  the second term i s e i t h e r
p o s i t i v e  or zero.  Under CARA, the second term of  (3-41)  can
be expressed as
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E{ U" ( n ) [ L  + y + L' ( r | _ - C[_ r ) ] } L ' ( r L  - - r )  =
u ' ( n )  
i n i T
E{U"(n)  • [ L + y + L ' ( r | _ - CL - r ) ] } L ' ( r | _ - CL - r )
(3-52)
u " ( n )Since g i s const ant  under CARA, (3-52)  can be r e wr i t t e n  
as
E{U"(n)  g-, I Hi  • [L + y + L ’ ( r L - C L - r ) ] } L ‘ ( rL-Ci _- r )  = 
u " i n i ' E { U ' ( n ) [ L  + y + L ' ( r |_ -CL-r ) ] }L ' ( r |_ -CL-r )  = 0
(3-53)
by the f i r s t  order  c ond i t i on  f o r  r T h u s ,  the numerator  of
( 3 - 4 0 )  i s  p o s i t i v e  s i n c e  ( 3 - 4 1 )  has been shown t o be
p o s i t i v e .  Wi th Ull < 0 by the second order  c ond i t i ons ,  i t
f o l l ows  t ha t  r|_ i s an i nc r eas i ng  f un c t i o n  of  C|_ under CARA.
P r 0 £ 0  s i t i o  i i_3 ) ; G i v e n  i n c r e a s i n g  a b s o l u t e  r i s k  
a v e r s i o n  IT'ARAT. tlie  op t i ma l  l oan  r a t e  i s  an i n c r e a s i n g  
f unc t i on  of  the marginal  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  cost  of  l oans.
Pr oo f :  In o r d e r  t o  unamb i guous l y  s i gn  Sr ^ / Sc L  under
IARA, the second term in (3-41) must be shown to be p o s i t i v e
or zero.
Let  y °  be the v a l u e  o f  y  such t h a t  L + y °  + L' (r [_ - C|_ 
- r )  = 0, and be the v a 1 ue o f  n when y = y ° .  Under  lARA, 
Rg(n) i s an i nc reas i ng  f unc t i on  of  II, thus
U"(n)  U" (n° )
f o r  a l l  y > y°  (3-54)
u ' ( n )  u ' ( n '
by lARA, si nce iS. > 0. Fur t hermore,
3y
U' ( I I ) [ L  + y + L ' ( rL-C[_- r  ) ] > 0, f o r  a l l  y £ y °  (3-55)
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bi» c o n s t r u c t i o n .  From ( 3 - 54 )  and ( 3 - 5 5 ) ,  i t  f o l l o w s  t h a t ,  
f o r  a l l  V U ° ,
- U" ( l i ) [ L  + y + L' ( r | _ - Cl - r  ) ] >
U" (n° )
-  —  • U ' ( n ) [ L  + y + L ' ( r L  - Cl - r ) ] .  (3-56)
U ' ( n ° )
Consider  the case when y < y ° .  Then,
u" ( n)  u " ( n° )
- --------- < -------------- f o r  a l l  P < (3-57)
U' (n)  U ' ( n ° )
and
U ' ( n ) [ L  + y + L ' ( r L - C L - r ) ]  < 0, f o r  a l l  y < y °  (3-58)
by cons t r uc t i on .  Hence, f rom (3-57)  and (3-58) ,  i t  f o l l o w s
t h a t  f o r  a l l  y < y ° ,
- U" ( n ) [ L  + y + L ' ( r L  - Cl  - r ) ]  >
U"(n° )
U ' ( n ) [ L  + p + L ' ( r L  - Cl - r ) ] .  (3-59)I mOu'  (n
I n s p e c t i o n  o f  ( 3 - 59)  r e v e a l s  t h a t  ( 3 - 56)  ho l d s  f o r  a l l  
va l ues  of  y . Theref ore,  t ak i ng  the expected va l ue of  both 
si des of  (3-56)  y i e l d s
- E{ U" ( n ) [ L  + y  + L ' ( r L  - Cl  - r ) ] }  >
U " ( n ° )
• E { U ' ( n ) [ L  + y + L ' ( r L  - Cl - r ) ] }  = 0 (3-60)
"  U ' ( n °
by t he f i r s t  o r d e r  c o n d i t i o n  f o r  r  L. From ( 3 - 6 0 ) ,  i t  i s  
c l ea r  t h a t ,  under lARA,
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E{ U" ( n ) [ L  + y + L ' ( r L  - c,_ - r ) ] }  < 0. (3-61)
Si nce L' (r |_ - C|_ - r )  < 0 ,  t he second t e r m o f  ( 3- 41)  i s 
s t r i c t l y  p o s i t i v e .  Theref ore,  r[_ i s  an i nc r eas i ng  f unc t i on  
of  C|_ under lARA.
To d e t e r m i n e  t he f u l l  i mpac t  on t he  i n t e r m e d i a r y ' s  
spr ead f r om a change i n  t he a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  c o s t  o f  l o a n s ,  
one must  c o n s i d e r  t he e f f e c t  o f  a change i n  Cl on t he 
opt i mal  depos i t  r a t e .
Pr opos i t i on  4 ): The opt i mal  depos i t  r a t e  i s  i n v a r i a n t
wi t h  r espec t  to changes in the margi nal  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  cost  
of  l oans.
Pr oo f :  I m p l i c i t  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  o f  t he f i r s t  o r d e r
c ond i t i on s  wi t h  r espec t  to C|_ y i e l d s
SCq E { U " ( n ) ( - L - y ) [ - D  + D ' ( r  - r Q  - C q ) ] }
TcT ■ [
Udd
( 3 - 6 2 )
The numerator  of  (3-62)  can be expressed as
E { U " ( n ) ( - L - y ) [ - D  + D ' ( r  - r ^  - Cq) ] }  =
E C-D + D ' ( r  - rp - Cq) ]  E { U " ( n ) ( - L - y ) } = 0. (3-63)
S i n c e  E [ - D  + D ' ( r  - r  Q - Cq ) ]  = 0 by t h e  f i r s t  o r d e r  
c o n d i t i o n ,  r ^  i s i n v a r i a n t  to changes in C | _ .
The r e s u l t s  f r o m  P r o p o s i t i o n s  1) ,  2 ) ,  and 3) are 
summar i zed i n Tab l e  1. Gi ven CARA or  lARA,  t he e f f e c t  i s  
the same as in the c e r t a i n t y  e q u i v a l e n t  model .
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Table 1
Ef f ec t s  of  a Change in Ci_ or  r ^
DARA CARA lARA 
3ri_/3CL ^ 0  > 0  > 0
Gi ven CARA or  lARA, t he i n t e r m e d i a r y  w i l l  pass i n c r e a s e d  
l oan a d mi n i s t r a t i o n  expenses on to the consumer in the form 
of  h i gher  l oan r a t es .  Pr opos i t i on  4) i mp l i e s  t h a t  3rQ/3C[_ = 
0 f o r  a l l  a t t i t u d e s  t owar d  r i s k .  T h e r e f o r e ,  t he spread 
between r ^  and rQ i n c r e a s e s  as C|_ i n c r e a s e s  g i v e n  CARA or 
lARA. I n t e r e s t i n g l y ,  the i n t e r med i a r y  c ha r ac t e r i z ed  by DARA 
( the most e m p i r i c a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  type of  r i s k  aver s i on)  ma.y 
a c t u a l l y  reduce i t s  spread between r a n d  rg in response to 
an i n c r e a s e  i n  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  expenses.  Th i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  
r e s u l t  demands f u r t h e r  e x p l o r a t i o n .
From the e a r l i e r  d i scuss i on  of  a t t i t u d e s  towards r i s k  
and r i s k  p r e m i u m s ,  r e c a l l  t h a t  t he  r i s k  p r e m i u m , 0 , 
decreases as the agent ' s r i s k  ave r s i on  decreases;  i .  e. , 0^ 
> 0'  ^ > 0P. S i m i l a r l y ,  t he s e c t i o n  d e a l i n g  w i t h  c e r t a i n t y  
versus u n c e r t a i n t y  compar i sons f o r  r|_ (see F i gur e 3),  demon­
s t r a t e d  t h a t  r|_® < r < r a n d  rg® = r g "  = rgP.  Hence,  
g r ea t e r  r i s k  ave r s i on  l eads the i n t e r med i a r y  to reduce i t s  
spread between loan and depos i t  r a t es .  In gener a l ,  one can 
c o n c l u d e  t h a t  t he o p t i m a l  l o a n  r a t e  and the r i s k  premium 
r e l a t e  i n v e r s e l y .  As the r i s k  premium i n c r e a s e s ,  A0> 0 ; 
then,  the opt i mal  l oan r a t e  decreases,  A r ^  < 0.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
71
The r i s k  premium demanded by the i n t e r m e d i a r y  depends 
on i t s  a t t i t u d e s  towards r i s k  and the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of  the 
random p r o s p e c t .  Hence,  8  depends on expec t ed  p r o f i t  and 
t he r i s k i n e s s  o f  a p a r t i c u l a r  p r o s p e c t .  A l t h o u g h  i t  i s  an 
i m p e r f e c t  measure o f  r i s k ,  the v a r i a n c e  o f  random p r o f i t ,  
Var (n) ,  i s used as a proxy f o r  r i s k .  Then, the r i s k  premium 
demanded by t he i n t e r m e d i a r y  i s  some f u n c t i o n  o f  expec t ed 
p r o f i t  and the var i ance  ( r i s k )  of  random p r o f i t .  Thus, 0  = 
0 (ÎÎ, Var (n) ) .  Fur t hermore,  ÎÏ and Var(n)  are both f unc t i ons  
of  C [ _ .  Theref ore,
d0  30 3 Ü 30 3 Var (n)
- j —  =  —  - - - - - - - -  +  —  ------ ,— ^  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  ( 3 - 6 4 )
an Var (n)  Cl .
I t  f o l l ows  i mmedi atel y t ha t
| L  = - U r o  < 0
and
= - 2 ( r L  - Cl - r ) V a r ( y )  < 0.
An i n c r e a s e  i n t he l oan  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  c o s t  r educes the
ex pe c t ed  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  and r educes  the " r i s k "  o f  random
p r o f i t .  Ot her  t h i n g s  e q u a l ,  t he r i s k  premium f o r  a r i s k
ave r s e  agen t  i n c r e a s e s  as the r i s k i n e s s  o f  a p r os pe c t
i n c r e a s e s ,  3 0 / 3 Var ( n )  > 0. The e f f e c t  o f  an i n c r e me n t a l
r educ t i on  in r i s k  on r , i s p o s i t i v e  si nce - — 3Va>"(ll) ^
L 3Var ( n) 3 Cl
0 f o r  a l l  r i s k  averse i n t e r med i a r i es  and s i nce rL and 0  are
i n v e r s e l y  r e l a t e d .  The ambi gui t y  i n the o v e r a l l  e f f e c t  of  a
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change i n  C[_ on r  occur s  because o f  86/311. Tab l e  2 
f o l l o w s  f rom the p r i o r  d i scuss i on of  DARA, CARA and lARA.
Table 2
Ef f ec t s  of  a Change in 
Expected P r o f i t  on 
the Risk Premium
DARA CARA lARA
8 ^ 8 n  < 0  = 0  > 0
In t he case o f  e i t h e r  CARA or  lARA, d0/dC|_ < 0, and 8r[_/3C[_
> 0. However,  DARA i mpl i es  - i l l  > 0 and dG/dCi - 0.
811 >
I f  t he e f f e c t  of  an i n c r e a s e  in C|_ on ex pec t ed  p r o f i t  
domi nat es  t he e f f e c t  o f  c |_ on " r i s k , "  t he i n t e r m e d i a r y  
c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by DARA w i l l  r e d u c e  r[_. I f  t he DARA 
i n t e r m e d i a r y  i s compensated f o r  the r e d u c t i o n  i n  expec t ed  
p r o f i t  caused by an i n c r e a s e  i n C|_, t he f i r m  w i l l  i n c r e a s e  
i t s  spread between r|_ and r g as C[_ i n c r e a s e s .  A l t e r n a ­
t i v e l y ,  i f  r i s k  is he l d const ant ,  the DARA i n t er med i ar y  w i l l  
l owe r  t he spread between r |_ and r  Q as c |_ i n c r e a s e s .  By 
l ower i ng r t h e  f i r m i ncreases the volume of  expected l oans.  
Other  t h i ngs  equal ,  an i ncrease in C|_ l owers the net  r e t u r n  
on t he aver age  l oan.  The r e d u c t i o n  i n aver age expec t ed  
p r o f i t  per  l oan  can be p a r t i a l l y  o f f s e t  by an i n c r e a s e  in 
l oan Vol  ume.
Cons i de r  now the e f f e c t  of  a change i n C[_ on the ne t  
b o r r o w i n g / l e n d i n g  o f  Federa l  f unds .  D i f f e r e n t i a t i n g  R =
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D(rp)  - L(r[_) wi t h  r espec t  to C|_ y i e l d s :
9R _ D'3rQ L'3r|_
3cl 3cl 3C|_
Gi ven DARA, 3 R / 3 c l  i s  ambiguous s i n ce 3r |_/3 c  ^ i s  i n d e t e r ­
mi na t e  under  DARA. For  e i t h e r  CARA or  lARA, 3r | _ / 9 C|_ > 0, 
and the i n t e r med i a r y  i ncreases l end i ng  of  Federal  funds as 
the margi nal  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  costs o f  l oans i ncreases ( i . e. ,
3R/gC|_ > 0).  I n t e r e s t i n g l y ,  t he DARA i n t e r m e d i a r y  may 
a c t u a l l y  decrease the amount of  l end i ng  in the Federal  funds 
mar ke t  as a r e s u l t  o f  an i n c r e a s e  i n C|_. Thi s  woul d  be 
c on t r a r y  to i n t u i t i o n .
The next  set  of  p r opo s i t i ons  exp l or es  the r e l a t i o n s h i p  
between the opt i mal  r i s k  averse l oan rate and the marginal  
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  c o s t  of  d e p o s i t s .  What e f f e c t ,  i f  any,  do 
changes i n the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  cost  of  depos i t s  have on the 
spread between r  ^ and r  ^? D i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  o f  t he f i r s t
order  cond i t i ons  w i t h  r espect  to Cq y i e l d s
gri - D • E{U" ( I I ) [ L + y + L ' ( r ,  - c , - r ) ] }
 -----------------------------------------------------------     • (3-65)
U ll
P r o p o s i t i o n  5 ) :  Under  DARA, the o p t i ma l  r i s k  averse
l oan  r a t e  i s  a d e c r e a s i n g  f u n c t i o n  of  the ma r g i n a l  admi n­
i s t r a t i v e  cost  of  depos i t s .
P r oo f :  As p r e v i o u s l y  demons t r a t ed  by ( 3 - 4 2 )  t h r ough
( 3 - 5 0 ) ,  E { U " ( n ) [ L  + V+ L ' ( r L  - C|_ - r ) ] }  > 0 g i v e n  DARA. 
Thus,  w i t h  - D < 0 and Tj|_[_ < 0 by the second o r d e r  c o n ­
d i t i o n s ,  i t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  t he op t i ma l  l oan  r a t e  i s  a de­
creas i ng f unc t i on  of  Cq.
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P r o p o s i t i o n  6 ) : Under CARA, the o p t i m a l  r i s k  ave r s e
l oan  r a t e  i s  i n v a r i a n t  w i t h  r e s p e c t  to changes i n t he mar ­
g i na l  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  cos t  of  depos i t s .
Proof :  Thi s p r o p o s i t i o n  can be e a s i l y  v e r i f i e d  since
E{ U" ( n ) [ L  + y + L ' ( r L  - c^ - r ) ] }  = 0 under  CARA, as shown 
by ( 3 - 52 )  and ( 3 - 5 3 ) .
P r o p o s i t i o n  7 ) : Gi ven lARA,  t he o p t i m a l  r i s k  ave r s e
loan r a t e  fs an i nc r eas i ng  f unc t i on  of  the margi nal  admi n i s ­
t r a t i v e  cos t  of  depos i t s .
P r oo f :  E { U" ( n ) [ L  + y + L ' ( r | _ - C | _ - r ) ] } < 0  g i v e n
lARA,  as e s t a b l i s h e d  by ( 3 - 54)  t h r o ugh  ( 3 - 6 1 ) .  T h e r e f o r e ,  
r i s  an i nc r eas i ng  f u n c t i o n  of  Cq under lARA.
P r o p o s i t i o n  8 ): The o p t i m a l  d e p o s i t  r a t e  i s  a de­
c r e a s i n g  f u n c t i o n  of  t he ma r g i n a l  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  c o s t  of  
depos i t s .
P r o o f :  D i f f e r e n t i a t i n g  i m p l i c i t l y  t he f i r s t  o r d e r
c ond i t i on s  w i t h  r espec t  to c q ,
3rQ - D ' - E [ U ' ( : ) ]  + E{ U" ( : ) ( - D ) ( r - r Q- CQ) }
- --------------------------------------------------------- -— — ■ (3-66)3cq
^DD
I nspec t i on  of  the numerator  of  (3-66)  r e v e a l s  t h a t  the f i r s t  
term i s  nega t i v e  s i nce -O'  < 0 and E[U' ( I I ) ]  > 0. The second 
term i n the numerator  can be r e w r i t t e n  as
E{ U" ( I I ) ( - D) [ - D + D ' ( r  - rp - c q ) ] }
= E{U" (n)D}  • E[ -D + D ' ( r  - rp - C p ) ]  = 0, (3-67)
by the f i r s t  order  c on d i t i o n  f o r  rp.
T a b l e  3 p r e s e n t s  t he r e s u l t s  f rom P r o p o s i t i o n s  5) ,  6) 
and 7).  The r i s k  a v e r s e  l oan  r a t e  i s  a d e c r e a s i n g ,  an
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T a b l e  3
Ef f ec t s  on r f rom a Change in Cq
DARA CARA lARA 
Br^/Bco < 0  = 0  > 0
i n v a r i a n t  or  an i nc r eas i ng  f u n c t i o n  of  the margi nal  admi n i s ­
t r a t i v e  c o s t  o f  d e p o s i t s  under  DARA, CARA and lARA r e s p e c ­
t i v e l y .  P r o p o s i t i o n  8) i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  Br ^ /  8c g < 0
i r r e s p e c t i v e  of  the degree of  abso l u t e  r i s k  aver s i on .  Thus, 
g i v e n  CARA o r  lARA,  t he spr ead between r|_ and rQ i s  an 
i nc r eas i ng  f unc t i on  of  Cq. Thi s r e s u l t  i s i d e n t i c a l  to the 
r i s k  n e u t r a l i t y  case. Under DARA, the e f f e c t  on the spread 
( r  - rp)  f r om a change i n  Cq i s  ambiguous i n  s i gn .  The 
DARA i n t e r m e d i a r y  l o we r s  i t s  l oan  r a t e  i n  r esponse t o an 
i n c r e a s e  i n t he a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  c o s t  of  d e p o s i t s .  Si nce 
3^ d/ 3^D 0 f o r  a l l  degrees o f  r i s k  a v e r s i o n ,  an i n c r e a s e  in
Cq means a l s o  a r e d u c t i o n  i n  rQ. As a r e s u l t ,  t he spread 
may i n c r e a s e ,  decr ease or  s t ay  the same f o l l o w i n g  an 
i n c r e a s e  i n  c q . The a m b i g u i t y  o f  t h i s  r e s u l t  under  DARA 
suggests the p o s s i b i l i t y  t ha t  the i n t e r med i a r y  cou l d  i n f a c t  
reduce the s i ze of  the spread in response to an i ncrease in 
the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  cost  of  depos i t s .
The p r o p o s i t i o n s  i n Tab l e  3 can be g i v e n  a r i s k  premium 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .  As di scussed in the pr ev i ous  sec t i on ,  the 
r i s k  premium demanded by the i n t e r med i a r y  in connect i on wi t h  
i t s  random p r o f i t  i s  a f u n c t i o n  o f  t he ex pec t ed  p r o f i t  and 
the var i ance or  r i s k  of  p r o f i t .  The t o t a l  r a t e  of  change in 
the r i s k  premium ( 6 )  as C q  changes i s gi ven by
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de 30 3:  30 8Var(%) , ,
  = _______ + ______________________ . ( 3 - 6 8 )
dcg 311 3c Q 3Var(H) 8cD
where





Theref ore,  a change in the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  cost  of  deposi t s  
has an e f f e c t  o n l y  on expec t ed p r o f i t .  An i n c r e a s e  i n Cq 
reduces expected p r o f i t  but  has no e f f e c t  on the var i ance or 
r i s k  of  p r o f i t .  From t h i s ,  i t  f o l l o w s  t ha t  the second term 
i n ( 3 - 68)  v a n i s h e s ,  and the e f f e c t  on the r i s k  premium 
d e p e n d s  s o l e l y  on t h e  mean i n c o m e  e f f e c t ,  i . e . ,  
(30/311) (3n/3C[ j ) .  E f f e c t s  of  a change i n  ex pec t ed  p r o f i t  
on the r i s k  premium under  DARA, CARA and lARA are shown in 
Tab l e  2 i n t he p r ec ed i ng  s e c t i o n .  Under DARA, 80/311 < 0, 
and s i n c e  t he mean p r o f i t  e f f e c t  i s  a l ways  n e g a t i v e ,  i t  
f o l l o w s  t h a t  d0 / dcp > 0. As e s t a b l i s h e d  p r e v i o u s l y ,  an 
i n c r e a s i n g  r i s k  premium i m p l i e s  a d e c r e a s i n g  l oan  r a t e .  
Hence,  under  DARA, gr |_/a cp < 0. S i m i l a r l y ,  g i v e n  CARA, 
30/3I I  = 0. A change i n n  has no e f f e c t  on the r i s k  premium 
under  CARA. From t h i s ,  i t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  dG/dCg = 0, and r|_ 
i s  i n v a r i a n t  w i t h  r e s p e c t  to changes i n  t he mar g i na l  
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  cost  of  deposi t s  under CARA. F i n a l l y ,  lARA 
i m p l i e s  t h a t  d 0 / dc p  < 0, s i nce  30/311 > 0. Thus,  i t
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f o l l o w s  f r om t he r e l a t i o n s h i p  between G and r ^  ( i n v e r s e l y  
r e l a t e d ) ,  Sr^/ScQ > 0. Given lARA, the i n t e r med i a r y ' s  l oan 
r a t e  i s an i nc r eas i ng  f u n c t i o n  of  Cq.
The i m p l i c a t i o n s  of  the p r o p o s i t i o n s  di scussed i n t h i s  
s e c t i o n  can be summar i zed as f o l l o w s .  Gi ven e i t h e r  r i s k  
n e u t r a l i t y  o r  n o n dec r eas i ng  a b s o l u t e  r i s k  a v e r s i o n ,  t he 
spread between r|_ and r g i s  an i n c r e a s i n g  f u n c t i o n  of  t he
ma r g i n a l  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  c o s t  o f  d e p o s i t s .  Under  DARA,
however,  an i ncrease in Cq cou l d  l ead to a r educ t i on  in the 
s i ze o f  t he spread.  I n v a r i a b l y ,  an i ncrease i n Cq causes a 
r e d u c t i o n  i n  t he  e x p e c t e d  s i z e  o f  t he  i n t e r m e d i a r y  
i r r e s p e c t i v e  of  a t t i t u d e s  toward r i s k .
F i n a l l y ,  i t  i s  e a s i l y  demonst rated t ha t  an i ncrease in 
the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  cost  of  depos i t s  causes the i n t e r med i a r y  
t o become a ne t  bo r r owe r  i n t he Feder a l  f unds  mar ke t  under  
e i t h e r  DARA or  CARA. The ex pec t ed  amount  o f  b o r r o w i n g /  
l end i ng  i n Federal  funds is g i ven by
R = D(rQ) - L f r ^ ) .
The e f f e c t  of  a change i n Cq on R i s gi ven by
3R 3r p) 3r I
= D ' ^  - L' _— •^Cp 3cp 3Cp
For  a l l  degrees o f  r i s k  a v e r s i o n ,  3rp/ 3cQ < 0. From Tab l e  
3, 3^ l / 3Cq < 0 under  DARA. Thus,  i t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  3 R / 3 Cq <
0. S i m i l a r l y ,  under  CARA, 3rL/3Cp = 0 wh i ch f a c t  i m p l i e s  
3R/gcp < 0 under  CARA.
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Hence,  g i v e n  e i t h e r  DARA or  CARA, t he i n t e r m e d i a r y  
t ends  to r educe the amount  o f  l e n d i n g  i n  Feder a l  f unds  
(becomes a ne t  b o r r o we r )  as the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  c o s t  o f  
depos i t s  i ncreases.  An i ncrease in the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  cost  
of  depos i t s  e s s e n t i a l l y  i ncreases the margi nal  resource cost  
of  t h i s  source of  funds.  Thi s causes an i n pu t  s u b s t i t u t i o n  
e f f e c t  t o t ake p l a c e  whereby d e p o s i t s  are s u b s t i t u t e d  by 
F e d e r a l  f u n d s  as a s o u r c e  o f  f u n d s  t o  t h e  
i n t e r m e d i a r y .  Under  lARA, 3R/ 3cq  ^ 0 s i nc e  a r ^ / a c p  > 0 
( Tab l e  3) .  Thus,  c o n t r a r y  to i n t u i t i o n ,  an i n c r e a s e  i n the 
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  c o s t  o f  d e p o s i t s  c o u l d  r e s u l t  i n  t he 
i n t e r m e d i a r y  l e n d i n g  more i n t he Fede r a l  f unds  mar ke t  (or  
bor rowi ng l e s s ) .
The next  set  of  p r o p o s i t i o n s  examines the e f f e c t s  of  a 
change i n t he Feder a l  f unds  r a t e  on the i n t e r m e d i a r y ' s  
spread between r|_ and r p ,  as w e l l  as t he f i r m ' s  l e n d i n g /  
b o r r o w i n g  i n t he Feder a l  f unds  mar ke t .  In g e n e r a l ,  most  
mar ke t  r a t e s  t end to f o l l o w  t he movements i n the Feder a l  
fund rate.  Al t hough the r at e on Federal  funds i s  determined 
by aggregate suppl y and demand under more or l ess  p e r f e c t l y  
c omp e t i t i v e  c o n d i t i o n s ,  the Federal  Reserve exer t s  c ons i de r ­
a b l e  i n f l u e n c e  on t h i s  r a t e  t h r o u g h  i t s  open m a r k e t  
ope r a t i ons .
Cons i de r  t he e f f e c t  on the i n t e r m e d i a r y ' s  l oan  r a t e  
f r o m a change i n  t he  F e d e r a l  f u n d s  r a t e .  I m p l i c i t  
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  of  the f i r s t  order  c ond i t i on s  w i t h  r espec t  
to r y i e l d s
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- L ' - E [ U ' ( n ) ]  + E { U " ( n ) ( D - L - y ) [ L + y + L ' ( r L - C L - r ) ] }
3r Ull
(3-69)
The f i r s t  t e r m i n  t he  n u m e r a t o r  o f  ( 3 - 6 9 )  i s  c l e a r l y  
p o s i t i v e .  The second term can be r e w r i t t e n  as
E { U " ( n )  ( D-L-y) [L + y + [ / ( r ^  - - r ) ] }  =
D - E { U " ( n ) [ L  + y + L'  ( r i _ - Cl  - r ) ] }
- E{ U" ( n ) ( L  + y ) [ L  + y  + L ' ( r L  - Cl  - r ) ] } .  (3-70)
S u b s t i t u t i n g  ( 3 - 4 1 )  f o r  t h e  l a s t  t e r m i n  ( 3 - 7 0 ) ,  and 
f a c t o r i n g  s i m i l a r  terms y i e l d s
E{U" ( n ) ( 0 - L- y ) [ L + y + L ' ( r L  - cL - r ) ] }  =
- E { U " ( n ) [ L  + y + L ' ( r L  - Cl - r ) ] ? }
+ E { U " ( n ) [ L + y + L ' ( r L - C L - r ) ] } [ D + L ' ( r L - C L - r ) ] .  (3-71)
I nspec t i on  of  (3-71)  r ev ea l s  t ha t  the sign of  the f i r s t  term
i s  p o s i t i v e  f o r  U"(H) < 0. W i t h ^ L L  < 0 by t he second o r de r
c o n d i t i o n s ,  t he s i gn  of  3 r L / 3 r  depends on t he s i gn of  t he
1ast  term in ( 3 - 71 ) .
P r opo s i t i on  9): Given DARA, a s u f f i c i e n t  c ond i t i on  f o r
3r l /  3r > 0 i s 0 ^  L .
P r o o f :  E { U " ( n ) [ L  + y + L ' ( r L  ~ ~ r ) ] }  > 0 under
DARA, as shown in (3-42)  - (3-50) .  From (3-38) ,  i t  i s  c l e a r
t ha t
L ' ( r i  - Cl - r )  ) -L.  (3-72)
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Adding D to both si des of  (3-72)  gi ves
L ’ (r|_ - Cl  - r )  + D > D - L. (3-73)
Cl e a r l ) ' ,  D + L ' ( r L  - c L - r  ) > 0 p r o v i d e d  t h a t  D ^  L. 
Hence,  p r o v i d e d  t h a t  t he f i r m  i s  not  an ex pec t ed  bo r r ower  
(D ^  L) ,  t h e  s i g n  o f  t h e  l a s t  t e r m i n  ( 3 - 7 1 )  w i l l  be 
p o s i t i v e  and 3rL / 3r  > 0 under DARA.
Pr opos i t i on  10): Given CARA, the opt i mal  r i s k  averse
l oan  r a t e  i s  an i n c r e a s i n g  f u n c t i o n  o f  t he r a t e  at  whi ch the 
i n t e r med i a r y  can borrow and l end Federal  funds.
P r oo f :  Under  CARA, E{ U" (n) [ L  + y + L ' ( r l " c l " r  ) ] }  = 0,
as demonst rated p r e v i o u s l y  by (3-52)  and (3-53) .  Thus, the 
l a s t  term of  (3-71)  i s p o s i t i v e .  I t  f o l l o w s  f rom t h i s  t ha t  
the numerator  of  (3-69)  i s c l e a r l y  p o s i t i v e .  Since Ull  ^  ^
by the second or der  c o nd i t i on s ,  9 r L / 9r  > 0 g i ven CARA.
Pr op o s i t i o n  H ) :  Under  lARA, t he s i g n  of  S r L ^ r  i s
ambiguous.
Proof :  Under lARA, E{U" (n) [ L + y + L ' ( r L - C L - r ) ] } < 0,
as demon s t r a t e d  e a r l i e r  i n  ( 3 -54)  - ( 3 - 61 ) .  S i nce [ 0 +
L ' ( r i  - CL - r ) ]  ^ 0,  g r L / s r  cannot  be signed under lARA.
In g e n e r a l ,  t he s i gn  o f  B r ^ /  i s  ambiguous under  
lARA. However ,  i t  can be demons t r a t ed  t h a t  a s u f f i c i e n t  
c ond i t i on  f o r  3 r L / 3 r  > 0 i mp l i es  t ha t  D < L.
C o r o l l a r y  1) :  A s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n  f o r  3 r | / 9 r > 0
under IXRA Imp l i e s  t ha t  the i n t e r med i a r y  must  be an expected 
net  bor rower  i n the Federal  funds market .
P r oo f :  Si nce E { U" ( n ) [ L  + y + L ' ( r L  - c L - r ) ] }  < 0
under  lARA, a s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n  f o r  3 r L / 3 r  > 0 i s  D +
L ' ( r i  - Cl - r )  < 0. Thus, (3-73)  y i e l d s  D < L.
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Pr opos i t i ons  9) - 11) and C o r o l l a r y  1) r eveal  t ha t  the 
i mpac t  o f  a change i n the Feder a l  f unds  r a t e  on the f i r m ' s  
cho i ce  o f  an o p t i ma l  l oan  r a t e  depends on bot h t he f i r m ' s  
a t t i t u d e  t owar ds  r i s k  and whe t he r  t he f i r m  i s an expec t ed  
l ender  or  bor rower .  These r e s u l t s  c l o s e l y  p a r a l l e l  the r o l e  
p l a y e d  by t he Feder a l  f unds  mar ke t  i n  t h i s  model .  In 
P r o p o s i t i o n  9) ,  s r ^ / a r  > 0 under  DARA i f  D > L. I t  i s  
i n t e r e s t i n g  to not e  t h a t  i f  t he f i r m  i s  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by 
DARA and i t  i s  a ne t  bo r r owe r  (D < L),  t hen ,  t he op t i ma l  
l oan r at e may be a decreasing f unc t i on  of  r.
Cons i de r  now the e f f e c t  o f  a change i n  the Feder a l  
funds r at e on the opt i mal  depos i t  r a t e .
P r o p o s i t i o n  12) :  The o p t i m a l  d e p o s i t  r a t e  i s  an
i n c r e a s i n g  "Func t i on o f  t he b o r r o w i n g  and l e n d i n g  r a t e  on 
Federal  funds.
Pr oo f  : I m p l i c i t  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  o f  t he f i r s t  o r d e r
cond i t i ons  wi t h  r espec t  to r gi ves
arg E { U ' ( n ) D ' }  + E{U" ( H) ( D- L - p ) [ - D+D' ( r - r g - c g ) ] }
^  ^
The f i r s t  term of  the numerator  of  (3-74)  i s  p o s i t i v e  since 
D' > 0 by assumpt i on .  The second t erm can be shown t o be 
equal  t o zero.  R e w r i t i n g  the second t erm i n t he numer a t o r  
of  (3-74)  as
E{ U" ( : ) ( D - L - p ) [ - D  + D ' ( r  - rg - C g ) ] }  =
E{U"(H)(D - L - p) -E[ -D + D ' ( r  - r g  -  C g ) ] } =  0, (3-75)
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s i n c e  E [ - D + D ' ( r  - r p  - Cp) ]  = 0 by t he  f i r s t  o r d e r  
c o n d i t i o n  f o r  rp.  Hence,  3 r p / 3 r  > 0, s i n c e  Upp < 0 by the 
second order  cond i t i ons .
Tab l e  4 shows the r e s u l t s  f r om P r o p o s i t i o n s  9) ,  10) ,  
and 11) .
Table 4
E f f e c t  of  a Change in r  on rL
DARA CARA lARA 
Srp/Sr  >0* >0 ^0
*Requ i res D > L
Given e i t h e r  DARA or  CARA, the i n t e r med i a r y ' s  l oan rate 
i s  an i n c r e a s i n g  f u n c t i o n  o f  the Feder a l  f unds  r a t e .  But
not e t h a t  under  DARA t h i s  r e s u l t  r e q u i r e s  t h a t  D ^  L. The
s i gn  of  9 r r  i s  ambi guous under  lARA. P r o p o s i t i o n  12) 
s t a t es  t ha t  the depos i t  r a t e  i ncreases as a f u n c t i o n  of  the 
Feder a l  f unds  r a t e  f o r  a l l  degrees of  r i s k  a v e r s i o n .  The 
e f f e c t  on t he spr ead between rp and rp i s  i n d e t e r m i n a t e  
under  DARA, CARA or  lARA. Thus,  a change i n  t he  Federa l
funds r a t e  cou l d  i nc r ease,  decrease or  l eave unchanged the
si ze of  the spread between rp and rp.
I n t u i t i v e l y ,  t he q u a l i t a t i v e  b e h a v i o r  o f  the r i s k  
premium,  0,  i n  r esponse  t o  a change i n t he Feder a l  f unds 
r a t e  can h e l p  e x p l a i n  t he  r e s u l t s  o b t a i n e d  i n  t h e s e  
p r opo s i t i ons .  Recal l  t h a t  0 depends on at  l e a s t  the f i r s t  
two moments o f  t he d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  random p r o f i t .  Thus,  
0 = 0 ( n ,  Var ( i i ) ) .  Then, i t  f o l l ows  t ha t
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de 30 an ae 3Var (n)
_  = ---------+ -------------------------------  (3-76)
dr  3H 3r  3 V a r ( H ) 3 r
Fu r t he r mor e ,





= - 2 ( r|_ - Cl - r  ) Var (y ) < 0,
The e f f e c t  on t he v a r i a n c e  o f  p r o f i t  f r om a change in r i s  
negat i ve .  As the var i ance  of  p r o f i t  i ncreases (decreases)  
t he r i s k  premium i n c r e a s e s  ( de c r e a s e s ) ,  3 0 / 3 V a r ( n )  > 0. 
From t h i s ,  i t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  t he second t erm i n s i d e  the 
b r a c k e t s  i n  ( 3 - 76 )  i s  n e g a t i v e  f o r  a l l  degrees  o f  r i s k  
a v e r s i o n .  The e f f e c t  on mean p r o f i t  f r om a change i n r 
depends on D and L s i nce 3 i f / 3 r  = D - L  ^ 0 as D  ^ L. I f  the 
i n t e r med i a r y  sets rL and r g such t h a t  i t  expects to be a net  
l e n d e r  i n  t he F ed e r a l  f unds  mar ke t  (0 > L) ,  t he e f f e c t  on 
mean p r o f i t  f r om a change i n  r  i s  p o s i t i v e .  On t he o t h e r  
hand,  i f  t he i n t e r m e d i a r y  e x p e c t s  t o be a ne t  b o r r o we r  in 
t he Fede r a l  f unds  mar k e t  (D < L ) , 3 l T / 3 r  < 0. F i n a l l y ,  i f  
D = L, t he i n s t i t u t i o n  i s  n e i t h e r  an ex pec t ed  bo r r owe r  nor  
an expected l ender  i n Federal  f unds,  and jf i s i n v a r i a n t  wi th 
r espec t  to changes in r. Tab l e 5 below shows the e f f e c t s  on
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t he r i s k  premium f r om a change i n  r under  DARA, CARA and 
lARA f o r  the case when D > L.
Table 5
E f f ec t s  on the Risk Premium 
f rom a Change i n r  when D > L
DARA CARA lARA
Mean P r o f i t  E f f e c t  <0 =0 >0
Var i ance E f f e c t  <0 <0 <0
The mean and var i ance  e f f e c t s  shown in Tabl e 5 cor respond to 
t he f i r s t  and second t erms i n s i d e  t he b r a c k e t s  i n ( 3 - 75 ) .  
As Tab l e  2 showed,  under  DARA, 36/3n < 0. Thus,  the mean 
p r o f i t  e f f e c t  on 0 f o r  the case when the i n t e r med i a r y  i s  an 
expected net  l ender  i n Federal  funds i s nega t i ve  under DARA, 
s i n c e  3 i f / 3  r  > 0. The mean p r o f i t  e f f e c t  on 0 f rom an
i ncrease in r  i s  nega t i ve  under DARA. Thi s f a c t  i s mu t u a l l y
r e i n f o r c e d  by the va r i ance  e f f e c t  on ©whi ch  i s  a l so  nega­
t i v e .  R e c a l l  t h a t  a d e c r e a s i n g  r i s k  premium i m p l i e s
i n c r e a s i n g  r[_. T h e r e f o r e ,  8r | _/3r  > 0 under  DARA. Gi ven
CARA, no mean e f f e c t  on 0 a r i s e s  f r om a change i n  r .  The 
v a r i a n c e  e f f e c t  under  CARA i s  n e g a t i v e .  Thus,  i t  f o l l o w s  
t ha t  3rL/3' ^ > 0 s i nce a dec l i ne  i s the r i s k  premium i mp l i es  
an i n c r e a s e  in r|_. The a m b i g u i t y  under  lARA i n t he s i gn  of  
3r |_/3r  i s  due to c o n f l i c t i n g  si gns in the mean and var i ance 
e f f e c t s  on t he r i s k  premium.  In t he case when t he i n t e r ­
med i a r y  s e t s  r[_ and rp such t h a t  t he i n t e r m e d i a r y  i s  an 
expected net  bor rower  i n Federal  funds (D < L),  the e f f e c t s
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on the r i s k  premium f rom a change in the Federal  funds rate
are shown in Table 6. In t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  case,  the mean and
Table 6
Ef f ec t s  on the Risk Premium 
f rom a Change i n r  when D < L
DARA CARA lARA
Mean P r o f i t  E f f e c t  >0 =0 <0
Var i ance E f f e c t  <0 <0 <0
v a r i a n c e  o f  p r o f i t  e f f e c t s  have c o n f l i c t i n g  s i gns  under  
DARA. Thus, the DARA i n t e r med i a r y  which i s an expected net  
bor rower  i n the Federal  funds market  coul d p o s s i b l y  l ower  r 
in response t o an i n c r e a s e  i n r .  Th i s  a c t i o n  wou l d  reduce 
t he s i z e  o f  t he spread between r a n d  rg.  I f  t he i n t e r ­
med i a r y  set s  r|_ and r g such t h a t  D = L, t h e r e  i s  no mean 
e f f e c t  on t he r i s k  premium s i nce  sn /  gr = 0. Si nce the 
v a r i a n c e  e f f e c t  on 0 i s  n e g a t i v e ,  3r|_/3r > 0 f o r  a 1 1 degrees 
of  r i s k  aver s i on .
Consider  now the e f f e c t  on the amount of  Federal  funds 
b o r r o w i n g / l e n d i n g  by t he i n t e r m e d i a r y  f rom a change i n r.  
The amount of  Federal  funds bor r owi ng / l end i ng  i s  gi ven by
R = D - L.
D i f f e r e n t i a t i n g  R wi t h  r espec t  to r  y i e l d s
3R 3rr, 3ri
_  = D ' _ 1 - L '  _
3r 3r 3r
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I t  i s  e a s i l y  v e r i f i e d  t ha t  g i ven non i ncr eas i ng abso l u t e  r i s k  
a v e r s i o n ,  3 R / 3 r  > 0 p r o v i d e d  t h a t  D 2 L. Thus,  i f  t he 
i n t e r med i a r y  i s  an expected net  l ender  in the Federal  funds 
market ,  an i ncrease i n r  i ncreases the amount of  l end i ng  in 
the Federal  funds market  under e i t h e r  DARA or  CARA.
B e f o r e  e x a m i n i n g  t he  case o f  u n c e r t a i n  d e p o s i t  
s u p p l i e s ,  i t  i s  of  i n t e r e s t  to c o n s i d e r  the e f f e c t s  on the 
l oan and depos i t  r a t es  f rom a mean p r es e r v i n g  spread in the 
d i s t r i b u t i o n  of  y .  Ro t hs c h i l d  and S t i g l i t z ^ B  i n t r oduced the 
concept  of  a mean p r es e r v i ng  spread in the d i s t r i b u t i o n  of  a 
random v a r i a b l e  as a t o o l  f o r  d e f i n i n g  i n c r e a s i n g  r i s k .  
E s s e n t i a l l y ,  a mean p r e s e r v i n g  spr ead r e d i s t r i b u t e s  the 
wei ght  of  a d i s t r i b u t i o n  f rom the cent er  to the t a i l s  wh i l e  
keep i ng  t he mean o f  t he d i s t r i b u t i o n  unchanged.  Thus,  a 
mean p r e s e r v i n g  s p r e a d  i n c r e a s e s  t h e  v a r i a b i l i t y  or  
d i spe r s i on  of  the d i s t r i b u t i o n  around the cons t an t  mean.
Def i ne a mean p r es e r v i ng  spread in the d i s t r i b u t i o n  of
V by
y* = Ty,  (3-77)
where Y i s  a s h i f t  parameter .  Now, w r i t i n g  the f i r s t  order  
c o n d i t i o n s  ( ( 3 - 3 1 )  and ( 3 - 3 2 ) )  i n  t e r m s  o f  y *  , and 
d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g  i m p l i c i t l y  w i t h  r espec t  to y ( e v a l u a t i n g  at  
Y= 1) y i e l d s
R o t h s c h i l d  and J. E. S t i g l i t z ,  " I n c r e a s i n g  Ri sk 
I :  A D e f i n i t i o n , "  J ou r n a l  o f  Economic Theor y ,  2 : 225- 43 .
1970.
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3Y J
E { U ' ( n ) y } + E { U " ( H ) ( r L - C L - r ) ( p ) [ L + p + L ' ( r L - C L - r ) ] }
Ï = 1  ^LL
( 3 - 7 8 )
The f i r s t  t erm i n  t he numer a t o r  o f  ( 3 - 78)  can be exp r essed  
as
E( U' ( n ) y }  = E[U' (n ) ] - E [ y ]  + C o v ( U ' ( : ) , y ) .  (3-79)
Si nce E[ y ]  = 0,  t he s i gn  o f  ( 3 - 79)  depends on t he s i gn  of  
Cov ( U' ( n) , y ) .  Note t h a t  SH/By = (r|_ - C|_ - r )  > 0, and
3 U ' ( n ) / 3 y  = U " ( n ) ( r L  - Cl - r  ) < 0 f o r  U" (n)  < 0. These
f a c t s  i m p l y  t h a t  Cov (U' (I I ) , y)  < 0, and t hus t he f i r s t  t erm 
in (3-78)  i s  nega t i ve .  Consider  now the second term i n the 
numerator  of  (3-78) .  Adding and s u b t r a c t i n g  (L + L‘ (r|_ - C|_ 
- r  )) s i mu l t aneous l y  i n s i de  the par ent hes i s  at  y r e s u l t s  i n 
t h e  f o l l o w i n g  e x p r e s s i o n  f o r  t he  s ec ond  t e r m i n  t he  
numerator  of  (3-78) :
E { U" ( n ) ( r ^  - - r ) ( y ) [ L  + y + L ' ( r ^  - C|_ - r ) ] }  =
E{ U" ( n ) [ L  + y + L' ( r | _ - C|_ - r ) ] ^ } ( r | _  - C|_ - r )
- -  E { U " ( n ) [ L  + y + L ' ( r L  - C[_ - r ) ] } ( L ( r L  - Cl - r )
+ L ' ( r ^  - c^ - r ) 2 ) .  (3-80)
The f i r s t  term in (3-80)  i s  c l e a r l y  negat i ve f o r  U" ( H) < 0.
P r o p o s i t i o n  ^ 3 j :  Gi ven  DARA, the e f f e c t  on t he r i s k
a v e r s e  l oan  r a t e  f rom a mean p r e s e r v i n g  i n c r e a s e  i n y i s  
nega t i ve .
Pr o o f :  To v e r i f y  t h i s  p r o p o s i t i o n  i t  must  be shown
t ha t  (3-80)  i s nega t i ve  in si gn.  As p r e v i o u s l y  demonst rated 
in (3-50)
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E{ U" ( n ) [ L  + y + L'  ( tl  - Cl - r ) ] }  > 0,
under DARA. From the f i r s t  order  c o n d i t i o n ,  [ L+L ' ( r l ~cL - r ) ]
> 0. M u l t i p l y i n g  both si des of  t h i s  i n e q u a l i t y  by ( r L-CL- r )
> 0 g i ves
[ L ( r i  - Cl - r )  + L ' ( r L  - CL - r ) ^ ]  > 0.
Hence, the term (3-80)  i s negat i ve  and Br ^ / BY]  % < 0.
Propos i t i  on____ 1 ^ ) :  Gi ven CARA, the e f f e c t  on the r i s k
a v e r s e  l oan  r a t e  f r om a mean p r e s e r v i n g  i n c r e a s e  i n i s
negat i  v e .
Proof :  Under  CARA, E{U"(11)[L + y + L ' ( r  l " c l " r  ) ] }  = 0
as shown e a r l i e r  i n (3-53) .  The l a s t  term of  (3-80)  i s zero,  
and ( 3 - 80 )  i s  n e g a t i v e .  T h u s , i t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  BCl / B Y ] . ^ = i  
< 0 .
Propos i t i  on 1 ^ ) :  Under lARA, t he e f f e c t  o f  a mean
p r e s e r v i n g  i n c r e a s e  i n  y on t he r i s k  av e r s e  l oan  r a t e  i s 
ambiguous.
Proof :  Recal l  t ha t  under lARA,
E { U" ( n ) [ L  + y + L ' ( r L  - Cl - r ) ] }  < 0
as shown i n  ( 3 - 61 ) .  Thus,  t he s i gn  o f  ( 3 - 80)  c anno t  be
det ermi ned,  and BrY/BY]  y=i  i s  ambiguous gi ven lARA.
Propos i t i  on 1^ ) :  A mean p r e s e r v i n g  i n c r e a s e  i n the




E { U " ( n ) ( y ) ( r L - C L - r ) [ - D + D ' ( r - r L , - C | 3 ) ] }
-*Y=1 ^DD (3-81)
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Not i ng t ha t
E{ U " (n ) (y ) ( r  |_ “ C|_ - r ) [ - D  + D ' ( r  - - Cq) ] }  =
( r L - C L - r ) E [ - D + D ' ( r - r o - C o ) ] E { U " ( n ) ( y ) }  = 0 ,  ( 3 - 8 2 )
bi' t he f i r s t  o r d e r  c o n d i t i o n  f o r  rg.  T h e r e f o r e , Srp/SY]
= 0 .
Table 7 shows the r e s u l t s  f rom a mean p r eser v i ng  spread 
(MRS) of  the d i s t r i b u t i o n  of  y on the l oan rate.
Table 7
E f f e c t  of  a Mean Preserv i ng Spread of  y on Loan Rate
DARA CARA lARA
Y= ’
a r ^ / aY ]  =1 <0 <0 ^0
A mean p r e s e r v i n g  spread of  y has o n l y  one e f f e c t  on 
the d i s t r i b u t i o n  of  the i n t e r med i a r y ' s  p r o f i t :  i t  i ncreases
the v a r i a b i l i t y  or d i spe r s i on  around the mean p r o f i t .  How­
ever ,  a mean p r ese r v i ng  spread does not  change the expected
va l ue  of  p r o f i t .  I ncreased v a r i a b i l i t y  wi t h  constant  mean 
p r o f i t  i mp l i e s  i nc r eas i ng  r i s k i n e s s  of  p r o f i t .  I n t u i t i v e l y ,  
as t he r i s k  o f  p r o f i t  i n c r e a s e s ,  the s i z e  o f  t he r i s k
premium a l s o  i n c r e a s e s  i r r e s p e c t i v e  o f  t he degree of  r i s k
a v e r s i o n .  R e c a l l  t h a t  as the r i s k  premium i n c r e a s e s ,  the 
l o a n  r a t e  d e c l i n e s .  Hence,  one s h o u l d  e x p e c t  a mean 
p r es e r v i ng  spread of  y to l ower  the i n t e r med i a r y ' s  l oan rate 
i r r e s p e c t i v e  of  the degree of  r i s k  aver s i on.  Except  f o r  the
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a mb i g u i t y  under  I ARA, t he s i gns  o f  t he e f f e c t  o f  a mean 
p r e s e r v i n g  spread o f  y on t he l oan  r a t e  agree w i t h  the 
i nc r eas i ng  r i s k  premium i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .
Pr opos i t i on  16) i mp l i e s  t ha t  a mean p r ese r v i ng  spread 
of  y has no e f f e c t  on Tq. T h e r e f o r e ,  g i v e n  non i n c r e a s i n g  
a b s o l u t e  r i s k  a v e r s i o n ,  t he s i z e  o f  t he spr ead between r 
and rp i s  reduced by a mean p r ese r v i ng  spread of  y.
F i n a l l y ,  how does the amount  o f  b o r r o w i n g  and l e n d i n g  
of  Feder a l  f unds  change i n r esponse to a mean p r e s e r v i n g  
spread of  y? D i f f e r e n t i a t i n g  R = D - L w i t h  r e s p e c t  to 
Y ( eva l ua t ed  at  Y = 1) y i e l d s
3R
3Y
D'Srp L ' s c l  
Y = /  ^  ^
Given noni  nc r e a s i  ng a b s o l u t e  r i s k  a v e r s i o n ,  3R/3Y] y= i  < 0. 
This i mp l i es  t h a t  a mean p r ese r v i ng  spread of  y reduces the 
amount of  l end i ng  in the Federal  funds market  (or  i ncreases 
b o r r ow i ng  of  Federa l  f unds ) .  As p r o f i t  " r i s k "  i n c r e a s e s ,  
t he f i r m  l o we r s  r w h i c h  i n c r e a s e s  t he vo l ume o f  expec t ed 
l oans .  The i n c r e a s e  i n  expec t ed  l oans  i s  f unded by an 
i ncrease in bor rowi ng ( reduced l end i ng)  in the Federal  funds 
mar ke t .  On ba l a n c e ,  t he i n c r e a s e d  r i s k  l eads  t he f i r m  to 
accept  a l ower  p r o f i t  margin per  d o l l a r  i nves t ed  i n consumer 
loans and to compensate p a r t i a l l y  by i nc r eas i ng  the volume 
of  expected 1oans.
Tab l e  8 p r e s e n t s  t he r e s u l t s  f r om the c o mp a r a t i v e  
s t a t i c s  der i ved  i n t h i s  sec t i on .
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Table 8
Loan Unce r t a i n t y  Case 
Comparat i ve S t a t i c s  Resul t s 
(S = Spread = r ^  - Tq)
Ef f ec t s  on 
Loan Rate DARA CARA lARA
Ef f ec t s  on 
Deposi t  Rati
3r|_/8C|_ >0 >0 3r[,/3C|_ = 0
3ri_/3C[) <0 = 0 >0 3r 0/  3cQ < 0
3r L / 3 r >0* >0 <-» 3r 0 / 3 r  > 0
MRS** <0 <0 <-« MRS** = 0
Ef f ec t s  on 
Spread




*Requi res D 2 L
**Mean Preserv i ng Spread o f p
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Deposi t  Unc er t a i n t y  Case
The p r e c e d i n g  s e c t i o n  i n v e s t i g a t e d  t he r a t e  s e t t i n g  
behav i o r  of  t he i n t e r med i a r y  con f r on t ed  w i t h  a random loan 
demand and a c e r t a i n  s u p p l y  o f  d e p o s i t s .  Th i s  s e c t i o n  w i l l  
determi ne the p r o p e r t i e s  of  the model  when depos i t  supp l i es  
are random and t he i n t e r m e d i a r y  knows i t s  l oan  demand w i t h  
c e r t a i n t y .
Ob j ec t i ve  Funct i on
The i n t e r med i a r y ' s  o b j e c t i v e  f u n c t i o n  can be expressed
a s
Maximize 
r i_, rD -D
U( n) h( e) de,  (3-83)
where U(n)  deno t es  t he u t i l i t y  o f  p r o f i t s  f u n c t i o n  w i t h  
U ' ( n )  > 0 and U" ( I I )  y  0,  d e p e n d i n g  on w h e t h e r  t he
i n t e r med i a r y  i s r i s k  averse,  r i s k  n e u t r a l ,  or r i s k  seeking.  
The f u n c t i o n  h(e) r epr esent s  the p r o b a b i l i t y  dens i t y  of  the 
random d e p o s i t  f l o w s ,  e .  The domain o f  t he random d i s ­
t u r b a n c e  e i s  such t h a t  -D £ e <  «.  The i n t e r m e d i a r y ' s  
p r o f i t  (n) may now be s t a t e d  as
n= r ^ L f r ^ )  - C|_L(rL) - rQ[D( rQ)  + e]  - CQ[D(rQ) + e]
+ r [ D ( r o )  + e - L( r |_) ]  . (3-84)
Note t h a t  the above express i on of  the i n t e r me d i a r y ' s  p r o f i t s  
assumes t h a t  l oan  demand i s  known w i t h  c e r t a i n t y ,  and t he 
va l ue  of  y i s zero.
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F i r s t  and Second Order  Condi t i ons
The f i r s t  order  cond i t i ons  f o r  an i n t e r i o r  opt imum are
ÏÏL = E { U ' ( n ) [ L  + L' ( r i _ - - r ) ] }  = 0 (3-85)
Hq = E { U ' ( n ) [ - D  - e + D ' ( r  - r ^  - C q ) ] }  = 0, (3-86)
where IT|_ = 8E [ U (n) ] / 3r  |_, and Üg = 8E [ U(II) ] /  8r q. (Tl can be 
r e w r i t t e n  as
U|_ = E[ U' ( n ) ] - L  + E [ U ' ( n ) ] L ' ( r [ _  - - r )  = 0. ( 3-87)
Hence,  [ L  + L ' ( r |_ - c^ - r  ) ] = 0. From ( 3 - 8 7 ) ,  a c l e a r  
necessary c o n d i t i o n  f o r  an opt i mal  v a l ue  of  r ^  i s t h a t  r - 
C[_ - r > 0. Th i s  f o l  l ows f rom the f a c t  t h a t  L' < 0 and 
E [ U ' ( n ) ]  > 0.
In s i m i l a r  f as h i on ,  Uq can be r e w r i t t e n  as
ÜQ = E{ U ' ( n) ( -D-e)  } + E [ U ' ( n ) ] D ' ( r - r o - C p )  = 0. (3-88)
The f i r s t  t erm i n ( 3 - 88)  i s  n e g a t i v e  s i n c e  U' (I I )  > 0 and 
- (D + e)  ^  0 f o r  D + e ^  0. T h e r e f o r e ,  i t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  a 
necessar y  c o n d i t i o n  f o r  an o p t i m a l  v a l u e  o f  rQ i s  t h a t  r - 
rQ - Cq > 0. Again,  t h i s  f o l l o w s  f rom D' >0 by assumpt ion,  
and E [ U ' ( n ) ]  > 0.
Comb i na t i on  o f  t he necessar y  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  r a n d  rQ 
r e v e a l s  t h a t  an i n t e r i o r  opt imum r e q u i r e s  t h a t  the spread 
between r ^  and rQ be s t r i c t l y  g r e a t e r  t han t he sum of  the 
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  costs of  l oans and depos i t s .
The second order  c ond i t i ons  f o r  a maximum are 
Ull = E { U ' ( : ) [ 2 L '  + L" ( rL-C| _- r ) ]  + U" ( n ) ( : L ) Z  } < 0 (3-89)
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UoD = E{ U ' ( n ) [ - 2D '  + D"( r - rD-C[ ) ) ]  + U" (n) (%D) '  } < 0 (3-90)
an d
 ^ ULL^DD ■ (^Lo)^ > 0,
2 —
where = - 2 - ^  = ECnJ ’ E[ U" ( n l n o l  = 0.
Exami na t i on  o f  t he second o r d e r  c o n d i t i o n s  r e v e a l s  t h a t  
s u f f i c i e n t  c ond i t i ons  f o r  a maximum in the case of  the r i s k  
ave r se  i n t e r m e d i a r y  are D" < 0 and L" < 0. For  t he r i s k  
p r e f e r r i n g  i n t e r med i a r y ,  the second order  cond i t i ons  may not  
hold.
Cer t a i n t y  versus Uncer t a i n t y  Comparisons
Rewr i t i ng the f i r s t  order  c ond i t i on  f o r  r g , Up as
Up = E[ U' ( n ) ] ■ E[-D -e + D ' ( r  - r p  -  C p ) ]
+ Cov(U' ( : ) , [ - ] )  = 0,  (3-91)
where [ • ]  = [ -D - e +  D ' ( r  - rp - c p ) ] .
I t  can be demons t r a t ed  t h a t  U' (I I ) and [ • ]  are s i m i l a r l y ,
i n d e p e n d e n t l y ,  o r  o p p o s i t e l y  o r de r ed  i n  e dependi ng on 
whet her  t he i n t e r m e d i a r y  i s  r i s k  av e r s e ,  r i s k  n e u t r a l ,  or  
r i s k  seeking.  Since
= U " ( n ) ( r  - r p  - Cp)  ;  0 as U"(n)  ^ 0 (3-92)
and,  3 [ - ] / S e  = - 1. Co n s e q u e n t l y ,  Co v (U ' (II ), [ ' ] ) > 0, f o r
a l l  U"(n) < 0. Wi t h E[ U ' ( n ) ]  > 0, t hen E[ -D - e +  D' ( r  - rp
- C p ]  < 0. Hence,  by t heorem 2 36 i n Hardy,  L i t t l e w o o d  and
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P o l  y  a ,  26 i t  f o l l o w s  t hat
[ -D + D ' ( r  - rg - c q ) ]  - 0, as U"( I I )  - 0. (3 -9 3 )> ' ' ' >
Denote bi» r a n d  r g "  t he r i s k  n e u t r a l  r a t e s  on l oans 
and d e p o s i t s .  Then,  d e f i n e  the l o c u s  o f  p o i n t s  i n t he ( r ^ ,  
r  Q ) space such t h a t  " 0- D e f i n i n g  r g as an
i m p l i c i t  f u n t i o n  of  r|_, and d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g  r  |_, r ^ f r ^ ) ]  
w i t h  r espec t  to r|_ g i ves
_
^DD a r t + ÏÏL0 = 0,
(3-94)
wh i ch i m p l i e s  t h a t  a r p / a r ^  = 0 by t he second o r d e r  c on ­
d i t i o n ,  ii|_p = 0. T h e r e f o r e ,  Ep = 0 i f  and o n l y  i f  rp = r p " .  
For a l l  rp > r p " ,  Hp < 0 (see Fi gure 4) .
Up > 0
Fi gure 4 
Ce r t a i n t y  versus Uncer t a i n t y  
Comparisons f o r  rp and rp 
(Depos i t  Uncer t a i n t y )
Let  rp^  and rpP denote the r a t e s  pa i d  on d e p o s i t s  by a 
r i s k  a v e r s e  and a r i s k  p r e f e r r i n g  i n t e r m e d i a r y .  As
26 Hardy,  L i t t l ewood  and Pol ya,  l oc .  c i t .
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demonst rated e a r l i e r ,  < 0, which i mp l i es  t ha t  rp® >
r g " .  For  t he r i s k  s eek i ng  i n t e r m e d i a r y ,  ng( r gP)  > 0 and 
rgP < rg" .
Denote by r^® and r gP t he r a t e s  on l oans  charged by a 
r i s k  av e r s e  and a r i s k  p r e f e r r i n g  i n t e r m e d i a r y .  D i v i d i n g  
( 3 - 80 )  by E [ U ' ( n ) ]  y i e l d s  [ L  + L ' ( r g  - Cg - r ) ]  = 0, whi ch 
i mp l i e s  t ha t  Hg = Eg = 0. Theref ore,  i t  i s  c l e a r  t ha t  rg^ =
r g P  = r g " .
Under  d e p o s i t  s u p p l y  u n c e r t a i n t y ,  t he r i s k  aver se  
i n t e r med i a r y  s e l e c t s  a depos i t  r a t e  s t r i c t l y  h i gher  than the 
r i s k  n e u t r a l  d e p o s i t  r a t e .  I f  t he i n t e r m e d i a r y  p r e f e r s  
r i s k ,  i t  w i l l  pay a r a t e  on d e p o s i t s  l o we r  t han t he r i s k  
n e u t r a l  r a t e .  Loan r a t e s ,  on t he o t h e r  hand,  w i l l  be 
u n a f f e c t e d  by random d e p o s i t  s u p p l i e s .  Under u n c e r t a i n  
d e p o s i t  s u p p l y ,  t he r i s k  av e r s e  i n t e r m e d i a r y  w i l l  s e t  a 
spread s ma l l e r  than the r i s k  neu t r a l  spread.
When d e p o s i t s  are random,  t he v a r i a b i l i t y  o f  p r o f i t  
r e l a t e s  i n v e r s e l y  to the r a t e  on d e p o s i t s . E s s e n t i a l l y ,  
t he  r i s k  a v e r s e  i n t e r m e d i a r y  can l o w e r  t he  r i s k  or  
d i s p e r s i o n  o f  p r o f i t  by r a i s i n g  t h e  r a t e  i t  pays on 
d e p o s i t s .  In essence,  a h i g h e r  d e p o s i t  r a t e  i m p l i e s  a 
g r e a t e r  expec t ed  vol ume o f  d e p o s i t s  and, c o n s e q u e n t l y ,  a 
l a r g e r  expec t ed  s i z e  or  s c a l e  f o r  t he r i s k  av e r s e  i n t e r ­
med i a r y  i n compar i son to t he r i s k  n e u t r a l  f i r m .  Si nce t he
^^Var( I I )  = ( r - r g - C g  )  ^Var (e ),  and BVar(n)  _
S^D
- 2 ( r - r g - C g ) V a r ( e )  < 0 .
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l oan r a t e  remains una f f ec t ed  by random depos i t  s upp l i es ,  the 
spread between r|_ and rg becomes s ma l l e r  as rg i s i ncreased.
Consider  now the amount of  bor rowi ng/ 1 ending of  Federal  
f unds  by t he r i s k  av e r se  i n t e r m e d i a r y  i n compar i son to t he 
r i s k  n e u t r a l  case .  Assume t h a t  t h e  r i s k  n e u t r a l  
i n t e r med i a r y  sets r|_ and rp such t h a t  = C^rg")  - L(r|_'^) = 
0. Then,  R® = O t r ^ * )  - L ( r L ^ )  > 0 and rP = Of r ^P)  - L(r|_P) 
< 0. Th i s  f o l  l ows f rom the f a c t  t h a t  r^® > r p "  > r ^P,  and 
Tl ® = r^*^ = r|_P as demonst rated in t h i s  sec t i on .  Hence, the 
r i s k  a v e r s e  f i r m  ex pe c t s  t o be a ne t  l e n d e r  i n  Feder a l  
f u n d s ,  and t he r i s k  p r e f e r r i n g  f i r m  a ne t  bo r r owe r  i n  
Federal  f unds.
Comparat i ve S t a t i c s
Thi s sec t i on  f i r s t  cons i ders  the e f f e c t s  on the opt i mal  
l o a n  and d e p o s i t  r a t e s  f r om changes in c o s t  pa r amet e r s  of  
t he  mode l .  Then i t  e s t a b l i s h e s  t he b e h a v i o r  o f  t he i n t e r ­
mediary ' s spread between r ^  and rp in response to changes in 
the r e t u r n / r i s k  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of  the supp l y  and demand f o r  
funds to the f i r m.
F i r s t ,  c o n s i d e r  t he  e f f e c t  o f  a change  i n  t he  
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  cos t  of  depos i t s  on the opt i mal  depos i t  r a t e .  
I m p l i c i t  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  of  the f i r s t  order  c o nd i t i on s  wi t h  
r espec t  to Cp y i e l d s
9-n ,  - E [ U ' ( n ) ] 0 ' t E ( I I " ( I I H - D - e ) [ - D - e + D ' ( r - r „ - C D ) ] )  ^
The f i r s t  term i n the numerator  of  (3-95)  i s nega t i ve  s i nce
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E [ U ' ( n ) ]  > 0 and D' > 0 by assumpt i on .  A f t e r  add i ng  and 
s u b t r a c t i n g  D ' ( r - r Q - c o )  i n s i d e  t he p a r e n t h e s i s  a t  ( - D- e ) ,  
the second term in the numerator  of  (3-95)  can be r e wr i t t e n  
as
E { U " ( n ) ( - D - e ) [ - D - e  + D' ( r - r p - C p ) ] }  = E{U" ( n ) [ - D-e
+ D ' ( r - r p - C p ) ] ^ }  -  D ' ( r - r p - C p ) • E { U " ( n ) [ - D-  e
+D‘ ( r - r p - c p ) ] } .  (3-96)
The f i r s t  term in (3-96)  i s c l e a r l y  negat i ve f o r  U"( l l )  < 0.
P r opo s i t i on  17): Given DARA, the e f f e c t  of  an i ncrease
in Cp on rp i s ambiguous.
Proof ;  In order  to v e r i f y  the ambi gui t y  of  t h i s  r e s u l t
under  DARA, i t  must be shown t h a t  the l a s t  term in (3-96)  is
p o s i t i v e .  Let  e° be t he v a l u e  of  e s u c h  t h a t  [ - D - e ° + D ' ( r -
r p - c p ) ]  = 0, and l e t  11° be t he  v a l u e  o f  H when e = e° .  The
Ar r o w- Pr a t t  i ndex of  absol ut e r i s k  aver s i on i s def i ned by
R, ( n)  . - M i m .
U' (H)
Rg(I I )  i s  a decreas i ng f unc t i on  o f  II under DARA, thus
- S i - R B
si nce 3II /3e = ( r  - rp - Cp) > 0 by the f i r s t  order  c ond i t i on  
f o r  rp.  Fur t hermore,  cons i der  a l l  va l ues  o f  e such t ha t  
E>G°. M u l t i p l y i n g  both si des of  t h i s  i n e q u a l i t y  by ( -1)  and 
adding -D + D' ( r  - rp - Cp) to both s i des y i e l d s  
[ - D  - E +D' ( r - r p - c p ) ]  ^  [ - D - e°  + D ' ( r - r p - C p ) ]  = 0. (3-98)  
From ( 3- 98)  i t  f o l l o w s  t h a t
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U ' ( n ) [ - D  - E + D ' ( r - T Q- c p ) ]  < 0, f o r  al 1 G > E° (3-99)
by c o n s t r u c t i o n .  T h e r e f o r e ,  f r om ( 3 - 97 )  and ( 3-99)  I t  
f o l l ows  t ha t  f o r  a l l  e ^ e ° ,
- U" ( n ) [ - D - e+ D ' ( r - r o - c o ) ]  >
- I • U ' ( I I ) [ - D- E +D ' ( r - r ^ -CQ ) ] .  (3-100)
Consider  the case when e < e°.  Then,
_ u" (n)  > _ U' ' (n°)
LTlnT u ' ( n ^ )  (3-101)
by DARA since i l l  > 0. S i m i l a r l y ,
U ' ( n ) [ - D -  e + D ' ( r - r o - c p ) ]  > 0 f o r  a l l  e<  e° (3-102)  
by c ons t r uc t i on .  Hence, f rom (3-101)  and (3-102)
-  U " ( n ) [ - D -  E + D ' ( r - r Q - C q ) ]  >
. i Ü J Î i .  u ' ( n ) [ - D - e  + D ' ( r - r n - c n ) ] .  ( 3 - 1 0 3 )
• U ' ( f  )
From ( 3 - 103 ) ,  i t  i s  a p p a r e n t  t h a t  ( 3 - 100)  h o l d s  f o r  a l l  
v a l u e s  o f  e. Tak i ng e x p e c t a t i o n s  of  bot h s i des  o f  ( 3-100)  
y i e l d s
-  E { U " ( n ) [ - D -  e +  O'  ( r - r o - c p ) ] }  >
- U;i (J- ). -E{U'  ( n ) [ - D-  g + D ' ( r - r n - C n ) ]  } = 0 (3-104)
U ' ( n ° )
by the f i r s t  order  c ond i t i on  f o r  rp.  Thus, i t  f o l l o w s  f rom 
(3-104)  t ha t  under DARA,
E { U" ( n ) [ - D- E +D‘ ( r - r | 3 - Co) ] }  < 0 .  (3-105)
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M u l t i p l y i n g  ( 3 - 105)  by - D' ( r - r q- c q) e s t a b l i s h e s  the s i gn  
of  the l a s t  term of  (3-96)  as p o s i t i v e .  Wi th Uqq < 0 by the 
second order  c o n d i t i o n ,  scq/ scq ^ 0 under DARA.
Pr opos i t i on  18): Given CARA, the opt i mal  r i s k  averse
d e p o s i t  r a t e  i s  a d e c r e a s i n g  f u n c t i o n  o f  the ma r g i n a l  
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  cost  of  depos i t s .
Pr oo f :  Th i s  p r o p o s i t i o n  f o l l o w s  f rom the f a c t  t h a t
under CARA the l a s t  term o f  (3-96)  vani shes.  Rewr i t i ng  the 
l a s t  term of  (3-96)  as
- D ' ( r - r g - C Q ) E { U " ( I I ) [ - D - e + D ' ( r - r Q - C [ ) ) ] }  =
- D ' ( r - r p - Cg )  ( n ) [ - D - e  + D ' ( r - r [ 3 -C[ ) ) ] }  = 0
U' ( n )  (3-106)
by the f i r s t  o r d e r  c o n d i t i o n  f o r  r g , and s i nc e  U" ( n ) / U' ( n )  
i s  c o n s t a n t  under  CARA. Hence,  ( 3 - 96)  i s  n e g a t i v e ,  and 
3rg/3Cg < 0 under  CARA.
Pr opos i t i on  19): Given lARA, the opt i mal  r i s k  averse
d e p o s i t  r a t e  i s  a d e c r e a s i n g  f u n c t i o n  o f  t he ma r g i n a l  
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  cos t  of  depos i t s .
P r o o f :  I n o r d e r  t o show t he  v a l i d i t y  o f  t h i s
p r o p o s i t i o n ,  t he l a s t  term i n  ( 3 - 96)  must  be shown to be 
n e g a t i v e  i n  s i gn .  Let  be the v a l u e  o f  e such t h a t  
[ -D-e°  + D ' ( r - r g - c g ) ] = 0,  and l e t  11° be t he  v a l u e  o f  n 
when E = e°.  Under lARA, Rg(I I )  i s i nc r eas i ng  wi t h  n,  thus,
-  S S  i  i " ’
s i nce 9H/3E > 0. Fur t hermore,  f rom (3-99)  i t  f o l l o w s  t ha t
U ' ( H ) [ - D - E + D ' ( r - r g - C g ) ]  < 0 f o r  a l l  e > eP (3-108)
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by c ons t r uc t i on .  From (3-107)  and (3-108) ,  i t  f o l l o w s  t ha t  
f o r  a l 1 e >e°,
- U " ( n ) [ - D - e  +D' ( r - r D- Cp ) 3  <
-  " " ( n ° ) ' U ' ( n ) [ - D - e  + D ' ( r - r  - c ) ] .  (3-109)
U ' ( n ) "
Now, cons i der  the case when e<  e ° . Then, 
and
U’ ( n ) [ - D - e + D ' ( r - r p - C p ) ]  > 0, f o r  a l l  e < c° (3-111)
by c o n s t r u c t i o n .  Hence,  f r o m  ( 3 - 1 1 0 )  and ( 3 - 1 1 1 ) ,  i t  
f o l l o ws  t ha t  f o r  a l l  e < e ° ,
- U " ( n ) [ " D - G + D ' ( r - r Q - c p ) ]  < 
u " ( no )
-  Ü : ( E ô ) ' " ' ( % ) [ - 0 - G  + D ' ( r - r Q -  c ^ ) ] .  (3-112)
I t  i s  c l e a r  f r om ( 3 - 112)  t h a t  ( 3 - 109)  h o l ds  f o r  a l l  v a l u e s  
o f  e. Tak i ng  e x pe c t ed  v a l u e s  o f  bo t h  s i d e s  o f  ( 3 -109)  
y i e l d s
- E{U" ( n ) [ - 0 - e + 0 ' ( r - rQ-Cp ) ] }  <
i l W  E { U ' ( n ) [ - 0 - e  + D ' ( r - r p - c p ) ] }  = 0 ( 3 - 1 1 3 )
U • ( n° )
by the f i r s t  or der  c on d i t i o n  f o r  rp.  Hence, under lARA,
E { U " ( ï ï ) [ - 0 -  e + D ' ( r - r p - C p ) ] }  > 0 .  ( 3 - 1 1 4 )
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From ( 3 - 114)  i t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  t he l a s t  t erm o f  ( 3 - 96)  i s  
negat i ve si nce - D' ( r - r Q- CQ)  < 0, and grp/acD ^ -
In o r d e r  t o  d e t e r mi n e  t he i mpac t  o f  a change i n t he 
m a r g i n a l  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  c o s t  o f  d e p o s i t s  on t h e  
i n t e r m e d i a r y ' s  spread,  one must  c o n s i d e r  t he e f f e c t  of  a 
change in cq on r|_. I m p l i c i t  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  o f  the f i r s t  
order  c ond i t i ons  wi t h  r espec t  to Cq y i e l d s
8r,  E { U " ( n ) ( - D - e ) } - E [ L  + L ' ( r , - C L - r ) ]
 -----------------------__-------------------   (3-115)
SCq Ull
P r o p o s i t i o n  20 ): The o p t i m a l  l oan  r a t e  i s i n v a r i a n t
w i t h  r espec t  to changes in the marginal  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  costs 
of  depos i t s .
P r o o f ;  Si nce E [ L + L ' ( r | _ - C L - r ) ]  = 0,  by t he f i r s t  o r de r  
c o n d i t i o n  f o r  r[_. Thus s r ^ / acg = 0.
Tab l e  9 summar i zes t he r e s u l t s  f rom P r o p o s i t i o n s  17),  
18) and 19). Given CARA or lARA, the e f f e c t  of  a change in
Table 9
Ef f ec t s  of  a Change in Cq on rp-
DARA CARA lARA 
<
>
Sro/Sco ^ 0  < 0  < 0
Cq on rp i s  t he same as i n t he r i s k  n e u t r a l  case.  Under 
nondecreasi ng abso l u t e  r i s k  aver s i on ,  the i n t e r med i a r y  w i l l  
t r a n s m i t  to d e p o s i t o r s  any changes i n t he a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  
c o s t  o f  d e p o s i t s  t h r o ugh  changes i n t he r a t e  o f  i n t e r e s t  
pa i d  on d e p o s i t s .  I n c r e as es  i n t he a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  c o s t  of
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depos i t s  w i l l  r e s u l t  in a decrease in the rate of  i n t e r e s t  
pa i d  t o  d e p o s i t o r s  under  CARA or  lARA. Under  DARA, an 
i n c r e a s e  i n cq c o u l d  r e s u l t  in a h i g h e r  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  pai d 
to depos i t o r s .  Pr opos i t i on  20) s t at es  t ha t  the opt imal  loan 
r a t e  i s  i n v a r i a n t  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  changes  i n  t he  
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  c o s t  o f  d e p o s i t s  f o r  a l l  degrees of  r i s k  
aver s i on.  Thus, gi ven nondecreasing abso l u t e  r i s k  avers i on,  
t he spread between r|_ and r g i s  an i n c r e a s i n g  f u n c t i o n  of  
the margi nal  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  cost  of  deposi t s .  Note t hat  the 
DARA i n t e r med i a r y  may a c t u a l l y  l ower  the s i ze of  the spread 
i n r esponse t o an i n c r e a s e  i n t he c o s t  o f  a d m i n i s t e r i n g  
depos i t s .  The r e s u l t s  presented in Table 9 deserve f u r t h e r  
exp l ana t i  on .
R e c a l l  f r om the e a r l i e r  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  r i s k  premiums 
t ha t  the i n t e r med i ar y ' s  r i s k  premium (6) depends on the mean 
and v a r i a n c e  o f  p r o f i t ,  i . e . , 8 = 0(n,  Var ( I I ) ) .  The e f f e c t  
on the r i s k  premium demanded by the i n t e r m e d i a r y  f rom a 
change in cq i s gi ven by
dO/dCQ = i i  3IL 39 3Var(n)an BCg + 3Var (n) 3Cq (3-116)
Fur t hermore,  the e f f e c t s  on the mean and var i ance of  p r o f i t  
f rom a change in cq are gi ven by
Sn/SCQ = - D( ro)  < 0,
and
3Var( I I ) /3c|3 = - 2 ( r - r g - CQ)  Var (e)  < 0.
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An i n c r e a s e  in t he a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  c o s t  o f  d e p o s i t s  l ower s  
t he mean and v a r i a n c e  o f  t he i n t e r m e d i a r y ' s  p r o f i t .  The 
f i r s t  t e rm i n  ( 3 - 116)  c a p t u r es  t he mean i ncome e f f e c t  on 0 
f rom a change in cq- The second term i ns i de  the bracket s  in 
( 3 - 116)  measures t he v a r i a n c e  or  " r i s k "  i mpac t  on 0 f rom a 
change i n  t he a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  c os t  o f  d e p o s i t s .  For  t h i s  
p a r t i c u l a r  case,  t he second t erm i n  ( 3 - 116)  i s  a l ways  
n e g a t i v e  s i n c e  3 9 / 3 V a r ( n )  > 0 f o r  a l l  deg r ees  o f  r i s k  
a v e r s i o n ,  and 9Var(I I ) /3CQ < o .  Gi ven lARA, t he mean p r o f i t  
e f f e c t  on 0 f rom a change in Cq i s negat i ve  s i nce 39/311 > 0. 
That  i s ,  as II i ncreases,  the i n t e r med i a r y  becomes more r i s k  
averse under lARA. Hence, under lARA both e f f e c t s  (mean and 
v a r i a n c e )  on 0 are n e g a t i v e ,  and dO/dcg < 0. R e c a l l  f rom 
the c e r t a i n t y  versus u n c e r t a i n t y  compar i sons f o r  rp and 
a t t i t u d e s  t owar d r i s k  t h a t  rp® > rp'^ > rpP.  T h e r e f o r e ,  an 
i nc r eas i ng  r i s k  premium i mp l i es  an i nc r eas i ng  depos i t  rate.  
Gi ven lARA,  3 r p / 3 c p  < 0 s i nc e  d0 / dc p  < 0. Fu r t he r mo r e ,  
under  CARA the mean and v a r i a n c e  e f f e c t s  on 9 are mutual  1 y 
r e i n f o r c i n g  i n  s i gn  ( z e r o  and n e g a t i v e ) ,  and rp i s  a 
d e c r e a s i n g  f u n c t i o n  o f  cp.  F i n a l l y ,  t he a m b i g u i t y  under  
DARA r e s u l t s  f r om c o n f l i c t i n g  s i g n s  f o r  t he mean and 
v a r i a n c e  e f f e c t s  on 0. Si nce 0 decr eases  as n i n c r e a s e s ,  
the mean p r o f i t  e f f e c t  on 0 i s p o s i t i v e .  The o v e r a l l  impact  
on 0, and thus on rp,  w i l l  depend on which e f f e c t  dominates 
in magni tude f o l l o w i n g  a change i n Cp.
What e f f e c t  does a change in the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  cost  of 
d e p o s i t s  have on t he b o r r o w i n g / l e n d i n g  o f  Feder a l  f unds?
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D i f f e r e n t i a t i n g  R = D - L w i t h  r e s p e c t  to y i e l d s
3R/9cq = D' ar ^ / Bco - L'3r|_/9CQ. (3-117)
From P r o p o s i t i o n  20) ,  S r ^ / g c p  = 0. Thus,  9 R / 9 cq < 0 f o r  
e i t h e r  CARA or  I ARA s i n c e  arg/gcQ < 0. An i n c r e a s e  i n  t he 
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  cost  o f  depos i t s  reduces the i n t e r med i a r y ' s  
l oans in the Federal  funds market .  Thus, as pa r t  of  the r e ­
source cost  of  depos i t s  i ncreases,  the i n t e r med i a r y  tends to 
become more of  a ne t  bo r r owe r  i n t he Fede r a l  f unds  mar ke t .  
One c o u l d  i n t e r p r e t  t h i s  as an i n p u t  s u b s t i t u t i o n  e f f e c t .  
The i n s t i t u t i o n  w i l l  s h i f t  f r om one sour ce  o f  f unds  to 
another  as the i npu t  cost  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of  each change.
Consider  now the e f f e c t s  of  a change in the a d m i n i s t r a ­
t i v e  c os t  of  l oans  on t he i n t e r m e d i a r y ' s  spr ead between r|_ 
and rQ. F i r s t ,  exami ne t he e f f e c t  of  a change i n  C|_ on rg.  
R e c a l l  t h a t  i n  t he c e r t a i n t y  e q u i v a l e n t  case t he d e p o s i t  
r a t e  was i n v a r i a n t  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  c han ges  i n  t he  
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  cost  of  l oans.  The r i s k  neu t r a l  i n t e r med i a r y  
e s s e n t i a l l y  manages l oans and depos i t s  i ndependent l y  of  one 
ano t he r .  Can t h i s  r e s u l t  be ex t ended t o t he case where 
d e p o s i t  s u p p l i e s  are random and t he i n t e r m e d i a r y  i s r i s k  
averse? I m p l i c i t  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  of  the f i r s t  order  c o n d i ­
t i ons  wi t h  r espec t  to C|_ g i ves
3ro . L - E ( U - ( n ) t - 0 - e + 0 ' ( r - r o - c „ ) ] )
Pr opos i t i on  21): Given DARA, the opt i mal  r i s k  averse
d e p o s i t  r a t e  i s  an i n c r e a s i n g  f u n c t i o n  o f  t he ma r g i n a l  
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  cost  of  l oans.
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Pr o o f :  Under  DARA, E {U " ( II) [ - D- e+D ' ( r - r  p-c p ) ]} < 0 as
demonst rated p r e v i o u s l y  in (3-105) .  Since L > 0 and Upp < 0 
(second or der  c o n d i t i o n ) ,  then Srp/BCp > 0 under DARA.
Pr opos i t i on  22): Under CARA, the opt i mal  r i s k  averse
dep os i t  r a t e  i s i n v a r i a n t  w i t h  r espec t  to changes i n Cp.
P r o o f :  Th i s  p r o p o s i t i o n  f o l l o w s  f r om t he f a c t  t h a t
E { U " ( n ) [ - D - e  + 0 ' ( r - r p - C p ) ] }  = 0 under  CARA, as shown i n (3-
106) .
P r opo s i t i on  23): Given lARA, the opt i mal  r i s k  averse
d e p o s i t  r a t e  i s  a d e c r e a s i n g  f u n c t i o n  o f  t he ma r g i n a l  
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  cost  of  l oans.
Pr oo f :  Under  lARA, E { U" ( II) [ - D- e +D ' ( r  - r  p - c  p ) ]} > 0 as
shown in (3-114) .  From t h i s  f a c t ,  i t  f o l l o w s  t ha t  9rp/Scp < 
0.
Turn now to the opt i mal  l oan rate.  D i f f e r e n t i a t i n g  the 
f i r s t  order  c ond i t i on s  i m p l i c i t l y  wi t h  r espec t  Cp y i e l d s  
ar p  - L ' - E { U ' ( n ) }  + E{ U' (n )  ( - L ) E [ L  + L ' ( r p - C p - r ) ] }
%
(3-119)
P r o p o s i t i o n  2 4 ) :  The o p t i m a l  l o a n  r a t e  i s  an
i nc r eas i ng  f u n c t i o n  of  the margi nal  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  cost  of  
l oans .
P r o o f :  I n s p e c t i o n  o f  ( 3 - 1 1 9 )  r e v e a l s  t h a t  t he
numer a t o r  i s  p o s i t i v e  s i n c e  E [ L+L ' ( r p-c p - r  ) ] = 0 by the
f i r s t  o r d e r  c o n d i t i o n  f o r  r p ,  and - L ' • E[ U' ( n) ]  > 0. Thus,
3r p / 3cp > U si nce Upp < 0 by the second order  c o nd i t i on .
Tab l e  10 p r e s e n t s  t he r e s u l t s  f rom P r o p o s i t i o n s  21) ,  
22) and 23).  The r i s k  averse depos i t  r a t e  i s  an i nc r eas i ng
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Table 10
Ef f ec t s  of  a Change in Cl on rp.
DÂRÂ CÂRÂ ÏÂRÂ" 
3rQ/3CL > 0  = 0  < 0
f u n c t i o n  o f  C|_ under  DARA, and a de c r e a s i n g  f u n c t i o n  o f  c  ^
under  lARA. Gi ven CARA, the b e h a v i o r  of  t he r i s k  ave r se  
d e p o s i t  r a t e  i s  i n dep e n d e n t  o f  C|_ as i n  t he c e r t a i n t y  
e q u i v a l e n t  case.  Pr opos i t i on  24) i mp l i es  t ha t  the opt i mal  
l o a n  r a t e  i s  an i n c r e a s i n g  f u n c t i o n  o f  t he  m a r g i n a l  
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  c o s t  o f  l o ans  f o r  a l l  degrees o f  r i s k  
aver s i on.  Given nondecreasi ng abso l u t e  r i s k  aver s i on ,  the 
spread between r a n d  r g i s  an i n c r e a s i n g  f u n c t i o n  of  
C| _.  I n t e r e s t i n g l y ,  t h a t  und e r  DARA t he  i n t e r m e d i a r y  
i ncreases the depos i t  r a t e  in response to an i ncrease in c^. 
Si nce the l o a n  r a t e  a l s o  i n c r e a s e s  w i t h  C| _,  the o v e r a l l  
e f f e c t  on the s i ze of  the spread i s uncer t a i n  under DARA.
P r o p o s i t i o n s  21) - 23) can be e x p l a i n e d  by aga i n
appeal i ng to the r i s k  premium i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .  The e f f e c t  on 
the r i s k  premium demanded by the i n t e r med i a r y  f rom a change 
in C|_ i s gi ven by
de
dc^
^  _ 3 II + 3 0  3 V a r ( n )
3n 3 ^ l 3 V a r  ( n )  3C|_
(3-120)
Fu r t h e r mo r e ,  3n / 3C i_ = -L < 0 and 3Var (n) / 3CL = 0. Hence,  
the second term i n s i d e  the bracket s  in (3-120)  vani shes and 
a change i n  c |_ has o n l y  a mean income e f f e c t  on the r i s k  
premium. Thi s e f f e c t  i s p o s i t i v e  under DARA since 38 / 3H<0
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(as ÏÏ i n c r e a s e s  0 dec r eases ) .  Re c a l l  t h a t  as the r i s k  
p r emi um i n c r e a s e s ,  t h e  d e p o s i t  r a t e  a l s o  i n c r e a s e s .  
Th e r e f o r e ,  ar^ /Bc^ > 0.
The DARA i n t e r med i a r y  i ncreases the depos i t  r a t e  as the 
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  c o s t  o f  l oans  i n c r e a s e s .  A h i g h e r  d e p o s i t  
r ate i mp l i es  a l a r g e r  d o l l a r  amount of  expected depos i t s  and 
t hus an i n c r e a s e  i n  t he s i ze  of  t he f i r m .  F u r t h e r mo r e ,  an 
i n c r e a s e  i n c^ i n c r e a s e s  t he i n t e r m e d i a r y ' s  l oan  r a t e .  A 
hi gher  l oan r a t e  i mp l i es  a s ma l l e r  amount of  l oan ext ens i ons 
and a g r e a t e r  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  as a ne t  l e n d e r  i n the Feder a l  
f unds  mar ke t .  Note t h a t  under  DARA, a p o s s i b i l i t y  e x i s t s  
t h a t  an i n c r e a s e  i n  C|_ c o u l d  a c t u a l l y  l ead  t o a s m a l l e r  
spread between r[_ and r ^ .  Under  CARA and lARA, t he mean 
income e f f e c t  on 0 f rom a change i n C|_ i s  zero and n e g a t i v e  
r e s p e c t i v e l y .  This ex p l a i n s  the signs of  Pr opos i t i ons  22) 
and 2 3).
F i n a l l y ,  how does a change in C|_ a f f e c t  t he amount  of  
b o r r o w i n g / l e n d i n g  i n  t h e  F e d e r a l  f u n d s  m a r k e t ?  
D i f f e r e n t i a t i n g  R (=D-L) wi t h  r espect  to C|_ gi ves
9R _ D' 3rQ _ L'  9r|_ (3-121)
3c L 3c L 3c L
The second term in (3-121)  i s p o s i t i v e  s i nce 9r|_/3C[_ > 0 and 
L' < 0. Gi ven DARA, Sr^ /SCL > 0 ( P r o p o s i t i o n  21) ) ,  and 
3R/gC|_ > 0. Under DARA the i n t e r m e d i a r y  i n c r e a s e s  the
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amount of  l end i ng  (expected)  i n Federal  funds.  For  CARA the 
f i r s t  term in ( 3-121)  i s  zer o s i nc e  3ro/8C|_ = 0 under  CARA.
As a r e s u l t ,  3R/3c|_ > 0 under CARA. F i n a l l y ,  under lARA the
e f f e c t  of  a change i n C|_ on R i s  no t  c l e a r .  Si nce 3rQ/3C[_
< 0, BR/Sc^ ^ 0 under  lARA.
Cons i der  now the e f f e c t  of  a change i n  t he Feder a l  
f unds  r a t e  on the i n t e r m e d i a r y ' s  spread between r|_ and rp,  
and on t he amount  o f  b o r r o w i n g / 1  end i ng  o f  Feder a l  f unds .  
I m p l i c i t  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  of  the f i r s t  order  c ond i t i ons  wi t h  
r espec t  to r  y i e l d s
3 r p  _ _ E{ U ' ( n ) } D '  + E { U" ( n ) ( D+e - L ) [ - D- e+D' ( r - r p - C g ) ] }
Udd
(3-122)
The f i r s t  t erm i n  t he numer a t o r  o f  ( 3 - 122)  i s  p o s i t i v e ,  
E [ U ' ( n ) ] D '  > 0, s i n c e  D' > 0 and E [ U ’ ( n ) ]  > 0. The second 
term in the numerator  of  (3-122)  can be r e w r i t t e n  as
E{ U" ( n ) ( D+e - L ) [ - D- e+D' ( r - r p - C p ) ] }  =
- E { U " ( n ) [ - D - e + D ' ( r - r p - C p ) ] 2 }
+ ( D ' ( r - r p - c p )  - L) E{ U" ( I I ) [ - D-  +D ' ( r - r p - Cp ) ] }. (3-123)
The f i r s t  term in (3-123)  i s  c l e a r l y  p o s i t i v e  f o r  U"( I I )  < 0.
Pr o p o s i t i o n  25 ): Gi ven DARA, a s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n
f o r  the opt i mal  r i s k  averse depos i t  r a t e  to be an i nc r eas i ng  
f u n c t i o n  o f  the Federal  funds rate i s t ha t  L ^  D.
P r o o f :  Under  DARA, E { U " ( n ) [ - D - e + D ' ( r - r p - C p ) ] }  < 0 as
shown i n  ( 3 - 105) .  T h e r e f o r e ,  t he s i gn  of  t he l a s t  t erm of
( 3 - 123)  depends on t he s i gn o f  ( D ' ( r - r p - Cp )  - L).  From (3-
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93) ,  [ - D  + D X r - r Q - c g ) ]  < 0 wh i ch  i m p l i e s  t h a t  D' ( r - r Q- CQ)  
- L < D - L. Thus, a s u f f i c i e n t  c ond i t i on  f o r  (3-123)  to be 
p o s i t i v e  i s t h a t  L ^  D. Consequent l y ,  g i ven L ^  D, Sr ^ /Br  > 
0 under  DARA.
P r opo s i t i on  26): Under CARA, the opt i mal  r i s k  averse
r a t e  i s an i nc r eas i ng  f u n c t i o n  o f  the Federal  f unds r a t e .
P r o o f :  Gi ven CARA, E{U" ( n) [ - D-e +0 ' ( r - r q- c q ) ] } = 0 as
shown in (3-106) .  Thus,  (3-123)  i s p o s i t i v e ,  and Brg/Sr  > 0
under CARA.
Pr opos i  t i  on 27 ) : Under  lARA,  S r p / g r  i s  ambiguous in
s i gn .
Proof :  Given lARA, E{ U " (II ) [ - D-e + D ' ( r - r p - Cp  ) ] }  > 0
as demonst rated p r e v i o u s l y  in (3-114) .  The sign of  the l a s t  
t erm i n  ( 3 - 123)  depends on the s i gn  of  ( D ' ( r - r Q- CQ)  - L). 
From ( 3 - 9 3 ) ,  - 0  + D' ( r - r Q- CQ)  < 0. S u b t r a c t i n g  L f rom bot h 
s i des y i e l d s
- L + 0'  ( r - r g - c g )  < D - L.
I f  0 ^  L , Sr p / Sr  i s  ambi guous.  For  0 2 L, t he s i gn  o f
(3-123)  i s  i nde t e r mi n a t e ,  and 3 r p / 3 r  ^  0.
To determi ne the o v e r a l l  e f f e c t  on the i n t e r med i a r y ' s  
spread between rp and rp f rom a change i n the Federal  funds 
r a t e ,  exami ne t he e f f e c t s  o f  a change in r  on rp.  I m p l i c i t  
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  o f  the f i r s t  o r der  cond i t i ons  w i t h  r espec t
t o r  y i e l d s
3rp _ - L ' E [ U ' ( n ) ]  + E[L + L ' ( r  p-c p - r  ) ] • E{ Ü " (n) ( D+e-L ) }
j-
^LL (3-124)
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£. L2. £ . ° . l l l i £J l _^â ) • The o p t i m a l  l o a n  r a t e  i s  an
i nc r eas i ng  f unc t i on  of  the Federal  funds r a t e .
P r o o f :  The numer a t o r  o f  ( 3 -124)  i s  c l e a r l y  p o s i t i v e
s i n c e  E[ L  + L ' ( r | _ - c i _ - r ) ]  = 0,  and - L ' ‘ E [ U ' ( I I ) ]  > 0.
T h e r e f o r e ,  B r ^ / B r  > 0. Tab l e  11 be l ow summar i zes the
r e s u l t s  f r om P r o p o s i t i o n s  25) ,  26) and 27) .  Gi ven e i t h e r
Table 11
E f f e c t s  on rp f rom a change in r
DARA CARA lARA
S r ^ / S r  >0* >0 ^0
*Requi res L> D.
DARA o r  CARA, t h e  i n t e r m e d i a r y ' s  d e p o s i t  r a t e  i s  an 
i nc r eas i ng  f unc t i on  of  the Federal  funds r at e .  In the case 
o f  DARA, t h i s  r e s u l t  r e q u i r e s  t h a t  t he i n t e r m e d i a r y  be an 
expected net  bor rower  in the Federal  funds market ,  i . e. ,  L 2 
D. The s i gn  o f  B r ^ / B r  c anno t  be d e t e r mi n e d  under  lARA. 
P r opos i t i on  28) i mp l i e s  t ha t  the l oan r a t e  i s  an i nc r eas i ng  
f u n c t i o n  o f  t he Feder a l  f unds  r a t e  i r r e s p e c t i v e  o f  t he 
degree of  r i s k  aver s i on .  The o v e r a l l  impact  f rom a change 
i n r  on the spr ead between r|_ and r ^  i s  u n c l e a r .  A change 
in the Federal  funds r a t e  coul d i ncrease,  decrease or  l eave 
unchanged the s i ze of  the spread.
An i n t u i t i v e l y  a p p e a l i n g  e x p l a n a t i o n  of  t he r e s u l t s  
d e r i v e d  here can be g i v e n  i n t erms o f  t he b e h a v i o r  o f  t he 
r i s k  premium w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o changes i n t he Fede r a l  f unds  
r a t e .
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The e f f e c t  on t h e  r i s k  pr emi um demanded by t he  
i n t e r med i a r y  (0) f rom a change in r  gi ven by
d9
dr
39 3n ^ 30 3 Var(n) (3-125)
3n 3r  3Var (n)  3 r 
In a d d i t i o n ,
3n / 3 r  = D - L
and
3 Va r ( n ) / 3 r  = 2 ( r - r p - C g ) Var(c ) > 0.
The e f f e c t  on the v a r i a n c e  o f  p r o f i t  f r om a change in r  i s 
p o s i t i v e  and i m p l i e s  t h a t  the second term i n s i d e  the
b r a c k e t s  i n ( 3 - 125)  i s  p o s i t i v e  f o r  a l l  degrees o f  r i s k
avers i on.  On the ot her  hand, the mean p r o f i t  e f f e c t  f rom a
change i n r depends on whet her  D ^ L. I f  t he i n t e r m e d i a r y
is an expected net  l ender  in the Federal  funds market  (D>L), 
t he mean p r o f i t  e f f e c t  f rom a change i n r  i s  p o s i t i v e .  I f  
t he i n t e r med i a r y  i s an expected net  bor rower  i n the Federal  
f u n d s  m a r k e t  ( D<L) ,  t hen  311/ 3 r  < 0. F i n a l l y ,  i f  t he 
i n s t i t u t i o n  i s n e i t h e r  an expec t ed l e n d e r  nor  an expec t ed 
bo r r ower  (D = L),  t hen f i s  i n v a r i a n t  w i t h  r e s p e c t  to
changes in the Federal  funds r a t e .
Tab l e  12 shows the e f f e c t s  on t he r i s k  premium as a 
r e s u l t  o f  a change i n r  under  DARA, CARA and lARA, f o r  the 
case when D > L. The s i gns  o f  t he two e f f e c t s  shown in
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Tab l e  12 are mutual  l y  r e i n f o r c i n g  o n l y  f o r  e i t h e r  CARA or 
lARA. No t i c e  t h a t  t he v a r i a n c e  e f f e c t  on t he r i s k  premium 
f rom a change in r  i s always p o s i t i v e .  The u l t i m a t e  e f f e c t  
on 0 and t hus  on rQ f rom a change i n r  depends on t he s i ze  
of  the mean p r o f i t  e f f e c t .  I t  i s c l e a r  f rom Table 12 t hat
Table 12
Ef f ec t s  on the Risk Premium 
f rom a Change i n r  when D > L.
DARA CARA lARA
Mean P r o f i t  E f f e c t  < 0  = 0  > 0
Var i ance E f f e c t  > 0  > 0  > 0
i f  the i n t e r med i a r y  i s an expected net  l ender  in the Federal  
funds market ,  nondecreasi ng r i s k  aver s i on  ( abso l u t e )  i mp l i es  
rp i ncreases wi t h  r.
Tab l e  13 be l ow i l l u s t r a t e s  t he e f f e c t s  on the r i s k  
premium f rom a change i n r  f o r  t he case when t he i n t e r ­
med i a r y  i s  an ex pec t ed  ne t  bo r r owe r  i n t he Feder a l  f unds 
mar k e t  (L > D).
Table 13
Ef f ec t s  on the Risk Premium 
f rom a change i n r  when L > D.
DARA CARA lARA
Mean P r o f i t  E f f e c t  > 0  = 0  < 0
Var i ance E f f e c t  > 0  > 0  > 0
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Tab l e  13 h e l p s  t o  e x p l a i n  t he a c t u a l  e f f e c t s  on rQ f rom a 
change i n r  as o b t a i n e d  i n P r o p o s i t i o n s  25) - 27) .  Note 
t h a t  i f  t he i n t e r m e d i a r y  i s  an ex pec t ed  n e t  bo r r owe r  of  
Feder a l  f u n d s ,  the mean i ncome e f f e c t  on t he r i s k  premium 
f rom a change i n  r i s  p o s i t i v e  under  DARA. Th i s  p o i n t  i s 
r e i n f o r c ed  by the f a c t  t h a t  the var i ance  or " r i s k "  e f f e c t  on
0 i s  a l s o  p o s i t i v e .  R e c a l l  t h a t  0 i n c r e a s e s  as r g 
i n c r e a s e s .  Hence,  i t  f o l  l ows t h a t  under  DARA, d 0 / d r  > 0, 
i m p l i e s  Br^ /Sr  > 0, p r o v i d e d  t h a t  L > D. Th i s  r e s u l t  a l s o  
h o l d s  f o r  t he case when L = D s i nc e  t he mean e f f e c t  i s  then 
equal  to zero,  and the var i ance  e f f e c t  i s s t i l l  p o s i t i v e .
F i n a l l y ,  how wou l d  t he amount  o f  t he i n t e r m e d i a r y ' s  
bor rowi ng/ 1 ending of  Federal  funds change i n response to a 
change in r? D i f f e r e n t i a t i n g  R wi t h  r espect  t o r  y i e l d s
^  (3-126)
3r  3r  3 r
The second t erm i n ( 3 - 126)  i s  a l ways  p o s i t i v e  s i n c e  L ' < 0, 
and 3r [_/3r  > 0 f o r  a l l  degrees  o f  r i s k  a v e r s i o n .  Gi ven 
t h a t  t he i n t e r m e d i a r y  i s  an e x pe c t ed  ne t  b o r r o we r  i n the 
Federal  funds market ,  3R/3r > 0 under non i nc r eas i ng  abso l u t e  
r i s k  a v e r s i o n .  I f  t he i n t e r m e d i a r y  i s  an e x pe c t ed  ne t  
l e n d e r  i n  t he Fed e r a l  f unds  mar k e t ,  3R/3r  > 0 h o l d s  t r ue  
o n l y  f o r  t he CARA i n t e r m e d i a r y .  Note t h a t  as r  i n c r e a s e s ,  
t h e  i n t e r m e d i a r y ' s  s i z e  o r  s c a l e  w i l l  be e x p e c t e d  to 
i n c r e a s e  under  e i t h e r  DARA o r  CARA f o r  t he ne t  bo r r owe r
1 ntermedi  ary .
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The next  set  of  comparat i ve s t a t i c  p r opos i t i ons  focuses 
on t he e f f e c t s  on t he r i s k  av e r s e  d e p o s i t  r a t e  and spread 
between r|_ and rQ f rom a mean p r e s e r v i n g  I nc r e as e  In t he 
d i s t r i b u t i o n  of  e.  Reca l l  t ha t  a mean p r ese r v i ng  spread of  
a random v a r i a b l e  I n c r e a s e s  the v a r i a n c e  o r  spread around 
t he mean o f  t he d i s t r i b u t i o n  w i t h o u t  a f f e c t i n g  t he s i z e  of  
t he ex pe c t ed  v a l u e  o f  t he random v a r i a b l e .  Thus,  a mean 
p r e s e r v i n g  spr ead o f  e I n c r e a s e s  t he v a r i a n c e  or  r i s k  of  
p r o f i t  w i t h o u t  a l t e r i n g  the expected p r o f i t .  Def i ne a mean 
p r es e r v i ng  spread of  e as
e* = r e .  (3-127)
W r i t i n g  ( 3 - 85)  and ( 3 - 86 )  I n t erms o f  and d i f f e r e n ­
t i a t i n g  w i t h  r espec t  to F ( e v a l u a t i n g  at  F = 1)
9F




Note t h a t  t he f i r s t  t e r m I n t he numer a t o r  o f  ( 3-128)  Is 
p o s i t i v e ,  -E{U' (H) }  > 0, s i n c e  8U'(I I )/3e < 0 f o r  U" (H ) < 0,
and 8n/3e > 0. A f t e r  one adds and s u b t r a c t s  -D + D ' ( r - r Q -  
Cq ) I n s i d e  the p a r e n t h e s i s  at  ( - e ) ,  t he second term of  the 
numerator  of  (3-128)  can be expressed as
- ( r - r D - C Q ) E { U " ( n ) ( - e ) [ - D - G + D ' ( r - r Q - C Q ) ] }  =
- ( r - r g - CQ j E { U " (  n ) [ - D- e  + D ' ( r - r p - Cp J ^ }  
- ( r - r D - C Q ) ( D - D ' ( r - r Q - C Q ) ) E { U " ( n ) [ - D - e + D ' ( r - r Q - C Q ) ] } .
(3-129)
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Pr o p o s i t i o n  29) :  Gi ven DARA, the e f f e c t  of  a mean
p r e s e r v i n g  spread o f  e on the op t i ma l  r i s k  ave r s e  d e p o s i t  
r a t e i s  p o s i t i v e .
P r o o f :  The f i r s t  t erm i n ( 3-129)  i s  p o s i t i v e  s i nc e
( r - r Q - C p )  > 0 b> the f i r s t  o r d e r  c o n d i t i o n  f o r  rp.  The 
second term in ( 3-129)  i s a l s o  p o s i t i v e ,  s i nce  E{ U" ( l i ) [ - D-  
e + D ' ( r - r p - C p ) ] }  < 0 under  DARA, and [ D-D' ( r - r p - C p ) ]  > 0.
Thus,  ( 3 - 129)  i s  p o s i t i v e  and 8r p / 3r ] p= i > 0.
P r opos i t i on  30): Given CARA, a mean p r eser v i ng  spread
of  e i ncreases the opt imal  r i s k  averse depos i t  r a t e .
P r o o f :  Under  CARA, the second term i n ( 3-129)  i s zero
si nce E{U" ( I I ) [ -D-  +D' ( r - r  p-Cp) ] }  = 0 f o r  CARA (see equat i on 
( 3 - 1 0 6 ) ) .  T h e r e f o r e ,  ( 3-129)  i s s t r i c t l y  p o s i t i v e  and (3-  
128) i s al so g r ea t e r  than zero.
Pr o p o s i t i o n  31) :  Gi ven lARA, the e f f e c t  o f  a mean
pr eser v i ng  spread of  e on rp i s ambiguous in s i gn.
Pr oo f :  Th i s  r e s u l t  f o l l o w s  f rom the f a c t  t h a t  under
lARA,  E { U" ( H) [ - 0 - e  + 0 ' ( r - r p - C D ) ]  } > ° as shown i n ( 3 - 114) .  
Th i s  i m p l i e s  t h a t  the l a s t  t erm i n (3-129)  i s  n e g a t i v e  and 
thus (3-128)  cannot  be si gned.
F i n a l l y ,  i t  i s necessary to i n v e s t i g a t e  the e f f e c t  of  a 
mean p r e s e r v i n g  i n c r e a s e  i n  e on the i n t e r m e d i a r y ' s  l oan
r a t e .  I m p l i c i t  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  o f  t he f i r s t  o r d e r
c ond i t i ons  w i t h  r espec t  to r  ( a t  r  = 1) y i e l d s
a r t
3 T
- ( r - r o - C o ) E [ L + L ' ( r p - C p - r ) ] ‘ E{U"(  H)E} . (3-130)
ULL
Pr o po s i t i o n  32): A mean p r e s e r v i n g  i n c r e a s e  i n the
d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  e has no e f f e c t  on the i n t e r m e d i a r y ' s  l oan 
ra t e .
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Proof :  Thi s p r o p o s i t i o n  f o l l o w s  f rom the f a c t  t ha t  E[L
+ L' (r [_ - C|_ - r ) ]  = 0 b}  t he f i r s t  o r d e r  c o n d i t i o n  f o r  r|_.
Tabl e 14 summarizes the r e s u l t s  f rom Pr opos i t i ons  29),
30) and 31). A mean pr eser v i ng  spread of  the d i s t r i b u t i o n
Table 14
Ef f ec t s  of  a Mean Preserv i ng 
Spread of  e on r ^ .
DARA CARA lARA
3 r p / 3 r ] p ^ ^  > 0  > 0  ^ 0
of  E has o n l y  a v a r i a n c e  or  r i s k  o f  p r o f i t  e f f e c t  on the
i n t e r m e d i a r y ' s  r i s k  p r emi um.  As t h e  v a r i a b i l i t y  of  e
i n c r e a s e s ,  the s i z e  o f  t he r i s k  premium i n c r e a s e s  as w e l l .  
Recal l  t ha t  as the r i s k  premium demanded by the i n t e r med i ar y  
i n c r e a s e s ,  t he d e p o s i t  r a t e  a l s o  i n c r e a s e s .  Hence,  one 
s h o u l d  e x p e c t  an i n c r e a s e  i n  t he  d e p o s i t  r a t e  as t he  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  of  e becomes more v o l a t i l e  ( keep i ng  the mean 
const ant ) .  As shown in Table 14, the si gns of  the e f f e c t  of  
a mean p r es e r v i ng  spread of  e on rg agree w i t h  an i n t u i t i v e  
r i s k  premium e x p l a n a t i o n  ex c ep t  f o r  t he case of  lARA. 
P r o p o s i t i o n  32)  i m p l i e s  t h a t  a mean p r e s e r v i n g  spread o f e
has no e f f e c t  on r T h e r e f o r e ,  a mean p r es e r v i ng  spread of  e
r e d u c e s  t he s i z e  o f  t h e  i n t e r m e d i a r y ' s  s p r e a d  u n d e r  
non i ncreas i ng abso l u t e  r i s k  aver s i on.
One f i n a l  i s s u e  t o  be a d d r e s s e d  i n  t h i s  s e c t i o n  
concerns the behav i o r  of  the i n t e r med i a r y  in the market  f o r
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Federal  funds f o l l o w i n g  a mean p r eser v i ng  spread of  g. The 
e f f e c t  on R f rom a mean p r e s e r v i n g  spread i n c i s  g i v e n  by
3 R / 9 r ] p = l  = O'  3 r [ ) / 3 r ] p = i .  ( 3 - 1 3 1 )
From ( 3 - 1 31 ) ,  t he b e h a v i o r  o f  R i n  r esponse t o  a mean 
p r e s e r v i n g  spr ead o f  £ c l e a r l y  depends s t r i c t l y  on the 
e f f e c t  o f  t he mean p r e s e r v i n g  spread o f  e on rp-  Gi ven 
n o n i n c r e a s i n g  a b s o l u t e  r i s k  a v e r s i o n ,  a mean p r e s e r v i n g  
spread of  e i ncreases the amount of  l end i ng  in the Federal  
funds market .  I t  i s i n t e r e s t i n g  to note t ha t  as the d i s t r i ­
b u t i o n  of  random d e p o s i t s  becomes more r i s k y  ( i n  t he sense 
o f  a mean p r e s e r v i n g  sp r ead ) ,  t he i n t e r m e d i a r y ' s  s i z e  
(expected)  tends to i ncrease.
Table 15 on the f o l l o w i n g  page dep i c t s  the comparat i ve 
s t a t i c  r e s u l t s  devel oped in t h i s  sec t i on .
Loan and Deposi t  Uncer t a i n t y  Case
What about  t he i n t e r m e d i a r y ' s  r a t e - s e t t i n g  d e c i s i o n s  
when l oans and depos i t s  are both uncer t a i n? Un f o r t u n a t e l y ,  
c o m p a r a t i v e  s t a t i c  r e s u l t s  canno t  be d e r i v e d  f o r  bot h 
sources of  u n c e r t a i n t y  appear i ng s i mu l t aneous l y .  However,  
some p a r t i a l  e q u i l i b r i u m  comparat i ve s t a t i c  r e s u l t s  can be 
obt a i ned,  f o r  i ns t ance,  the e f f e c t s  of  r i s k  aver s i on  on the 
o p t i m a l  l oan r a t e  when d e p o s i t  r a t e s  are f i x e d .  Thi s  mode 
of  b e h a v i o r  i s  o b s e r v e d  on the p a r t  o f  f i n a n c i a l  i n t e r ­
medi ar i es  s ub j ec t  to c o n s t r a i n t s  on the r a t es  t ha t  they are 
a l l owed to pay to depos i t o r s .  The l a s t  pa r t  of  t h i s  sect i on
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Table 15 
Depos i t  Uncer t a i nt y '  Case 
Comparat i ve S t a t i c s  Resul t s  
(S = rL - rg)
E f f e c t s  on 
Loan Rate
E f f ec t s  
Deposi  t
on
Rate DARA CARA lARA
3r|_/3CL > 0 8r [ ) /3CL > 0 = 0 < 0
9rL/3cQ = 0 3ro/3Co < 0 < 0
3r |_/3r  > 0 3rQ/3 r > 0* > 0
MRS** = 0 MRS**
Ef f ec t s
Spread
on
> 0 > 0 <-»
3 S/3Cl -< “ > 0 > 0
3 S/SCq > 0 > 0
3S/ 3r < - °
MRS** < 0 < 0
* Requi res t h a t L > D
* *  MRS = mean p r ese r v i ng  spread of  e.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
120
examines the e f f e c t s  of  an I ncrease in r i s k  aver s i on  on the 
i n t e r med i  ar^/ ' s spread between r|_ and rg.  The t e x t  shows 
t h a t  an i ncrease in r i s k  aver s i on  tends to l ower  the i n t e r ­
mediary ' s spread under cons t ant  abso l u t e  r i s k  avers i on.
Ob j ec t i ve  Funct i on




U( n) g ( p ) h ( e ) d  e dy  , (3-132)
where H i s  def i ned as
n = r L +  y]  - Cg[L+y] - rg[D+e]  - Cg[D+£]
+ r [ D+E- L - y ] .  (3-133)
F i r s t  and Second Order  Condi t i ons 
The f i r s t  order  c ond i t i on s  are
Ug = E { U ' ( n ) [ L + y + L ' ( r g - C L - r ) ] }  = 0 (3-134)
Ûg = E { U ' ( n ) [ - D - c + D ' ( r - r g - C g ) ] }  = 0. (3-135)
The second or der  cond i t i ons  are gi ven by
Ull = E { U ' ( n ) [ 2 L ' + L " ( r L - C L - r ) ] + U " ( : ) ( n g ) 2 }  < 0 (3-136)
ÜDD = E { U ' ( n ) [ - 2 D ' + D " ( r - r g - C g ) ] + U " ( n ) ( n g ) 2 )  < 0
^ ^LLÜgg - (Ul d ^^  ^ °-
For  t he r i s k  av e r s e  i n t e r m e d i a r y  (U"(n)  < 0) ,  s u f f i c i e n t
c ond i t i on s  f o r  the second order  cond i t i ons  to be s a t i s f i e d
are t ha t  L" < 0 and D" < 0.
Ce r t a i n t y  versus Uncer t a i n t y  Comparisons
In o r d e r  t o de t e r mi ne  the e f f e c t s  o f  r i s k  a v e r s i o n  on
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the opt i mal  l oan r at e ,  rear range the f i r s t  order  cond i t i on  
f o r  r ^  as f o i l o w s ;
" ' l ■ ' l ^  ^ ■ TÉcùxin'-
Under l i n e a r  r i s k  pref erences,  the l a s t  term of  (3-137) 
vani shes,  and the i n t er medi ar y  chooses i t s  opt imal  l oan r a t e  
by e q u a t i n g  the expec t ed mar g i na l  r evenue on l oans  to t he 
sum of  t he a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  and l i q u i d i t y  c os t s .  When r i s k  
p r e f e r e n c e s  are n o n l i n e a r ,  t he l a s t  t erm i n ( 3 -137)  i s  
nonzero,  and the i n t er medi ar y  sets i t s  opt i mal  l oan r at e by 
e q u a t i n g  the expec t ed mar g i na l  r evenue on l oans  to a 
q ua n t i t y  d i f f e r e n t  f rom j u s t  the sum of  margi nal  costs.  How 
does the opt i mal  rate on loans under r i s k  aver s i on compare 
to the r i s k  neu t r a l  l oan rate? The f o l l o w i n g  p r opos i t i ons  
expl ore t h i s  quest i on.
Pr opos i t i o n  33): Assuming rQ f i x e d ,  and p and e
i ndependent l y  d i s t r i b u t e d  wi t h  a d d i t i v e  l oan demand in terms 
of  y ,  then r|_^ < r ^^ .
Proof :  In order  to v e r i f y  t h i s  p r opos i t i on  i t  must be
shown t ha t  the r i s k  premium, 0 , t ha t  y i e l d s  e q u a l i t y  between 
U ( n - 9 )  = E [ U ( n ) ]  i s  an i n c r e a s i n g  f u n c t i o n  o f  r ^ .
D i f f e r e n t i a t i n g  U ( n - 9 )  wi t h  r espect  to r ^  and e v a l u a t i n g  at  
r|_ = r[_® y i e l d s
, 88
- A .  U(n-9)  = U ' ( n - 0 ) [ L + L ' ( r i _3 - CL- r ) ]  - --------- ] = 0. (3-138)
8 ri_^
From the f i r s t  order  c ond i t i on  f o r  r i t  f o l l ows  t hat
L * L ' ( r L = - CL - r )  = - I . (3-139)
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Su b s t i t u t i n g  (3-122)  i n t o  ( 3-121) ,  i t  f o l l ows  t ha t
36 = - Cov(U ‘ ( I I ) , y ) . (3-140)
SrL* E [ U ' ( n ) ]
From (3-123) ,  9 w i l l  be an i nc r eas i ng  (decreas i ng)  f unc t i on  
o f  r  as C o v ( U ' ( n ) , y )  < (>)  0. S i n c e ,  [ 3 U ' ( n ) / 3 y ]  = 
U " ( n ) ( r L - C L - r )  < 0, f o r  U"( : )  < 0, t hen Co v ( U • ( I I ) , y ) < 0, 
and 30/3r|_® > 0. The r i s k  premium (0) i s an i n c r e a s i n g  
f u n c t i o n  of  the r i s k  averse l oan r a t e ,  r^®-
P r o p o s i t i on 34 ) :  For  y and e j o i n t l i »  n o r m a l l y
d i s t r i b u t e d  wTth y and e p o s i t i v e l y  c o r r e l a t e d  ( p >  0 ) and 
rp f i x e d  at  the o p t i ma l  r i s k  n e u t r a l  l e v e l  r g " ,
P r oo f :  Th i s  p r o o f  r e q u i r e s  t h a t  Cov(U' (  n " ) , y )  < 0,
where n" i s  t he v a l u e  o f  H e v a l  uat ed a t  r  Q = r g " .  Usi ng
Tay l o r  ser i es  expansion of  U'( H") about  the expected va l ue
of  n" :
Cov(U' (  n " ) , y )  = U" ( nc ) Cov ( n " , y )  (3-141)
where H  ^ i s  a c o n s t a n t  t h a t  e x i s t s  by t he Law o f  t he Mean. 
The Cov( n^ , y )  can be expressed as
Cov( n " , y )  = U" ( I I c ) { ( r i _ - CL- r ) Var  (y)
+ ( r - r Q- CQ) Co v ( y , e ) } . (3-142)
S u b s t i t u t i o n  of  (3-142)  i n t o  (3-141)  y i e l d s :
Cov(U' (  n " ) , y )  = U"( nc ) { ( r i _ - CL - r ) Va r ( y )
+ ( r - r p - C Q ) C o v ( y ,e ) }  ( 3 - 1 4 3 )
The Cov(y , e)  > 0 by assumpt i on  ( p >  0) and U"( JI^ , ) < 0 f o r  
the r i s k  averse i n t e r med i a r y .  Thus, i t  f o l l o w s  t ha t  (3-143)
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i s  s t r i c t l y  nega t i ve  and r|_® < r
Coro 11ary 2 ) : For y and e j o i n t l y  n o r ma l l y  d i s t r i b u t e d
w i t h  p<  0 and r g f i x e d  a t  t he r i s k  n e u t r a l  o p t i m a l  l e v e l
r  [ )",  r L^  ^  r  1^ ' .^ Th i s  f o l l o w s  f r om t he  f a c t  t h a t  ( 3 - 143)
cannot  be signed f o r  P < 0 .
P r o p o s i t i o n s  33) and 34) s ugges t  t h a t  t he r i s k  ave r s e
i n t e r med i a r y  w i l l  choose a r a t e  on l oans t ha t  i s  below the
r i s k  n e u t r a l  l e v e l .  Gi ven i n d e p e n d e n t  or  p o s i t i v e l y
c o r r e l a t e d  l oan and depos i t  l e v e l s ,  the r i s k  or  v a r i a b i l i t y
of  p r o f i t  i s  an i nc r eas i ng  f u n c t i o n  of  the l oan ra t e .  Thus,
the r i s k  averse i n t e r med i a r y  w i l l  reduce i t s  l oan r at e to a
l e v e l  below the r i s k  neu t r a l  r a t e ,  t r ad i ng  o f f  pa r t  of  i t s
p r o f i t s  in order  to reduce the r i s k  or  d i spe r s i on  of  p r o f i t .
P r o p o s i t i o n 3 5 ) :  As s u mi ng  r ^  f i x e d ,  and y an de
i ndependent l y  d i s t r i b u t e d  w i t h  a d d i t i v e  depos i t  suppl y in 
t erms o f  e ,  t hen r^® > r ^ " .
P r oo f :  Th i s  p r o p o s i t i o n  can be v e r i f i e d  by showing
t ha t  the r i s k  premium (0 ) t h a t  y i e l d s  e q u a l i t y  between U(H-
9 )  and E [ U ( n ) ]  i s  a d e c r e a s i n g  f u n c t i o n  o f  r Q ^ .
D i f f e r e n t i a t i n g  U(II-Q) w i t h  r espec t  to rp and e v a l u a t i n g  at
rp^ y i e l d s
J _ U ( ï ï - 9 )  = U ' ( i ï - e ) { [ - D + D ' ( r - r j  - C p ) ]  -  3 Q  }= 0. (3-144)  
3rp 3rp3
From the f i r s t  order  c ond i t i on  f o r  rp,
- D+D' ( r - r g - Cg )  = ‘ (3-145)
S u b s t i t u t i n g  (3-145)  i n t o  (3-144)  gi ves
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»» .  (3-146)
: ro» E [ U ' ( n ) ]
Hence, 0 w i l l  be an I nc r eas i ng  (decreas i ng)  f un c t i o n  of  r ^^ 
as C o v ( U ' ( n ) , e )  > ( < )  0.  Si nc e ,  3 U ‘ ( n ) / 3 e  = U"( H) ( r - r D-
Cg)  < 0 f o r  U " ( n )  < 0 ,  and 3 n / 3 e  > 0 ,  C o v ( U ' ( n ) , e )  < 0 and 0 
i s  a decreas i ng f u n c t i o n  of  the opt i mal  r i s k  averse depos i t  
r a t e ,  r g^ .
Pr opos i t i on  36): Assuming y and e no r ma l l y  d i s t r i b u t e d
w i t h  p> 0 and r i  f i x e d  a t  i t s  o p t i ma l  r i s k  n e u t r a l  l e v e l  
r  1^ " ,  t hen r^® > r g " .
Proof :  This p r o p o s i t i o n  r equ i r es  t ha t  Cov(U' ( n"),E)<0.
Tay l or  se r i es  expansion of  Cov(U' (  H " ),  e) about  H" y i e l d s
Cov(U' (  n " ) , e )  = U"( n(. )Cov( H " , e ) ,  (3-147)
where i s  a c o n s t a n t  t h a t  e x i s t s  by t he Law o f  t he Mean. 
The CoV( H" , e) i s gi ven by
Cov ( n'^,e) = { ( r - r g - c g ) V a r ( e )
+ ( r L " - C | _ - r ) C o v ( y , e ) } .  (3-148)
S u b s t i t u t i n g  (3-149)  i n t o  (3-148)  y i e l d s
Cov(U' (  n " ) , e ) =  U"( Hc ) { ( r - r g - C g ) V a r ( e )
+ (r|_'^-C|_-r)Cov(y,E)} . (3-149)
Wi t h Cov(y,  e) > 0 by as s umpt i on ,  U" (  ) < 0 and ( r - r g - C g )  >
0 , ( r [ _ ' ^ - C | _ - r )  > 0 by t h e  f i r s t  o r d e r  c o n d i t i o n s ,
Cov ( U ' ( n ' ^ l . e)  < 0- T h e r e f o r e ,  r  > r  g " .
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Coro 1 1ary 3 ) : For y and e j o i n t l y  nor ma l l y  d i s t r i b u t e d
wi t h  p < 0 and r ^  f i x ed  at  r r p ®  ^ rg" .  In t h i s  case 
(3-149)  i s ambiguous in sign f o r  p< 0.
When l oan and depos i t  l e v e l s  are e i t h e r  independent  or 
p o s i t i v e l y  c o r r e l a t e d ,  t he r i s k  ave r s e  d e p o s i t  r a t e  i s 
g r e a t e r  t han the r i s k  n e u t r a l  r a t e .  Wi t h the l oan  r a t e  
f i x e d  at  i t s  opt i mal  r i s k  neu t r a l  l e v e l ,  the r i s k  of  p r o f i t  
i s  a d e c r e a s i n g  f u n c t i o n  of  t he r i s k  ave r se  d e p o s i t  r a t e .  
The r i s k  averse i n t e r med i ar y  l owers the d i sper s i on of  p r o f i t  
by r a i s i n g  i t s  depos i t  r a t e  above the r i s k  neut ra l  l e v e l .
Ef f ec t s  of  Increase in Risk Aversi on
This sec t i on w i l l  examine the e f f e c t s  of  an i ncrease in 
r i s k  a v e r s i o n  on t he o p t i ma l  l oan  and d e p o s i t  r a t e s .  To 
a l l o w  f o r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  b o t h  l o a n  and d e p o s i t  
u n c e r t a i n t y ,  the f o l l o w i n g  f u n c t i o n  i s assumed to descr i be 
the i n t e r med i a r y ' s  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n ;
U(n) = - exp ( - a • II ) • (3-150)
where a i s  a p o s i t i v e  cons t ant  which equal s the Ar r ow- Pr a t t
i ndex  o f  a b s o l u t e  r i s k  a v e r s i o n .  That  i s ,  Rg( n) = a -  
Thus,  ( 3 - 150)  i s  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  b e h a v i o r  e x h i b i t e d  under  
cons t ant  abso l ut e r i s k  aver s i on.
Hi 1 d r e t h ^ B   ^g g shown t h a t  when H i s  n o r m a l l y  
d i s t r i b u t e d ,  maximi zi ng E[ U( H)] i s  t antamount  to maximizi ng:  
ÏÏ- a / 2  V ar  (H ) .
G. H i l b r e t h ,  " P o i n t  Es t i ma t es  o f  Or d i n a t e s  o f  
Concave Funct i ons. "  Journal  of  American S t a t i s t i c a l  Associ a­
t i on  49 ( 1 954),  598-'¥TT:
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Hence, the i ntermedi  ar i»' s o p t i m i z a t i o n  problem becomes
Maximize n - a/2 Var (n)  • (3-151)
The expected val ue and var i ance of  p r o f i t s  are gi ven b}f
n = ( r  |_-c r ) L + ( r - r  q-Cq ) D (3-152)
V a r ( n )  = ( r L - C L - r ) ^ E [ p ] 2  +  ( r - r Q - C o ) ^ E [ e ] ^
+ 2( r - rQ-C[ ) )  ( r L - C| _ r ) Cov ( v , e ) , (3-153)
where E[ y ] ^  = Var  (y) and E[ e] ^  = Var  (e),  s i nc e  E[ y ]  = E[e]  
= 0.  I nc o r po r a t i ng  (3-152)  and (3-153)  i n t o  (3-151)  r e s u l t s  
i n
F = (r|_-C|_-r)L + ( r - rQ-CQ)D - o/2(r ,^-C|^-r )^ Var(y )
- a / 2 ( r - r Q- Cp ) 2  Var (e ) - a ( r  |_-CL-r ) ( r - r ^ -CQ ) Cov (y ,e ),
(3-154)
where F denotes { n  - a / 2  Var ( n) }•
I f  y and e are i ndependent l y  d i s t r i b u t e d ,  Cov( y^e) = 0. 
The f i r s t  or der  c ond i t i on s  are gi ven by;
F|_ = {L + L ’ ( r |_-C[_-r ) - a( r  |_-c |_-r ) Var ( y ) } = 0 (3-155)
Fq = { -D + D' ( r - r g - Cg )  + a ( r - r p - C p ) Var ( e ) } = 0. (3-156)
Second order  cond i t i ons  are
F l l  = { L ‘ + [ L '  - o V a r ( y ) ]  + L" ( r | _ - Cp- r ) }  < 0 (3-157)
Fpp = { - O'  - [O'  + a Va r ( e ) ]  + D " ( r - r p - Cp ) }  < 0,
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and
“  = f Ll ^DD - ( fLD>^ > 0
Flo = Cov ( y , e )  ^ 0 as Cov(y,e)  ^ 0.
I n s p e c t i o n  o f  t he f i r s t  o r d e r  c o n d i t i o n s  r e v e a l s  t h a t  
necessary cond i t i ons  f o r  an i n t e r i o r  opt imum are t ha t  r L - cL-  
r  > 0 and r - r  g - c g > 0. Fo r  U"( I I )  < 0,  t he  second o r d e r  
c ond i t i on s  w i l l  be s a t i s f i e d ,  p r ov i ded t ha t  L" < 0 and D" < 
0 .
D i f f e r e n t i a t i n g  the f i r s t  order  c ond i t i ons  wi t h  respect  
to a f i e l d s :
3r L/ 3a = - D ' ^ [ F l „  ' Fpo]  (3-158)
3r o/ 3a = -D' ^LFoa ' Fl l ] ,  (3-159)
wher e  F ^  = - ( r L - C L - r ) V a r ( y )  < 0 , and Fqo = ( r - r g -  
Cg) V ar (e) > 0. T h e r e f o r e ,  3r L/  3o < 0, and 3r g/ 3a > 0 .  An 
i ncrease in the c o e f f i c i e n t  of  r i s k  aver s i on ( o ) ,  i ncreases 
r g and decr eases  rL-  Hence,  g i v e n  u n c o r r e l a t e d  l oan  and 
d e p o s i t  l e v e l s ,  i n c r e a s e s  i n r i s k  a v e r s i o n  t end to r educe 
t he s i z e  of  t he c o n t r o l l a b l e  r a t e  spr ead.  Wi t h Cov(y,e)  ^  
0 , t he s i g ns  o f  ( 3rL/3o)  and ( 3r g / 3 a) are no t  d e t e r m i n a t e  a 
p r i o r i .
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
C h a p t e r  4
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE THEORY 
OF DEPOSITORY FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES
C h a p t e r  3 d e v e l o p e d  a mi c r o e c o n o m i c  model  o f  a 
d e p o s i t o r y  f i n a n c i a l  i n t e r m e d i a r y  under  u n c e r t a i n t y .  The 
mode l ' s  f o r m u l a t i o n  emphas i zed the b e h a v i o r  o f  d e p o s i t o r y  
i n t e r m e d i a r i e s  as r a t e  s e t t e r s  i n  t he l o a n  and d e p o s i t  
mar k e t s .  S e v e r a l  key assumpt i ons  u n d e r l a y  t he model ,  
i n c l u d i n g  i mpe r f ec t  l oan and depos i t  markets,  r ea l  resource 
c o s t  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ,  and n o n l i n e a r  r i s k  p r e f e r e n c e s .  The 
approach empl oyed t o model  t he i n t e r m e d i a r y ' s  o p t i m i z i n g  
b e h a v i o r  was t h a t  o f  ex pec t ed  u t i l i t y  m a x i m i z a t i o n  of  
p r o f i t s  s ub j ec t  to a bal ance sheet  c o n s t r a i n t .  P r o f i t s  were 
assumed random due to u n c e r t a i n t y  over  the q u a n t i t y  of  loans 
and d e p o s i t s .  Th i s  c h a p t e r  w i l l  r e v i e w  t he t h e o r e t i c a l  
r e s u l t s  der i ved  in the pr ecedi ng chapt er  and examine t h e i r  
b e a r i n g  on t he t h e o r y  o f  d e p o s i t o r y  f i n a n c i a l  i n t e r ­
medi ar i es  .
In t he r i s k  n e u t r a l  or  c e r t a i n t y  e q u i v a l e n t  case,  the 
i n t e r m e d i a r y  d e t e r m i n e s  t he o p t i m a l  l oan  r a t e  by e q u a t i n g  
the marg i na l  revenue f rom l oans to the sum of  the marginal  
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  cost  of  l oans p l us  the r at e on Federal  funds.  
S i m i l a r l y ,  the opt i mal  r i s k  neu t r a l  depos i t  r a t e  i s set  at  a 
l e v e l  a t  wh i ch  t he sum of  t he m a r g i n a l  i n t e r e s t  c o s t  of
128
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depos i t s  and t h e i r  margi nal  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  cost  j u s t  equal s 
the Federal  funds r at e .  Under r i s k  n e u t r a l i t y ,  the loan and 
depos i t  r a t e - s e t t i n g  dec i s i ons  are c l e a r l y  separabl e.  The 
o p t i m a l  r i s k  n e u t r a l  l oan  r a t e  i s  i nd e p e n d e n t  bot h o f  the 
ra t e  to be paid on depos i t s  and of  the margi nal  admi n i s t r a -  
t i v e  c o s t s  i n c u r r e d  i n p r o v i d i n g  s e r v i c e s  to d e p o s i t o r s .  
I ndependence between t he o p t i m a l  l oan  and d e p o s i t  r a t e  
d e c i s i o n s  under  r i s k  n e u t r a l i t y  i s  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  the 
f i n d i n g s  o f  K l e i n . ^  The o p t i m a l  s c a l e  o f  o p e r a t i o n  of  the 
r i s k  n e u t r a l  i n t e r m e d i a r y  i s  d e t e r m i n e d  by e q u a t i n g  the 
margi nal  revenue f rom l oans to the sum of  both the marginal  
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  c o s t  o f  l o a n s  p l u s  t he ma r g i n a l  c o s t  of  
d e p o s i t s .  Compa r a t i v e  s t a t i c s  r e s u l t s  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  the 
opt i mal  r i s k  neu t r a l  l oan r a t e  i s an i nc r eas i ng  f u n c t i o n  of  
the margi nal  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  cost  of  l oans and i ndependent  of
the margi nal  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  cost  of  depos i t s .
On the d e p o s i t  s i d e ,  t he o p t i m a l  r i s k  n e u t r a l  d e p o s i t  
r a t e i s  a decreasi ng f unc t i on  of  the margi nal  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  
c o s t  of  d e p o s i t s  and i n v a r i a n t  w i t h  r e s p e c t  to changes i n 
the margi nal  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  cost  of  l oans.  Fur t hermore,  the
r i s k  neu t r a l  l oan and depos i t  r a t es  are i nc r eas i ng  f unc t i ons
o f  t h e  F e d e r a l  f u n d s  r a t e .  W i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  t h e  
i n t e r med i a r y ' s  spread between r a n d  r ^ ,  an i ncrease in the 
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  c o s t  of  e i t h e r  l oans  or  d e p o s i t s  i n c r e a s e s
^M. A. K l e i n ,  "A Theory of  the Banking Fi rm, "  Journal  of  
Money Cr ed i t  and Banki ng," 3:205-18,  May, 1971.
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t he s i z e  o f  t he i n t e r m e d i a r y ’ s spread.  In a d d i t i o n ,  an 
i n c r e a s e  i n  t he ma r g i n a l  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  c o s t  o f  l oans  
i ncreases the amount of  l end i ng done by the i n t e r med i ar y  in 
t he Federal  funds market .  As Cl i nc reases ,  the i n s t i t u t i o n  
t ends  t o  become more o f  a ne t  l e n d e r  i n  t he Feder a l  f unds  
mar ke t .  On the o t h e r  hand,  an i n c r e a s e  i n  t he mar g i na l  
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  c o s t  o f  d e p o s i t s  r educes  t he amount  o f  
l end i ng  i n Federal  funds.  The i n t e r med i a r y  tends to become 
a net  bo r r owe r  o f  Feder a l  f unds  as Cq i n c r e a s e s .  F i n a l l y ,  
an i ncrease in the Federal  funds rate l eads the i n t e r med i ar y  
t o r a i s e  bot h r a n d  rg.  Co ns equ en t l y ,  t he e f f e c t  on the 
r i s k  neut r a l  spread f rom a change in the Federal  funds rate 
i s  i n d e t e r m i n a t e .  The e f f e c t  on the spread between r g and 
rQ f rom a change in the Federa l  f unds r a t e  depends on both 
the r a t e  e l a s t i c i t i e s  of  the l oan demand and depos i t  suppl y 
f u n c t i o n s .
R e l a x i n g  t he  a s s u m p t i o n  o f  r i s k  n e u t r a l i t y  has 
s i g n i f i c a n t  e f f e c t s  on the b e h a v i o r  o f  t he d e p o s i t o r y  
i n t e r med i a r y  conf ront ed wi t h  qua n t i t y  u nc e r t a i n t y  on e i t h e r  
si de of  i t s  bal ance sheet .  Under uncer t a i n  l oan demand, the 
v a r i a n c e  o f  t he i n t e r m e d i a r y ' s  p r o f i t  i s  an i n c r e a s i n g  
f u n c t i o n  o f  t he r i s k  av e r s e  l oan r a t e .  As a r e s u l t ,  t he 
r i s k  averse i n t e r med i a r y  sets a l oan r at e t ha t  i s below the 
r i s k  n e u t r a l  r a t e  in an e f f o r t  t o r educe t he d i s p e r s i o n  of  
p r o f i t .  Thus,  t he r i s k  aver se i n s t i t u t i o n  i s  w i l l i n g  to 
ac c ep t  a r e d u c t i o n  i n expec t ed p r o f i t  i n exchange f o r  l ess  
v a r i a b i l i t y  around t he expec t ed  v a l u e  o f  p r o f i t .  Th i s
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r e s u l t  i s  q u i t e  o p p o s i t e  t o t he c o n c l u s i o n  r eached 
P r i n g l e . 2 The re s u i t s  der i ved  here i mpl y  t ha t  l oan demand 
u n c e r t a i n t y  and r i s k  a v e r s i o n  l e a d  to a r e d u c t i o n  i n  the 
s i ze of  the i n t e r med i a r y ' s  spread between r ^  and rp.  Given 
uncer t a i n  l oan demand, the si ze of  the i n t e r med i a r y ' s  spread 
decreases as r i s k  aver s i on  i ncreases.
The model  a l s o  has some i m p l i c a t i o n s  c o n c e r n i n g  the 
b o r r o w i n g / l e n d i n g  p o s i t i o n  of  t he i n t e r m e d i a r y  i n  the 
Feder a l  f unds  mar ke t .  The r i s k  av e r s e  i n t e r m e d i a r y  under  
l oan demand u n c e r t a i n t y  sets r|_ and rp (and thus the spread) 
such t h a t  t he i n t e r m e d i a r y  ex pec t s  t o be a ne t  bo r r owe r  i n 
the Federal  funds market .  On the o t her  hand, i f  t he i n t e r ­
med i a r y  p r e f e r s  r i s k ,  i t  w i l l  s e t  r a n d  rp such t h a t  i t  
expects to be a net  l ender  of  Federal  funds.
Comparat i ve s t a t i c  r e s u l t s  of  the l oan u n c e r t a i n t y  case 
i n d i c a t e  t h a t  t he b e h a v i o r  o f  t he r i s k  av e r s e  spread i n 
r esponse t o changes i n  c^,  cp and r  i s  i d e n t i c a l  t o the 
c e r t a i n t y  e q u i v a l e n t  case under  CARA and lARA. Gi ven 
non dec r eas i ng  a b s o l u t e  r i s k  a v e r s i o n ,  an i n c r e a s e  i n the 
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  cost  of  e i t h e r  l oans or  depos i t s  l eads to an 
i n c r e a s e  i n t he i n t e r m e d i a r y ’ s spread.  The e f f e c t  o f  a 
change in the Federal  funds r at e on the spread i s ambiguous 
under  r i s k  n e u t r a l i t y  as w e l l  as f o r  a l l  degrees  of  r i s k  
avers i on.
^J.  P r i n g l e ,  "The C a p i t a l  De c i s i o n  i n  Commerci al  
Banks," Journal  of  Fi nance,  29:779-95,  June, 1974.
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Under  DARA, t he e f f e c t s  on t he spread f rom changes i n 
C|_, C0 and r  are i n c o n c l u s i v e .  This ambi gui t y  i s i mpor t an t  
i n t h a t  i t  r a i s e s  t he p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  spread management  
behav i o r  of  the DARA i n t e r med i a r y  may d i f f e r  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  
f r om the b e h a v i o r  o f  t he i n t e r m e d i a r y  under  CARA or  IARA. 
Recal l  t ha t  DARA repr esent s  the most e m p i r i c a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  
h y p o t h e s i s  c o n c e r n i n g  t he r e l a t i o n s h i p  between w e a l t h  and 
r i s k  t a k i n g  b e h a v i o r .  One e f f e c t  on t he s p r ead ,  whose 
d i r e c t i o n  i s  u na mb i guo us l y  c l e a r  under  DARA, i s  t h a t  of  a 
mean p r e s e r v i n g  spr ead o f  t he d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f p  . A mean 
p r e s e r v i n g  spr ead of  y t ends  t o  r educe the s i z e  o f  t he 
i n t e r m e d i a r y ' s  sp r ead  under  e i t h e r  DARA or  CARA. R e c a l l  
t ha t  a mean p r ese r v i ng  spread of  y i ncreases the v a r i a b i l i t y  
o f  t he d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  y w i t h o u t  a f f e c t i n g  t he mean o f  the 
d i s t r i b u t i o n .  Note t h a t  a mean p r e s e r v i n g  spr ead of  y has 
no e f f e c t  on t he o p t i m a l  d e p o s i t  r a t e .  Hence,  as l oan  
demand v a r i a b i l i t y  i ncreases (mean p r ese r v i ng  spread) ,  the 
DARA and CARA i n t e r me d i a r i e s  reduce the s i ze of  t h e i r  spread 
by l o w e r i n g  t h e i r  l o a n  r a t e s .  The e f f e c t  o f  a mean 
p r e s e r v i n g  spr ead o f  y on the spread i s  ambiguous under  
lARA.
Comparat i ve s t a t i c  r e s u l t s  of  the model  r evea l  severa l  
i n s i g h t s  i n t o  the behav i o r  of  the r i s k  averse i n t e r med i a r y  
i n t he mar ke t  f o r  Feder a l  f unds .  Gi ven CARA or  lARA, an 
i ncrease in the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  cost  of  making a l oan induces 
t he i n t e r m e d i a r y  t o  l e n d  more f unds  i n t he Fede r a l  f unds  
market .  Under DARA, the i n t e r med i a r y  cou l d  a c t u a l l y  end up
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bor rowi ng more in the Federal  funds market  as a r e s u l t  of  a 
change i n C|_- Note t ha t  the Federal  funds market  serves as 
a sou r ce  as w e l l  as use of  f unds  f o r  t he i n t e r m e d i a r y .  
Thus ,  i t  r e p r e s e n t s  a c o n s t a n t  c o s t  s o u r c e  o f  f u n d s  
a l t e r n a t i v e  to depos i t s  and a cons t ant  r e t u r n - e a r n i n g  asset  
as w e l l .  I t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  any changes wh i ch  a f f e c t  t he 
r e t u r n  or  cost  of  l oans and depos i t s  w i l l  cause a change in 
t he amount  o f  b o r r o w i n g / 1  end i ng  o f  Feder a l  f unds  by t he 
i n t e r med i a r y .  For example,  an i ncrease in the admi n i s t r a ­
t i v e  cos t  of  depos i t s  i ncreases the t o t a l  resource cost  of  
usi ng depos i t s  as a source of  funds.  An i ncrease in Cq w i l l  
l e a d  t h e  i n t e r m e d i a r y  t o  b o r r o w  more F e d e r a l  f u n d s .  
Per c e i v i ng  the r e l a t i o n s h i p  between the amount of  bor rowi ng/  
l e n d i n g  o f  Feder a l  f unds  and t he b e h a v i o r  o f  the spread 
under d i f f e r e n t  degrees of  r i s k  aver s i on  hel ps one to under ­
stand the process of  l i a b i l i t y  management.
The r e s u l t s  o f  t h e  l o a n  u n c e r t a i n t y  model  have 
s i g n i f i c a n t  i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  t he i n t e r a c t i o n  between l oan  
and d e p o s i t  r a t e  d e c i s i o n s .  Compa r a t i v e  s t a t i c  r e s u l t s  
i n d i c a t e  t h a t  t he o p t i m a l  r i s k  a v e r s e  l oan  r a t e  i s  a 
decreas i ng f u n c t i o n  of  the marginal  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  cost  of  
d e p o s i t s  under  DARA, i n v a r i a n t  under  CARA, and i n c r e a s i n g  
f o r  lARA. Thus , whereas t he r i s k  n e u t r a l  l oan  r a t e  i s  
i n v a r i a n t  wi t h  r espec t  to changes in the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  cost  
o f  d e p o s i t s ,  t he o p t i m a l  r i s k  av e r s e  l oan  r a t e  depends on 
t he pa r ame t e r s  o f  the d e p o s i t  s u p p l y  f u n c t i o n .  I t  appears 
t h a t  t he e x i s t e n c e  o f  r e s ou r c e  c os t  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ,  l oan
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demand u n c e r t a i n t y ,  and r i s k  avers i on pr ov i de  a l i n k  between 
the opt i mal  l oan and depos i t  r ate dec i s i ons .
When u n c e r t a i n t y  e x i s t s  on the d e p o s i t  s i d e ,  the r i s k  
averse i n t e r med i a r y  s e l ec t s  a depos i t  r a t e  which i s s t r i c t l y  
h i g h e r  than t he r i s k  n e u t r a l  d e p o s i t  r a t e .  Si nce the l oan 
r a t e  i s  u n a f f e c t e d  by random d e p o s i t  s u p p l i e s ,  t he r i s k  
a v e r s e  spread between r |_ and r  ^  i s  s m a l l e r  t han the r i s k  
n e u t r a l  spr ead.  When d e p o s i t  s u p p l i e s  are random,  the 
v a r i a n c e  o f  t he i n t e r m e d i a r y ' s  p r o f i t  i s  a de c r e a s i n g  
f u n c t i o n  o f  t he r i s k  a v e r s e  d e p o s i t  r a t e .  The r i s k  ave r s e  
i n t e r m e d i a r y  i s  w i l l i n g  t o f o r e g o  some ex pec t ed  p r o f i t  
( h i g h e r  d e p o s i t  r a t e )  i n  o r d e r  t o r e d u c e  t he  r i s k  or  
v a r i a b i l i t y  o f  p r o f i t .  Co ns e q u e n t l y ,  i t  se t s  the r i s k  
averse depos i t  rate at  a l e v e l  above the r i s k  neu t r a l  r ate.  
Thus, the i n t r o d u c t i o n  of  e i t h e r  l oan or  depos i t  unc e r t a i n t y  
coupl ed wi t h  r i s k  aver s i on  l eads to a r educ t i on  in the si ze 
of  the i n t e r med i a r y ' s  spread f rom the r i s k  neu t r a l  l e v e l .  A 
s m a l l e r  r i s k  av e r s e  spread r e s u l t s  i n t he r e d u c t i o n  of  
p r o f i t s  and o f  t h e i r  v a r i a b i l i t y  as w e l l .
T h i s  r e s u l t  p r o v i d e s  t h e o r e t i c a l  s u p p o r t  f o r  
Heggestad' s^ e mp i r i c a l  f i n d i n g s .  Examining the i n f l u e n c e  of 
market  s t r u c t u r e  on bank p r o f i t a b i l i t y ,  hi s study concluded 
t h a t  banks w i t h  monopol y  power  use i t  to reduce the r i s k s  
t hey t ake r a t h e r  t han t o i n c r e a s e  t h e i r  l e v e l  of  p r o f i t s .
A. J. Hegges tad,  "Market  St r uc t u r e ,  Risk and P r o f i t a ­
b i l i t y  in Commercial  Banking, "  Journal  of  Fi nance, 32:1207- 
16, September,  1977.
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Note t h a t  one o f  t he i m p l i c a t i o n s  of  d e p o s i t  u n c e r t a i n t y '  
under  r i s k  a v e r s i o n  i s  an i n c r e a s e  i n  the expec t ed  s i z e  of  
the i n t e r med i ar y .  Fur t hermore,  the r i s k  averse i n t e r med i ar y  
f a c i n g  d e p o s i t  s u p p l y  u n c e r t a i n t y  se t s  r|_ and rg such t h a t  
i t  i s  an expec t ed  ne t  l e n d e r  i n t he Feder a l  f unds  market .  
Thus, i f  the i n s t i t u t i o n  has cons i der ab l e  u n c e r t a i n t y  as to 
t he amount  o f  d e p o s i t  f u n d i n g ,  i t  w i l l  s e t  r ^  and r g such 
t ha t  i t  expects to l end funds in the Federal  funds market .
Comparat i ve s t a t i c  r e s u l t s  of  the depos i t  unc e r t a i n t y  
case r e v e a l  t h a t  t he e f f e c t s  on the i n t e r m e d i a r y ' s  spread 
f rom changes i n  C[_, Cq and r  are f u l l y  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t he 
e f f e c t s  under  l oan demand u n c e r t a i n t y .  Aga i n ,  j u s t  as i n 
t he case o f  l oan  demand u n c e r t a i n t y ,  t hese r e s u l t s  i mp l y  
t h a t  t he b e h a v i o r  o f  the spr ead under  DARA may d i f f e r  
s i g n i f i c a n t l y  f rom the spread under  CARA or  lARA. For  t he 
most  par t ,  the e f f e c t s  on the amount of  bor r owi ng / 1  ending of  
Feder a l  f unds  f rom changes i n C | _ ,  C q  and r are c o n s i s t e n t  
w i t h  the e f f e c t s  o b t a i n e d  f o r  t he l oan  demand u n c e r t a i n t y  
case.
F i n a l l y ,  Py l e ^  p r o v i d e s  one o f  t he most  i m p o r t a n t  
c o n t r i b u t i o n s  to the theory of  depos i t o r y  f i n a n c i a l  i n t e r ­
medi a r i es. His ana l ys i s  exp l o r ed  the cond i t i ons  under which 
the process of  f i n a n c i a l  i n t e r med i a t i on  would be enhanced. 
Usi ng a p o r t f o l i o  model  o f  a d e p o s i t o r y  f i n a n c i a l  i n t e r ­
med i a r y ,  he conc l uded  t h a t  an i n c r e a s e  in t he c o r r e l a t i o n
^ D. H. P y l e ,  "On t h e  T h e o r y  o f  F i n a n c i a l  I n t e r ­
med i a t i on , "  Journal  of  Fi nance,  26:737-47,  June, 1971.
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between l oan and depos i t  y i e l d s  would tend to f a c i l i t a t e  the 
process of  f i n a n c i a l  i n t e r med i a t i on .
P y l e ’ s model  v i ewed t he d e p o s i t o r y  i n t e r m e d i a r y  as a 
qua n t i t y  s e t t e r  in both loan and depos i t  markets.  In such a 
s e t t i n g ,  the degree of  c o r r e l a t i o n  between uncer t a i n  y i e l d s  
on assets and l i a b i l i t i e s  becomes a key det er mi nant  o f  the 
process of  f i n a n c i a l  i n t e r me d i a t i o n .
The i ssue ra i sed here i s whether  Pyl e ' s  r e s u l t s  can be 
e x t e n d e d  t o  t he  case o f  a r a t e  s e t t i n g  d e p o s i t o r y  
i n t e r med i a r y .  However,  under the assumpt ion of  r a t e - s e t t i n g  
on bot h  l o a n s  and d e p o s i t s ,  i t  i s  no l o n g e r  a p p r o p r i a t e  to 
f ocus  on t he c o r r e l a t i o n  between l oan  and d e p o s i t  y i e l d s .  
Rather ,  the i ssue becomes whether  an i ncrease in the cor re-  
l a t i o n  between loan and depos i t  l e v e l s  enhances the process 
of  f i n a n c i a l  i n t e r med i a t i on .
When bo t h  l oans  and d e p o s i t s  are u n c e r t a i n ,  and the 
i n t e r m e d i a r y ' s  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  i s  e x p o n e n t i a l ,  t he  
o b j e c t i v e  f unc t i on  as gi ven by (3-137)  is
F = (r |_-C[_-r)L + ( r - r p - Cp l D - a/2 ( r [ _-Ci_- r )^Var (y)
- a/2 ( r - r Q- CQ) 2var ( e ) -  a( r  |_-c |_-r ) ( r - r  q-Cq ) Cov ( y , e ).  ( 4-1 )
The f i r s t  order  cond i t i ons  are
F |_ = ( r | _ - C i _ - r  ) L '  + L -  a ( r  i _ - C | _ - r ) v a r ( y ) - a  ( r - r p - C Q j C o v  ( y ,  e)  = 0 
F Q = ( r - r p - C Q  ) D ' - D +  a ( ' "■' "d ' C q ) V a r  ( e ) ( 4 - 2 )
+ a ( r L - C | _ - r ) C o v ( y , e )  = 0 .  ( 4 - 3  )
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Necessary c o nd i t i on s  f o r  opt imal  val ues of  r|_ and rp are
 ^ ^ and r - r Q - c Q > 0. The second o r d e r  c o n d i t i o n s  
w i l l  be s a t i s f i e d ,  pr ov i ded t ha t  L" < 0 and D" < 0.
In o r d e r  t o d e t e r m i n e  t he i mpac t  o f  a change i n  t he 
c o r r e l a t i o n  between y and e on the opt i mal  l oan and depos i t  
r a t e s ,  t h e  f i r s t  o r d e r  c o n d i t i o n s  can be i m p l i c i t l y  




• F q p  -  F | _ Q - F p p ] ,










where F|_p and Fpp are gi ven by
Lp = - a ( r - r p - c p ) a  aV e
Fpp = a ( r p - C | _ - r ) o ^ O g ,
(4-6)
(4-7)
F[_l < 0 , Fpp < 0 by the second order  c o n d i t i o n s ,  andDD
D = F i_ i_ F qq  - ( F p p )  > 0 .
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I f  the signs of  (4-4)  and (4-5)  are such t ha t  an i ncrease in 
p r e s u l t s  i n a l a r g e r  spread between r|_ and r g , t hen one 
can c o n c l u d e  t h a t  an i n c r e a s e  i n  t he c o r r e l a t i o n  between 
l oan and depos i t  l e v e l s  f a c i l i t a t e s  the process of  f i n a n c i a l  
i n t e r med i a t i on .  I f  an i ncrease i n the c o r r e l a t i o n  c o e f f i ­
c i e n t  between l oans  and d e p o s i t s  r educes  t he s i z e  o f  t he 
spr ead ,  t hen such an i n c r e a s e  w i l l  more t han l i k e l y  make 
f i n a n c i a l  i n t e r me d i a t i o n  l ess a t t r a c t i v e .
Re t u r n i n g  t o  e x p r e s s i o n s  ( 4 -4)  and ( 4 - 5 ) ,  t he t erm F|_q 
i s  g i v e n  by
FfD = oCov( y , e) ,  a > 0. ( 4-8)
The sign of  F|_q depends on whether  y and e are p o s i t i v e l y .
i ndependen t l y ,  or  n e g a t i v e l y  c o r r e l a t e d .  Thus, F[_q - 0 as 
P  ^ 0.
When l oan and depos i t  l e v e l s  c o r r e l a t e  n e g a t i v e l y ,  then 
F|_p < 0 and Fpp > 0. Th i s  i m p l i e s  t h a t  3 r | _ / 3p  < 0 and 
3 r g/Sp > 0. Hence,  f o r  n e g a t i v e l y  c o r r e l a t e d  l oan  and 
depos i t  l e v e l s ,  an i ncrease i n p  tends to reduce the s i ze of  
the spread.  A s ma l l e r  spread means l ower  p r o f i t s  which make 
the i n t e r me d i a t i o n  process l ess a t t r a c t i v e .
Wi th p o s i t i v e l y  c o r r e l a t e d  loan and depos i t  l e v e l s ,  the 
s i gns  o f  ( 4 - 4 )  and ( 4 - 5 )  are i n d e t e r m i n a t e .  Thus,  P y l e ' s  
conc l us i ons  regar d i ng the c ond i t i ons  t ha t  would enhance the 
pr ocess  of  f i n a n c i a l  i n t e r m e d i a t i o n  do no t  gener a l  1 y h o l d  
when extended to the r a t e - s e t t i n g  depos i t o r y  i n t e r med i ar y .  
I t  has been demons t r a t ed  here t h a t  w i t h  l oan and d e p o s i t
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l e v e l s  n e g a t i v e 1^ c o r r e l a t e d ,  an i ncrease in the c o r r e l a t i o n  
c o e f f i c i e n t  between l oan and deposi t s  w i l l  act ual  l »^ tend to 
l essen the a t t r a c t i v e n e s s  of  the i n t e r med i a t i on  process by 
reduci ng the i n t e r med i a r y ' s  p r o f i t s .
A f i n a l  q u e s t i o n  a r i s e s .  What  a r e  t he m a j o r  
i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  t h i s  d i s s e r t a t i o n  f o r  t he  t h e o r y  o f  
depos i t o r y  f i n a n c i a l  i n t e r med i a r i es?
1) The o v e r a l l  impact  of  qua n t i t y  unc e r t a i n t y  and r i s k  
aver s i on i s the r educ t i on of  the i n t e r med i a r y ' s  spread f rom 
the r i s k  n e u t r a l  ( expec t ed  p r o f i t  max i mi ze r  l e v e l ) .  Thi s 
r e s u l t  has p o l i c y  i m p l i c a t i o n s  concerni ng the r e l a t i o n s h i p  
between p r o f i t a b i l i t y  ( p r i c es ) ,  market  s t r u c t u r e ,  and r i s k  
avers i on and suggests t ha t  r i s k  averse depos i t or y  i n s t i t u ­
t i ons  use t h e i r  monopoly or  market  power to reduce the r i sks  
they take r a t he r  than to i ncrease t h e i r  p r o f i t s .
2) The opt imal  net  p o s i t i o n  in the Federal  funds market  
adopt ed by a r i s k  ave r se  i n t e r m e d i a r y  w i l l  depend on the 
sour ces  o f  u n c e r t a i n t y  t h a t  domi nat e i t s  ba l anc e  sheet  
c o n s t r a i n t .  I f  the i n t e r med i a r y ' s  l oan c ’ n'and unc e r t a i n t y  
dominates ot her  sources of  u nc e r t a i n t y  i n i t s  bal ance sheet ,  
then the i n t e r m e d i a r y  w i l l  se t  and rQ such t h a t  i t  
ex pec t s  t o be a ne t  bo r r owe r  i n  t he Feder a l  f unds  market .  
I f ,  on the ot her  hand, depos i t  suppl y unc e r t a i n t y  dominates,  
then the i n t e r med i a r y  w i l l  set  r|_ and rg such t ha t  the f i r m 
i s  an ex pec t ed  ne t  l e n d e r  i n t he Federa l  f unds  market .  
These r e s u l t s  are c o n d i t i o n a l  upon t he r i s k  n e u t r a l
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i n t e r m e d i a r y ' s  s e l e c t i n g  a n e u t r a l  net  p o s i t i o n  i n  the 
Federal  funds market .
3) Quant i t y  unc e r t a i n t y  and r i s k  aver s i on  w i l l  tend to 
i n c r e a s e  t he s c a l e  o f  o p e r a t i o n  o f  t he i n t e r m e d i a r y  t o a 
l e v e l  about  the p r o f i t  maximizi ng or  r i s k  neu t r a l  l e v e l .  In 
the case of  l oan u n c e r t a i n t y ,  the growth in s i ze takes pl ace 
t h r o ugh  t he purchase of  Feder a l  f unds .  On the o t h e r  hand,  
d e p o s i t  u n c e r t a i n t y  i m p l i e s  t h a t  t he i n c r e a s e  i n s i z e  i s  
funded by depos i t s .
4) The e f f e c t s  of  qua n t i t y  v a r i a b i l i t y  on the l i q u i d i t y  
of  the i n t e r med i a r y ' s  asset  p o r t f o l i o  are asymmet r i cal .  An 
i ncrease in the v a r i a b i l i t y  of  l oan demand w i l l  reduce the 
l i q u i d i t y  of  the asset  p o r t f o l i o .  In c on t r a s t ,  an i ncrease 
i n d e p o s i t  v a r i a b i l i t y  enhances t he l i q u i d i t y  o f  t he 
i n t e r me d i a r y ' s  asset  p o r t f o l i o .
5) C o m p a r a t i v e  s t a t i c s  r e s u l t s  i m p l y  a p o s i t i v e  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  between d e p o s i t  v a r i a b i l i t y  and the s i ze  or  
s c a l e  o f  o p e r a t i o n  o f  t he i n t e r m e d i a r y .  For  a p a r t i a l  
r ev i ew of  the l i t e r a t u r e  on t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  r e l a t i o n s h i p  see 
Kaufman.5 Fur thermore,  the r e s u l t s  presented here i nd i c a t e  
t h a t  d e p o s i t  v a r i a b i l i t y  and t he  l i q u i d i t y  o f  t he 
i n t e r med i a r y ' s  asset  p o r t f o l i o  are p o s i t i v e l y  r e l a t e d ,  thus
George G. Kaufman,  " D e p o s i t  V a r i a b i l i t y  and Bank
Si ze, "  Journal  of  F i n a n c i al  and Quan t i  t a t i v  e Ana 1 y s i s , 7 :
2087-96,  December, 1972.
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suppor t i ng  the conc l us i ons  of  Hester^ and Kane and M a l k i e l . ^
6 ) The r e s u l t s  f r om t h e  model  i m p l y  t h a t  t he  
i n t e r m e d i a r y ' s  l o a n  r a t e  i s  i n d e p e n d e n t  o f  d e p o s i t  
v a r i a b i l i t y .  E s s e n t i a l l y ,  the i n t e r med i a r y  n e u t r a l i z e s  the 
e f f e c t s  o f  d e p o s i t  v a r i a b i l i t y  on the l oan  r a t e  by the use 
o f  t he Feder a l  f unds  mar ke t .  As d e p o s i t  v a r i a b i l i t y  
i nc reases ,  the i n t e r med i a r y  i ncreases i t s  l end i ng  of  Federal  
funds .
7) Compa r a t i v e  s t a t i c s  r e s u l t s  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  d e p o s i t  
v a r i a b i l i t y  r e l a t e s  i n v e r s e l y  t o  t he  i n t e r m e d i a r y ' s  
p r o f i  tab i l i t y .
8 ) B e h a v i o r  o f  t he spread i n  r esponse  t o changes i n  
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  costs coul d d i f f e r  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  f o r  the DARA 
i n t e r med i a r y .  The e f f e c t s  of  q u a n t i t y  u n c e r t a i n t y  i n e i t h e r  
l oans or  depos i t s  are c o ns i s t e n t  and mu t u a l l y  r e i n f o r c e  the 
behav i or  of  the spread.  The degree of  r i s k  aver s i on  appears 
to be an i mpor t an t  f a c t o r  in det er mi n i ng spread management 
behav i or .
9) The d i s s e r t a t i o n  showed t h a t  when l oan  and d e p o s i t  
l e v e l s  are c o r r e l a t e d  n e g a t i v e l y ,  an i n c r e a s e  i n  t he 
c o r r e l a t i o n  c o e f f i c i e n t  between y and e may a c t u a l l y  l essen
^ Dona l d  D. He s t e r ,  "An E m p i r i c a l  Ex a mi na t i on  o f  a 
Commercial  Bank Loan Of f e r  Func t i on , "  Yale Economic Essays, 
2 : 3- 57,  Spr i ng,  1962.
^Edward E. Kane and Burton G. M a l k i e l ,  "Bank P o r t f o l i o  
A l l o c a t i o n ,  De p o s i t  V a r i a b i l i t y  and t he A v a i l a b i l i t y
D o c t r i n e , "  Qy.a.11 l i £ i y _^ o ü J UHl  o f  Eco n o mi c s , 7 9:1 1 3- 34 ,
February,  1965.
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t h e  a t t r a c t i v e n e s s  o f  t h e  p r o c e s s  o f  f i n a n c i a l  
i n t e r m e d i a t i o n .  Th i s  was shown f o r  t he case when the 
i n t e r m e d i a r y ' s  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  e x h i b i t s  p r o p e r t i e s  
c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  CARA. Theref or e ,  Pyl e' s® conc l us i ons  cannot  
be e x t e n d e d  t o  r a t e - s e t t i n g  d e p o s i t o r y  f i n a n c i a l  
i n t e r m e d i a r i e s .  However ,  i f  l oan  and d e p o s i t  l e v e l s  
c o r r e l a t e  p o s i t i v e l y ,  an i ncrease in the c o r r e l a t i o n  between 
y and c c o u l d  l ead  to an i n c r e a s e  i n  the i n t e r m e d i a r y ' s  
spread.  This t rend would enhance the process of  f i n a n c i a l  
i ntermedi  at  ion .
Th i s  d i s s e r t a t i o n  has p r o v i d e d  a w o r k a b l e  model  of  a 
d e p o s i t o r y  f i n a n c i a l  i n t e r m e d i a r y  under  u n c e r t a i n t y .  The 
model  y i e l d s  a number o f  i n t u i t i v e l y  a p p e a l i n g  r e s u l t s  
( t h e o r e t i c a l ) ,  and has some s i g n i f i c a n t  i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  
sever a l  aspects of  the pub l i shed  l i t e r a t u r e  on the theory of  
depos i t o r y  f i n a n c i a l  i n t e r med i a r i es .  A number of  extens i ons 
c o u l d  p r ove  u s e f u l  i n  any e m p i r i c a l  a t t e mp t s  to t e s t  the 
mode l ' s  i m p l i c a t i o n s .  The i n c l u s i o n  o f  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  
f a c t o r s ,  such as r eser ve  requi rements and depos i t  i nsurance 
would be one o f  these poss i b l e  ex t ens i ons .
®Pyle,  1oc.  ci  t .
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Books
Ar row,  K.J.  Essays i n  t he Theory o f  Ri sk Bear i ng. Chicago:  
Markham, 1971.
C h i a n g ,  A l p h a  C.  M e t h o ds o f  Ma t h e m a t i c a l
Economics. New York:  McGraw-Hi l l  Book Co. ,  1974.
Gup, Benton E. F i nanc i a l  I n t e r med i a r i es .  Boston:  Hough ton
M i f f l i n  Co. ,  1980.
Hardy,  G.H. ,  J .E.  L i t t l e wo o d ,  and G. Pol ya.  I nequa l i  t i e s . 
London: Cambridge Un i v e r s i t y  Press,  1934.
Hey, John D. Economics i n D i s e q u i l i b r i u m . New York:  New
York Un i v e r s i t y  Press,  1981.
 . Uncer t a i n t y  i n Mi croeconomi cs. New York:  New York
Un i v e r s i t y  Press,  1979.
Markham, J.W. and G.F. Papanek, eds.  I n d u s t r i a l  Or gani za t i on 
and Economic Devel opment .  Bos t on:  Houghton M i f f l i n
Co. ,  1970.
Mason,  John M. Fi n a n c i a l Management  o f  Commer c i a l Banks.
Boston:  Warren,  Gorham, and Lamont,  1979.
Pe r i o d i c a l s
Ba l t ensper ger ,  Ernst .  " A l t e r n a t i v e  Approaches to the Theory 
of  the Banking F i r m. "  Journal  of  Monetary Economics,
Chat eau,  J. P. "On DFI ' s  L i a b i l i t y  Management . "  J ou r n al  of  
Banking and Fi nance, 6: 533-47.  December, 1982”.
Deshmukh,  Sudhakar  D., S t u a r t  I .  Greenbaum,  and George 
Kanatas.  " I n t e r e s t  Rate U n c e r t a i n t y  and t he F i n a n c i a l  
I n t e r med i ar y ' s  Choice of  Exposure. "  Journal  of  Finance,  
38: 141-55.  March,  1985.
D i l l ,  A r n o l d .  " L i a b i l i t y  Management  Bank i ng . "  Mont h l y
Rev i e w - - F ede r a l Re s e r ve Bank o f  A11a n t a, 56: 218- 24.
December, T981.
F r i e n d ,  I r w i n  and Mar sha l  E. Blume.  "The Demand f o r  Ri sky  
Assets, "  American Economic Review,  65:900-22.  December, 
1975.
143
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
144
Har t ,  O l i v e r  D. and Dwight  M. Jaf f ee.  "On the A p p l i c a t i o n  
o f  P o r t f o l i o  T h e o r y  t o  D e p o s i t o r y  F i n a n c i a l  
I n s t i t u t i o n s . "  Review o f  Economic St ud i es ,  41:129-47.  
January,  1974.
Heggestad,  A. J. "Market  S t r uc t u r e ,  Ri sk,  and P r o f i t a b i l i t y  
i n Commercial  Banking. "  Journal  of  Fi nance,  32:1207-15.  
September,  1977.
Hester ,  Donald D. "An Empi r i ca l  Examinat i on of  a Commercial
Bank Loan Of f e r  F u n c t i o n , "  Yal e  Economic Es s ay s , 2 : 3 -
57. Spr i ng,  1962.
H i l d r e t h ,  C. G. " P o i n t  Es t i ma t es  o f  Or d i n a t e s  of  Concave 
Funct i ons. "  Journal  of  the Amer i can S t a t i s t i c a l Asso­
c i a t i o n , 49:598-619.  March,  1954.
Kane, Edward E. and Bur t on G. M a l k i e l .  "Bank P o r t f o l i o  
A l l o c a t i o n ,  Deposi t  V a r i a b i l i t y  and the A v a i l a b i l i t y
Doc t r i ne , "  Qua r t e r l y  J o u r n a l o f  Economi cs, 79: 113- 74.
February,  1965.
Kaufman,  George G. " D e p o s i t  V a r i a b i l i t y  and Bank S i z e , "  
Journal  of  F i nanc i a l  and Q u a n t i t a t i v e  A n a l y s i s , 7:2087- 
December, 1972.
K l e i n ,  Mi chae l  A. "A Theory of  t he Bank i ng F i r m. "  J o u r n a 1 
of  Money, Cr ed i t ,  and Banki ng, 3:205-18.  May, 1971.
"The Economics o f  S e c u r i t y  D i v i s i b i l i t y  and
F i nanc i a l  I n t e r med i a t i on . "  Journal  of  Fi nance, 28:923- 
32. September,  1973.
Koppenhaver,  G. D. "Bank Funding Ri sks,  Risk Avers i on,  and 
the Choice o f  Fu t u r es  Hedgi ng I n s t r u m e n t . "  J ou r na l  of  
F i nance, 40:241-55.  March,  1985.
Le l a nd ,  Haynes E. "Theory  o f  t he Fi rm Fac i ng  Un c e r t a i n  
Demand." Amer i can Economic Rev i ew,  62:278-91.  June, 
1972.
L i n t n e r ,  John.  "The V a l u a t i o n  o f  Ri sky  Asset s  and the 
Se l ec t i on  of  Risky I nvestments i n Stock P o r t f o l i o s  and 
C a p i t a l  Budget s . "  Review of  Economics and S t a t i s t i c s ,  
47:13-37.  February ,^"9 331
Ma r k o w i t z ,  Har r y  M. " P o r t f o l i o  S e l e c t i o n . "  J ou r na l  of  
F i nance, 77:77-91.  March,  1952.
Mason,  John M. " Mo d e l i n g  Mut ua l  Funds and Commerci al  
Banks. "  J ou r na l  o f  Bank i ng and F i n a n c e ,  3 : 3 4 7 - 5 3 .  
December, "1979:
M i l l s ,  Edwin S. " U n c e r t a i n t y  and Pr i c e  Theor y . "  Quar t e r l y  
Journal  of  Economics,  73:116-29.  February,  1959.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
145
O'Hara,  Maureen.  "A Dynamic Theory  o f  t he Bank i ng F i rm. "  
Journal  of  Fi nance, 38:127-40.  March,  1983.
P a r k i n ,  M. " D i s c o u n t  House P o r t f o l i o  and Debt  S e l e c t i o n . "  
Review of  Economic S t ud i es , 37:469-97.  October ,  1970.
Pesek, Bor i s  P. "Bank's Suppl y Funct i on and the Eq u i l i b r i u m 
Quant i t y  of  Money." The Canadian J ou r na l  o f  Economi cs,  
3:357-85.  August ,  1970.
Poole,  Wi l l i a m.  "Commercial  Bank Reserve Management i n an 
U n c e r t a i n  Wor l d :  I m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  Monet a r y  P o l i c y . "  
Journal  of  F i nance, 23:769-91.  December, 1968.
P r a t t ,  J. W. "Ri sk Avers i on in the Smal l  and in the Large, "  
Econometr i  ca , 32:122-36.  January,  1974.
P r i n g l e ,  John J. "A Theory o f  t he Bank i ng F i rm:  Comment." 
Journal  of  Money, Cr ed i t  and Banki ng, 5:990-96.  
November,  1973.
"The I mper f ec t - Mar ke t s  Model  of  Commercial  Bank
F i nanc i a l  Management." Journal  of  F i nanc i a l  and Quan­
t i t a t i v e  A n a l y s i s , 9 : 69-87.  January,  1974.
_________ . "The C a p i t a l  De c i s i o n  i n  Commerci al  Banks. "
Journal  of  Fi nance, 29:779-95.  June 1974.
Pyle,  David H. "On the Theory of  F i nanc i a l  I n t e r med i a t i on . "  
Journal  of  Fi nance, 29:734-47.  June, 1971.
" De s c r i p t i v e  Theor i es o f  F i nanc i a l  I n s t i t u t i o n s
Under  U n c e r t a i n t y . "  Journal  of  F i nanc i a l  and Quan t i t a ­
t i v e A n a l y s i s , 7:2009-29.  December, 1972.
R a t t i ,  Ronald A. "Bank A t t i t u d e  Toward Risk,  I m p l i c i t  Rates 
o f  I n t e r e s t ,  and t he B e h a v i o r  o f  an I ndex  o f  Ri sk 
A v e r s i o n  f o r  Commerci al  Banks." The Qu a r t e r l y  Journal 
of  Economics, 95:309-31.  SeptembeT^ 1980.
R o t h s c h i l d ,  M. and J. E. S t i g l i t z .  " I n c r e a s i n g  Ri sk I :  A 
D e f i n i t i o n . "  J o u r n a l  o f  Economic T h e o r y ,  2 : 2 2 5 - 4 3 .  
September,  1970.
Sandmo, Agnar.  "On the Theory of  the Compet i t i ve  Fi rm Under 
U n c e r t a i n t y . "  Ame r i c a n  Economi c  R e v i e w ,  6 1 : 6 5 - 7 3 .  
March,  1971. ----------------------------------------------------
Saving,  Thomas. "A Theory of  Money Supply w i t h  Compet i t i ve  
Bank i ng . "  J ou r na l  o f  Monet ar y  Economi cs,  3 : 289- 303.  
J u l y ,  1977.
Sea l ey ,  C. W., J r .  and J. T. L i n d l e y .  " Ou t p u t s ,  I n p u t s ,  
and a Theory o f  P r o d u c t i o n  and Cost  a t  De p o s i t o r y  
F i nanc i a l  I n s t i t u t i o n s . "  Journal  o f  Fi nance,  35:1139- 
54. December, 1980.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
146
_________ . " V a l u a t i o n ,  C a p i t a l  S t r u c t u r e ,  and Sh a r e h o l d e r
Un a n i m i t y  f o r  D e p o s i t o r y  F i n a n c i a l  I n t e r m e d i a r i e s . "  
Journal  o f  F i nance, 38:857-71.  June, 1983.
SI o v i n ,  Myron B. , and Mar i e Sushka. "A Model  of  the Commer­
c i a l  Loan R a t e , "  r  J £ f  _F i_££ n c e , 3 8 : 1 5 8 3 - 9 6 .
December,  1983.
Thakor ,  An j an  V. "Toward a Theory o f  Bank Loan Commi t ­
ments, "  Journal  o f  Banking and Fi nance, 6:55-83.  1982.
Tob i n ,  James.  " L i q u i d i t y  P r e f e r e n c e  as B e h a v i o r  Towards 
Ri sk. "  The Review of  Economic S t u d i e s , 26:65-86.  
February,  1958.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
V I T A
E m i l i o  Ramon Z a r r u k  was bo r n  J a n u a r y  5, 1950 i n
Managua,  N i c a r a g u a  t o  E m i l i o  C. Z a r r u k  and E s p e r a n z a  
S a l a v e r r y  de Zar r uk .  F o l l o w i n g  g r a d u a t i o n  f rom I n s t i t u t o
Pedagogico de Managua, he came to the Uni t ed States where he
e n r o l l e d  at  Loui s i ana State U n i v e r s i t y  in the Summer of  1969 
and graduated wi t h  a B.S. degree in Chemical  Engi neer i ng in 
August ,  1973.
He was a c c e p t e d  t o  t h e  M a s t e r  o f  B u s i n e s s
Ad mi n i s t r a t i o n  program in the F a l l  o f  1973 and r ece i ved  an
M.B.A. degree f rom Loui s i ana State U n i v e r s i t y  i n the Summer 
of  1975.
Dur i ng  t he F a l l  o f  1977,  he e n r o l l e d  i n t he d o c t o r a l  
program i n F i nance a t  L o u i s i a n a  S t a t e  U n i v e r s i t y .  He was 
employed by the U n i v e r s i t y  of  M i s s i s s i p p i  f rom the F a l l  of  
1981 through the Spr i ng of  1984, where he hel d the p o s i t i o n  
of  As s i s t a n t  Prof essor  of  Finance.
Mr. Zar ruk w i l l  r ece i v e  a Ph.D. degree in Finance from 
Loui s i ana St at e Un i v e r s i t y  i n the Summer of  1985.
A f t e r  gr aduat i on ,  Mr. Zar ruk w i l l  assume a p o s i t i o n  as 
A s s i s t a n t  P r o f e s s o r  o f  F i nance a t  S o u t h e a s t e r n  L o u i s i a n a  
Un i v e r s i t y  i n Hammond, Lou i s i ana.
147
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
DOCTORAL EXAMINATION AND DISSERTATION REPORT
Candidate: E m ilio  Zarruk
Major Field: Finance
Title of Dissertation: Loan and D eposit Rate S e tt in g , R isk  A vers io n ,
U n c e rta in ty , and the  Theory o f D eposito ry  F in a n c ia l In te rm e d ia rie s
Approved:
Date of Examination:
May 2 , 1985
Major Professor and Ciiairman
>ean of the Graduate" School
EXA M IN IN G  COM MITTEE:
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
